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Ignorance of the law is no excuse?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Paul Matthews
Paul Matthews*
Affiliation:
University College, London
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Extract

‘Ignorance is not innocence, but sin.’

– Browning, The Inn Album

The maxim ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse” has much to answer for. Defendants arguing that they did not know or misunderstood the law have been told that their ignorance or mistake made no difference to their liability. The institutional writers have laid down as much. The courts have repeatedly emphasised it.

However, it is here submitted that this blanket approach, characterised by the very existence of such a general maxim, is misconceived. No such general principle exists, nor should it. Although the judges have spoken in general terms, their remarks really depend on the context of the particular offences in question, where no knowledge of the law has been necessary, and liability has been (in this respect at least) ‘strict’.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , July 1983 , pp. 174 - 192
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1983

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References

1. There is a large literature, amongst which the writer owes debts to the following: Keedy (1908) 22 Haw LR 75; Ryu and Silving (1957) 24 Univ of Chic LR 421; Hall (1957) 33 Ind LJ 1; Brett (1966) 5 Melb ULR 179; Marston (1967–8) 8 UWALR 459; Ashworth [1974] Grim LR 652; O'Connor (1976) 39 MLR 644; Turpin [1978] CLJ 8; Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (1978) Ch. 18; Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (4th edn, 1978) at pp. 64–69.

2. Various forms (usually Latin) exist. See Keedy op. cit. p 76 note 1, and O'Connor op. cit. p. 645 note 7.

3. Dialogue II, c 46, f 123b (published 1530). Now reprinted in Selden Society vol 91 (1974) at 279.

4. I Hale PC 42.

5. (1568) 1 Plow 340 at 342, 75 ER 516 at 520.

6. 4 BI Comm 27, referring to Digest 22.6.9.

7. Die Normen und ihre übertretung, 1872, vol 3 Google Scholar, para 53, and vol 1, ch 2. See also Ryu and Silving, op. cit. p. 425–427.

8. Art 33, at 19.

9. See e.g. Morgan [1976] AC 182, and O'Connor op. cit. pp. 653–662.

10. Op. cit., p. 421.

11. Winfield (1943) 59 LQR 327; Wilson (1963) 26 MLR 609; Mureinik (1982) 98 LQR 587.

12. See e.g. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature III. 1.1Google Scholar; Kelsen, What is Justice (1971) pp. 141, 269Google Scholar. Cf Milton (1982) 2 LS 14.

13. See e.g. Mackie, Ethics — Inventing Right and Wrong (1977)Google Scholar.

14. Modern examples are: Rawls, A Theory of justice (1972)Google Scholar; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977)Google ScholarPubMed; Finnis, , Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980)Google Scholar.

15. See e.g. Hart, Thc Conccpt of Law (1961)Google Scholar; MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Thcory (1978)Google Scholar.

16. See e.g. Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence (4th edn, 1979)Google Scholar.

17. Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 at 483; Angus v Clifford [1891] 2 Ch 449 at 470.

18. Western Commercial Bank v Kitson (1884) 13 QBD 360 at 363; London Tramways v LCC [1898] AC 375 at 380–381; Ianella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84 at 97, 114; see Marston op. cit. pp. 472–474.

19. See Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 30; Thomas v R (1937) 59 CLR 279; Gould [1968] 2 QB 65.

20. See generally Cross Evidence (5th edn 1979) Ch. III; Glanville Williams ‘Law and Fact’ [1976] Crim LR 472, 532.

21. See e.g. Metropolitan Railway Co v Wright (1886) 11 App Cas 152.

22. E.g. Feely [1973] QB 530, as explained in Ghosh [1982] QB 1053.

23. E.g. Boggeln v Williams [1978] 2 All ER 1061 at 1065d, 1066bc.

24. (1867) LR 2 HL 149 at 170.

25. Andre et Cie v Ets Michel Blanc et Fils [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427 at 431, 432. Cf Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 at 685, 695 (private rights), and 705 (not private rights).

26. See e.g. Morris, The Conflict of Laws (2nd edn, 1980) Ch. 3Google Scholar.

27. Andre v Blanc, supra n. 25, at 430–431, 434.

28. Ibid at 430.

29. See generally, Smith and Hogan op. cit. Ch. 2.

30. Bilbie v Lumley (1802) 2 East 469, 102 ER 448 is one of the most famous, following Lowrie v Bourdieu (1780) Doug 467, 99 ER 299 at 471, 300.

31. This is almost certainly why two cases dealing with similar situations were differently decided: Youle (1861) 6 H & N 753, 158 ER 311, where mistake of law excused, was criminal, whereas Cooper v Simmons (1862) 7 H & N 707, 158 ER 654, where a similar mistake did not, was civil (see per Martin B at 720, 659).

32. See infra, text to notes 34–36, and cf Keedy, op. cit. pp. 88–92 Google Scholar, Brett, op. cit. p. 186 Google Scholar, Marston, op. cit. p. 470 Google Scholar.

33. E.g. Brett v Rigden n. 5 supra; Mildmay's Case (1584) 1 Co Rep 175a at 177b, 76 ER 379 at 386; Manser's Case (1608) 2 Co Rep la at 3b, 76 ER 387 at 393; Lowrie v Bourdieu (1780) Doug 467 at 471,99 ER 299 at 300. Vaux (1613) I Bulst 197, 80 ER 885, is the sole criminal exception, but the statement there appears only in counsel's argument.

34. E.g. ESOP (1836) 7 Car & P 456, 173 ER 203; Barronet (1852) Dears 51, 169 ER 633.

35. [1982] AC 341.

36. Cf David Smith [1974] QB 354, where D positively believed the property to be his and not another's.

37. (1860) Bell 303, 169 ER 1271.

38. See also Burns v Nowell (1880) 5 QBD 444 at 454; Manning v Cory [1974] WAR 60 at 63.

39. (1800) Russ & Ry 1, 168 ER 651.

40. See text to n. 18 and 19 supra, and cf Gould [1968] 2 QB 65 where D believed court proceedings to have taken place which in fact had not. Lord Eldon specifically refers in Bailey to D's ‘ignorance of that fact’, i.e. the passing of the Act, at Russ & Ry 4, 168 ER 653.

41. E.g. Smith, and Hogan, op. cit. p. 64 n. 16Google Scholar.

42. Op. cit. p. 187 n. 26.

43. Brasier (1779) 1 Leach 199, 168 ER 202; Huet (1798) 2 Leach 820, 168 ER 509; Crocker (1805) 2 Leach 987, 168 ER 591

44. Dixon (1803) Russ & Ry 53, 168 ER 680; Phillips (1818) Russ & Ry 369, 168 ER 849.

45. If the error appeared on the face of the record (e.g. if the indictment was bad) judgment could be arrested: Wedderburn (1746) Fost 22, 168 ER 12 at 23, 12. But if not, only a pardon was possible. See Tilley (1795) 2 Leach 662 at 671, 168 ER 433 at 437.

46. Russ & Ry 1 at 4, 168 ER 651 at 653.

47. E.g. Sheppard (1782) 1 Leach 226, 168 ER 215.

48. See Christian's, Edward (17th) edition of Blackstone's Commentaries (published 1830), vol 4, p. 27 Google Scholar.

49. [1963] AC 160 at 175–176

50. Other such cases are Frailey v Charlton [1920] 1 KB 147; Ross [1945] 3 DLR 574; cf Maidstone BC v Mortimer [1980] 3 All ER 552 (knowledge of tree preservation order irrelevant for conviction for cutting tree down).

51. (1968) 119 CLR 84.

54. Ibid at 97. See also at 115–116, and Donnelly v CIR [1960] NZLR 469 at 472–473.

53. (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200, 8 ER 718.

54. Ibid at 209, 722 (emphasis supplied).

55. Ibid at 210, 722 (emphasis supplied).

56. Ibid at 210, 723.

57. [1952] 2 QB 826.

58. See 17 MLR 383 at 385. In Stapleton v R (1952) 86 CLR 358 the High Court of Australia held that Windle was erroneous, and that the test was whether D knew he was acting morally wrongly, not whether he knew he was acting legally wrongly. Sed quaere.

59. (1840) 11 Ad & E 727, 113 ER 590.

60. E.g. Soleguard (1738) Andr 231, 95 ER 376; Carter v Mclaren (1871) LR 2 Sc & Div 120; Johnron u Youden [1950] 1 KB 544; Reid [1973] 3 All ER 1020; Miller [1975] 2 All ER 974; Howells [1977] QB 614

61. Under the Statute 12 Geo 3 c 48, s. 1.

62. (1837) 8 C & P 136 at 139, 173 ER 431, 432–433.

63. See also Phekoo [1981] 3 All ER 84 (knowledge that victim is within statutory definition of ‘residential occupier’ essential for D to be convicted of harassing residential occupier).

64. These are cases where D knows the facts, but does not realise he ought to report them. See Jackson v Butterworth [1946] VLR 330; Donnelly v CIR [1960] NZLR 469; Moore v Branton [1974] Crim LR 439. Cf Roberts v Duce [1974] Crim LR 107, dealing with different legislation to Moore v Brunton (but not otherwise distinguishable). For a case where D did not know the facts, and was acquitted, see Harding v Price [1948] 1 KB 695.

65. Reed (1842) Car & M 306, 174 ER 519.

66. Hall (1828) 3 C & P 409, 172 ER 447.

67. Bernkard [1938] 2 KB 264.

68. Twose (1879) 14 Cox CC 327.

69. Theft Act 1968, ss. 2(1)(a), 21(1).

70. Duvid Smith [1974] QB 354 at 360D.

71. (1837) 8 C & P 218, 173 ER 467.

72. (1861) 6 H & N 753, 158 ER 311 at 767, 316–317.

73. See e.g. Ocean Accident Ltd v Cole [1932] 2 KB 100; Younghusband v Luftig [1949] 2 KB 354; Barrett (1980) 72 Cr App Rep 212 at 216; Secretary of State for Industry v Hart [1982] 1 All ER 817.

74. Supra, text to nn. 24–25.

75. [1963] 2 QB 561 at 567.

76. E.g. Wells v Hardy [1964] 2 QB 447; Brandon v Barnes [1966] 3 All ER 296; Cambridge County Council v Rust [1972] 2 QB 426; Bowsher [1973] RTR 202.

77. Brett v Rigden, n. 5 supra, per Serj Manwood, arguendo: Hale, n. 4 supra; Blackstone, n. 6 supra; Bilbie v Lumley n. 30 supra; Carter v McLaren, n. 84 infra at 125, 126.

78. Note 3 supra, 91 Sel Soc at 279.

79. History of the Criminal Law (1882) vol 2, p. 114 Google Scholar. See also Selden Table Talk (ed. Arber, 1898) p. 65.

80. Martindale v Falkner (1846) 2 Google Scholar CB 706, 135 ER 1124 at 719–720, 1129–1130.

81. See Kiriri Cotton v Dewani [1960] AC 192 at 204; André v Blanc [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427 at 431.

82. See (1981) 1 LS 37.

83. E.g. remoteness of damage in contract: Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341, 156 ER 145 at 354, 151.

84. E.g. Carter v McLaren (1871) LR 2 Sc & Div 120 at 126.

85. [1961] AC 290.

86. O'Connor op. cit. p. 647.

87. S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA 513. See Turpin op. cit.

88. Lectures on jurisprudence (5th edn, 1885) vol 1, p. 482.Google Scholar

89. Loc. cit. n. 79 supra. See also Bilbie v Lumley, n. 39 supra; Carter v McLaren, n. 83 supra at 125–126.

90. Loc. cit. n. 88 supra.

91. (1937) 59 CLR 279 at 309. See also Howard Strict Responsibility Ch. 1; Holmes The Common Law (1963 edn) p. 41.

92. Ibid, Brett op. cit. pp. 195–196.

93. Ryu and Silving op. cit. pp. 442ff.

94. Ibid at 440–442.

95. Op. cit. pp. 41–43.

96. (1946) 62 TLR 462 at 463 col 2.

97. Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132; Morgan [1976] AC 182. See also 4 BI Comm 20.

98. Hunter v Slate (1928) 12 SW 2d 361 at 363. Cf Long v State (1949) 65 A 2d 489 at 497–499, where the Supreme Court of Delaware allowed the defence.

99. See Brett, op. cit. p. 201 Google Scholar.

100. E.g. Dodrworth, n. 71 supra; Youle, n. 72 supra; Bernhard, n. 67 supra. Cf Earl Russell [1901] AC 446; Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220, and also Crichton v Victorian Dairies [1965] VR 49.

101. E.g. Cooper v Simmons, n. 31 supra; Federal Commerce v Molena Alpha [1978] QB 927 at 979E; Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393 at 405a; Nonvich City Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1982] QB 808 at 827B.

102. See Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393.

103. (1862) 7 H & N 707, 158 ER 655 at 717, 658.

104. Op. cit. p. 19 (emphasis in the original). See also his General Principles of Criminal Law (1947) p. 353.

105. Ibid.

106. E.g. Morgan [1976] AC 182.

107. Op. cit. p. 433. See also Ashworth op. cit. p. 661.

108. Text to nn. 93–97 supra.

109. Text to nn. 93–97 supra.

110. For a recent discussion, see Dennis (1980) 96 LQR 208, esp pp. 232–235.

111. Supra, text to n. 53–58.

114. See Smith, and Hogan, op. cit. pp. 184–191 Google Scholar.

113. See e.g. Williams, op. cit. Ch. 24 Google Scholar; Glazebrook [1972] CLJ 87.

114. [1971] 2 QB 202 at 206 E-F. See also Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294 at 300E.

115. Ethica Nicomachea Book 5, viii; Penguin Classics (1976 edn) pp. 191–194.

116. 1 Hale PC 42; 4 Bl Comm 27.

117. Or at any rate substantially? Cf Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294 at 300G–H.

118. Op. cit. n. 7 supra.

119. Younger (1795) 5 TR 449, 101 ER 253.

120. Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220.

121. See Imperial Tobacco v A-G [1981] AC 718, but cf A-G v BBC [1981] AC 303 at 336G–337D.

122. Ashworth, op. cit. pp. 657–461Google Scholar. And see also Howell v Falmouth Boat Construction Co [1951] AC 837 at 845, 849; Sursty County Council v Battersby [1965] 2 QB 194; Cambridgeshire County Council v Rust [1972] 2 QB 426.

123. See the cases cited in n. 100 supra, and text to nn. 100–102.

124. E.g. State v O'Neil (1910) 126 NW 454 at 456.

125. See Williams, op. cit. p. 556 Google Scholar, in relation to necessity, but the same reasoning applies; Brett op. cit. p. 203.

126. Surrey County Council v Battersby, n. 123 supra; Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546 at 563C.

127. The writer is indebted to his colleagues Ian Dennis, Stephen Guest, and Nichola Lacey for helpful comments upon an earlier draft. They must not be taken necessarily to agree with the views here expressed, and the writer is responsible for the remaining shortcomings.