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Determinants of policy change: a cross national analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Prakash Sarangi*
Affiliation:
Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, India

Abstract

This study is an attempt to explain redistributive policy changes in democratic political systems. The two major competing paradigms of such determinants are the ‘political environments matter’ hypothesis and the economic resources model. This study attempts to show that there is an interdependent or exchange relationship between the choices of the policy makers and the policy takers, and that the periodic elections and the parties are important institutional mechanisms which make the exchange relationship possible. Several propositions about the conditions of policy change emerge from the assumptions about the behaviour of the policy makers and the policy takers. These propositions along with those emerging from the socio-economic and the political factors are tested using data from 21 contemporary democratic regimes beteen 1952–1980. The two dependent variables in the model are expenditures on the direct transfers to the households, and revenue from the direct taxes. Multiple regression analyses are utilized in the statistical tests. These analyses confirm the contention that political exchange plays an important part as a determinant of policy outcomes. It explains as much, if not more, variation in the model as the socio-economic or political environment variables.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1986 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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