1 Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), 21

2 Julia Driver, ‘The Virtues of Ignorance’ Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989) 373-84

3 Note, however, that it is precisely the connection between virtue and epistemic defect that Driver seeks to establish, for her interest in modesty is to present it as an example of the fact that the virtues need not fulfill the traditional Aristotelian requirement that virtuous action be performed with an awareness of why the action is virtuous. Driver presents other virtues to make her point (e.g. blind charity, impulsive courage and special forms of forgiveness and trust), but modesty is her flagship example of a virtue that does not require agents to knowingly exhibit the practical wisdom necessary to exhibit modesty according to an Aristotelian understanding of the virtues.

4 See Owen Flanagan, ‘Virtue and Ignorance’ Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990) 420-8. A similar description of humility can be found in Norvin Richards, ‘Is Humility a Virtue?’ American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1998) 253-9.

5 See A.T. Nuyen, ‘Just Modesty’ American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1998) 101-9, and Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, ‘The Virtue of Modesty’ American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993) 235-46.

6 See G.F. Schueler, ‘Why IS Modesty a Virtue?’ Ethics 109 (1999) 835-41.

7 Michael Ridge, ‘Modesty as a Virtue’ American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2000) 269-83

8 See ‘modesty, n3a.’ OED online, September 2002, Oxford University Press, 29 November 2005, <>.

9 Flanagan, ‘Virtue and Ignorance’

10 See ‘Just Modesty’ and ‘The Virtue of Modesty’ respectively.

11 ‘Why Modesty is a Virtue,’ Ethics 107 (1997) 467-85. Schuler uses the term ‘presentation account’ of modesty to refer to a strictly behavioural definition of the virtue that sets no further conditions on the reasons motivating the modest agent to behave in the specified way. This view obviously invites problems with false modesty. See 475-7. Schuler's own view is not easily classified; see fn. 25 below.

12 See Daniel Statman, ‘Modesty, Pride and Realistic Self-Assessment,’ Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1992) 420-38, and Ridge, ‘Modesty as a Virtue.’

13 Both Schuler (1999, 827) and Ridge (271) pick up on this point. Schuler presents the hypothetical case of Albert: the third best physicist in the world who incorrectly believes he is the fifth best physicist in the world and brags about this underestimated status to his peers. Similarly, Ridge entertains the idea that Einstein might have been boastful even if he underestimated his momentous accomplishments. In neither case is it intuitive to think the agent is modest. Driver does not address these types of examples in Uneasy Virtue. However, in a prior exchange with Schuler she claims that Albert is a modest agent, though he is an anomalous case where the virtue is not ‘functioning normally’ (‘Modesty and Ignorance’ Ethics 109 (1999) 827-34, at 829). This is not an entirely satisfying response considering how easy it is to imagine boastful agents who persistently underestimate their self-worth.

14 Flanagan, 427. The evidence in question is discussed in more detail in his subsequent book, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1991).

15 Ben-Ze'ev, 235-7. Note that Daniel Statman defends a definition of modesty that is closely related to the definition provided by Ben-Ze'ev, but because Statman explicitly recognizes the importance of how agents present themselves to others I classify his position as a presentation definition of modesty.

16 Furthermore, Glen's immodesty is presented with rhetorical flourish to make a point, but we can imagine other, less flamboyant, types of immodest egalitarian agents. For example, Gladys might conclude her victorious chess matches with the following attempt to console her opponents: ‘Please don't feel bad about losing the match so quickly. Remember that you are a human being just like everyone else, and losing at chess won't change that. Besides, I am an extremely good player — you really shouldn't expect to be able to beat someone who is as skilled at playing the game as I am. I mean, I'm so good that I could probably capture…’ Gladys might feel genuine sympathy for her opponents in a way that Glen does not, but if her benevolent attempts to console her opponents include long, forthright descriptions of her talents, then she is similarly not a modest person. This is noteworthy because it would seem especially ad hoc to claim that an agent like Gladys cannot endorse the type of egalitarian attitude that Ben-Ze’ev has in mind.

17 Note that one can also generate examples of agents who reject egalitarianism because they believe the group to which they belong is inferior compared to other groups. Michael Ridge provides an example of this kind: a person who believes that some human beings are fundamentally more valuable than others (e.g. a person who accepts some type of caste system), yet one who believes she belongs to the group of persons who are comparatively the least valuable (270). As Ridge points out, this person could surely be modest despite the fact that she does not endorse an egalitarian evaluative attitude.

18 Driver does allow that false modesty could count as an aesthetic virtue because such behaviour is thought of as polite (Uneasy Virtue, 25), but she sharply distinguishes it from the moral virtue of true modesty.

19 Uneasy Virtue, 19

20 Note that I will often speak only of accomplishments for the sake of brevity. Unless otherwise stated, I intend the same points to be made for natural talents and other factors that contribute to self-worth.

21 Moreover, this list does not take into account the added benefit of using humour to deflect attention from one's accomplishments. Modest agents often employ humour to gracefully avoid discussing the greatness of their accomplishments. (E.g. ‘Yes, but then running that fast isn't hard when you think everyone else in the race is chasing you.’) In this respect, the social efficacy of modesty is amplified if an agent possesses a disarming sense of humour.

22 Statman, 434

23 Ridge, 281

24 See Ridge, 273. Here he is explicit about seeking a motivational profile that will distinguish modesty from false modesty. This search initially leads him to the stark proposal that modest agents not care at all whether others are impressed with her for her accomplishments, but Ridge quickly, and wisely, switches to the more moderate view that modest agents not care too much about whether they are esteemed by others for their accomplishments.

25 Note that this is Schuler's more recent definition of modesty, from ‘Why IS Modesty a Virtue?’ In this updated definition of modesty, Schuler moves to the more rigid claim that modest agents must not care at all about the impressions of others, whereas his earlier definition in ‘Why Modesty is a Virtue’ generally states that a modest agent must not care about these impressions. Schuler updates his definition in this way to avoid the counterexample of a person who does not care about the impressions of others after taking into account independent factors like not respecting one's peers.

26 Ridge also distinguishes his account of modesty from Schuler's earlier view by rejecting what he calls the ‘no-desert thesis,’ which is the claim that nobody really deserves credit for their accomplishments or their abilities. Schuler originally argued that modesty's value is justified by the fact that the desire to be given credit for one's accomplishments is illegitimate considering the genetic and cultural circumstances for which we are not responsible. He has since recanted this claim in ‘Why IS Modesty a Virtue?’

27 See Ridge, 275-6.

28 Ridge, 276-7

29 In fact, Thomas Hurka presents a definition of modesty that conforms to the general thesis that modesty is a matter of keeping one's accomplishments in perspective. Hurka claims that modesty ‘involves not taking much more pleasure in one's own achievements and virtues than in the similar merits of others’ (Virtues and Vices [Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001], 110). His interest in modesty is to highlight the fact that it is a virtue of proportion and to show that virtues of this kind support his unique, recursive account of goodness and virtue. However, within the terms of Hurka's recursive framework, modesty can be viewed as having a general structure that consists in keeping one's accomplishments in perspective by appropriately balancing their significance against the significance of similar accomplishments achieved by others. My own view is that Hurka has, like Statman and Ben-Ze'ev, not specified the correct basis of comparison for modesty. Nevertheless, he has accurately identified the fact that modesty is a virtue that is constituted by placing an appropriate amount of significance on one's own accomplishments compared to other goods or principles.

30 Although this is a departure from Driver's view, there are two reasons why she could adopt my definition of modesty without compromising her philosophical interests in the virtue. First, my definition of modesty reflects the fact that the social consequences of the virtue are responsible for its moral value. My definition is, in this respect, nicely suited to Driver's consequentialist account of the virtues. (Note, however, that my definition of modesty is not limited to a consequentialist perspective. One can adopt my definition as long as one's preferred ethical theory recognizes that the social consequences of modesty are vital to its moral value, and this condition is consistent with several non-consequentialist theories, e.g. a Kantian deontology in which modesty is an imperfect duty one owes to others because it promotes social harmony and thereby fosters conditions that are conducive to other rational agents being able to realize their autonomy. C.f. The Doctrine of Virtue, part II, chapter I, section II, where Kant asserts that ‘willing restriction of one's self-love in view of the self-love of others, is called modesty’ (The Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor, ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996], 209). Second, my definition of modesty is sufficient for Driver to strike the blow she desires against the Aristotelian claim that virtuous action must be performed with an awareness of why the action is virtuous. As Driver notes, as long as it is possible for an agent to be unknowingly modest, then Driver has the counterexample she needs for her argument to succeed (Uneasy Virtue, 17, 24 and 41). This is possible, according to my definition of modesty, because all three of the conditions in the definition can be met without the agent in question being aware that she is motivated in the relevant ways for her to be modest. This would be an unusual case, since most modest agents could, if asked, identify the motivations responsible for their dispositions to de-emphasize her accomplishments even if the agents had not previously been aware of these motivations. Yet continuous ignorance of one's own motivations is not inconceivable. Hence, my definition of modesty recognizes the possibility that an agent can be modest while being either temporarily or continuously unaware of her own modesty, and this makes it possible for Driver to adopt my definition of modesty without undermining her thesis that virtue need not require the awareness of Aristotelian practical wisdom.

31 Ridge, of course, may not see my proposal as a friendly amendment. Despite the similarity between our definitions, there is a difference in the way that each view deals with the problem of false modesty. As we have seen, Ridge's definition of modesty is specifically designed to exclude examples of what he considers to be paradigmatic examples of false modesty: cases of agents who are motivated to act ‘modestly’ because they want others to think of them as modest and thereby be even further impressed. By seeking to rule out all examples of this kind, Ridge sets up his definition of modesty so that any case where an agent behaves in a seemingly modest way but cares ‘too much’ about the esteem of others is a case of false modesty. By contrast, one can be modest, according to my definition of modesty, while acting to impress others as long as this is not the sole motivation for one's m odest behaviour. Thus, the key difference between Ridge's position and my own is that I do not automatically rule out cases where agents self-consciously attempt to appear modest to receive esteem from their peers. In most cases, a modest agent will not seek to appear modest to others. (In fact, it is interesting to note that exemplary instances of modesty will go unnoticed, since they involve de-emphasizing one's accomplishments without inviting further admiration that would, in turn, also need to be de-emphasized. False modesty, by comparison, normally requires that others notice one's attempts to de-emphasize one's accomplishments.) However, as long as seeking to appear modest is not the only motivation responsible for an agent's disposition to de-emphasize her accomplishments, then it is, I believe, still possible for her to be genuinely modest. As I understand it, false modesty necessarily involves deception in the form of hidden, usually selfish, motivations that fill in for the proper motivations of a modest agent. The corrupt element of Ridge's paradigmatic cases of false modesty is not, in itself, the fact that agents behave ‘modestly’ to receive praise from their peers. What is corrupt about these cases is the insincerity on the part of agents who behave in ways that seem modest for no other reason than to gain further respect from others. It may be true that all cases of false modesty are cases in which agents are interested in eliciting praise from others, but it is the deceptive nature of their lack of any other reasons for their behaviour that is responsible for these agents being falsely modest.

32 There is one important complication for this connection between modesty and humility. This is the fact that a modest agent can, on my view, privately hold an overstated conception of herself but publicly deflect attention from her accomplishments, whereas there is no parallel possibility for humility. This is a curious result, but it is explained by the fact that the relevant social environment for humility includes one's private thoughts since these thoughts cannot be shielded from the mind of God.

33 This asymmetry is depicted with unsettling acuity by Hume in Book III of the Treatise. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 364-6.) Hume claims that the asymmetry is explained by the importance of guaranteed paternity for the socialization of children and thus for the general public good. For a description of how asymmetric sexual modesty and chastity are, for better or worse, entirely representative of Hume's account of artificial virtues, see Ann Levey, ‘Under Constraint: Chastity and Modesty in Hume’ Hume Studies 23 (1997) 213-26.

34 I take it that recognition of this type of injustice is one of the motivations for proposals to sort classrooms according to gender in primary and secondary level education. Studies seem to indicate that girls learn more effectively in all-girl classrooms, and these results can be explained, in part, by the hypothesis that girls are more comfortable participating in an all-girl environment because this environment decreases the’normal’ expectations in mixed classrooms for girls to avoid drawing attention to their talents

35 This tricky relation between virtue and social justice is not limited to modesty. For example, courage is a virtue that might be said to exacerbate the injustice of class structure in modern societies, since the options available to low-income persons are limited in ways that create a situation where the possession of courage leads to disproportionately higher risks for those who find it necessary to serve in the armed forces in order to finance their education or simply to find employment.

36 Another exception was suggested to me by an anonymous referee: suppose Bob believes that if others do not esteem him enough he will become depressed and consequently fail to complete his life work of, say, curing cancer. Bob does not care about esteem for its own sake; he instead cares about esteem merely as a necessary condition for his own happiness, which he cares about only as a means of promoting the welfare of others. This is an especially curious case where it would be better for Bob to stop being modest (if his character is flexible enough to allow him to do so). As I shall argue, however, it is a sufficiently unusual case to not lead us to rethink whether we ought to promote modesty as a generally praiseworthy trait for humans to possess in light of its normally reliable ability to promote harmonious social interaction.

37 Note that by referring to a traditional Aristotelian conception of the virtues I do not mean to imply that it includes the virtue of modesty. Quite the reverse: Aristotle's account of the virtues of character contains no mention whatsoever of modesty. One might even think that Aristotle's description of magnanimity implies that a contemporary interpretation of his work endorses nothing beyond the virtue of not overestimating or underestimating one's self worth. (Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Terence Irwin [Indianapolis: Hackett 1985], 97-105). Yet there are sections within this account of magnanimity that suggest a more complex relationship between Aristotle's original views and our modern opinions regarding the social dimensions of modesty. For example: ‘When [the magnanimous person] meets people with good fortune or a reputation for worth, he displays his greatness, since superiority over them is difficult and impressive, and there is nothing ignoble in trying to be impressive with them. But when he meets ordinary people he is moderate, since superiority over them is easy, and an attempt to be impressive among inferiors is as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak’ (102).

38 Moreover, if one prefers the option of constructing an infallible definition of modesty, then one can alter my definition so that condition one states: ‘She will, in the appropriate circumstances, de-emphasize the magnitude and importance of her natural talents, accomplishments and other traits that are thought to merit esteem from one's peers.’

39 I would like to thank Jason Brennan, Samantha Brennan, Eva Buccioni, Steven Burns, Todd Calder, Julia Driver, David Elliott, Vicki Igneski, Corey MacIver, G.F. Schuler, Eldon Soifer, Mariam Thalos and James Young for their help with earlier drafts of this paper.