Introduction

This chapter offers a discussion of ambivalence and sentiment in moral choices specifically pertaining to non-human animal justice and veganism. Ambivalence is understood sociologically in two key ways in this chapter: first, it captures the emotional experience of being pulled in opposing directions by contrarian circumstances (Merton, 1976), and second, it is the recognition that modernity itself functions through a range of contradictions that individuals must navigate, balance and selectively ignore, in order to participate in society (Bauman, 1991). By bringing together an understanding of ambivalence as a potentially positive way of navigating complex moral issues (Kołakowski, 1968; McKenzie, 2018) with a sentiment-based theory of moral judgements (Greenspan, 1995; Prinz, 2006; McKenzie, 2019), this chapter will unpack the roles of emotion and rationality in moral decision making. In this context, sentiment refers to feelings that contain an element of personal reflection, and philosophers from Hume to Smith have employed the concept to consider the role of feeling in moral decision making. The area of animal justice serves as a useful place for this kind of analysis given that (a) intensely emotional responses to animal cruelty are common and relatable, and (b) ambivalence is a common response to the problem of animal cruelty for both vegans and non-vegans. This speaks to both forms of sociological ambivalence we have just described, as the norms that frame human interactions with animals are loaded with contradictions and inconsistencies.