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The ‘Common European Approach', ‘International Trends', and the Evolution of Human Rights Law. A Comment on Goodwin and I v. the United Kingdom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Alexander Morawa

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On 11 July 2002, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Ct. H.R.) ruled unanimously in the cases of Goodwin and I v. the United Kingdom that the failure of British law to recognize gender re-assignment and to permit male to female transsexuals to marry persons of their newly opposite sex violated the applicants’ right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR) and to marry (Article 12). These two cases, apart from constituting an explicit deviation from previous constant jurisprudence, gave the Court (sitting as a Grand Chamber) an opportunity to creatively apply its longstanding interpretative principles, including the search for a ‘common European approach’ – now increasingly an ‘international trend’ –, in order to evolve human rights law. The following observations will focus on this aspect, while paying due attention to the other implications of the present cases. Finally, the two cases will be placed in the context of the current jurisprudence of the Court which, unfortunately, does not show a consistent tendency to progressively advance human rights law.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 3 , Issue 8 , August 2002 , E4
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

Mag.iur. (University of Salzburg, Austria), LL.M., S.J.D. (George Washington University); European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI); Visiting Professor of International Law, Arcadia University, Philadelphia, PA. The author serves as counsel in proceedings before international bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee.Google Scholar
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