This chapter highlights the causal primacy of systemic variables for the use of no-fly zones in US foreign policy, and thus rebalances the relationship between international environments and ideational competition. In the preceding chapters, I have provided an answer to the question: When and why are no-fly zones used? No-fly zones play a crucial role in overcoming pervasive ideational competition in the US foreign policy executive. Absent agreement or presidential leadership, the no-fly zone functions as a quick fix – adhesive tape on deep ideational divides. I argued that by taking on this role, the no-fly zone functions symbolically in foreign policy deliberations, disconnected from its actual strategic properties or utility and indeed from any detailed political or military planning. This ‘idealization’ process is most visible over time and across the cases discussed in previous chapters. In Iraq, the no-fly zone emerged out of the hesitancy to commit large-scale support to Kurdish refugees and Shia rebels. In Bosnia, the no-fly zone symbolized how the US could easily signal commitment yet avoid any actual responsibility and the risks of involvement. Diverging viewpoints and arguments are frequent in the US foreign policy executive, however. If the no-fly zone takes on the role of a faux compromise in the foreign policy executive, why do we not see even more no-fly zones?

First, use of the no-fly zone is connected to military-technological improvements that make aerial intervention seemingly risk-free for the US.