Limited research has been devoted to investigating assumptions about competition dynamics established through a neoliberal lens. Advocates argue that competition fosters innovation and benefits consumers by incentivizing private enterprises to develop better products or services at competitive prices compared to their rivals. Critics argue that competition exacerbates inequality by disproportionately rewarding high achievers. Rewarding high achievers reflects the meritocratic aspect of competition, which has been widely assumed to be rooted in the individualistic culture of Western countries. Contrary to this assumption, the ideology of meritocratic competition thrived in ancient collectivist Asian countries. Moreover, the assumed linear relationship between individualism, competition, and inequality is contradicted by economic literature, which suggests more individualistic nations display lower income inequality. Despite extensive economic and cultural examination of competition, competition’s political dimensions remain understudied. This interdisciplinary book challenges conventional assumptions about competition, synthesizing evidence across economics, culture, and politics.

The economic reforms of China in 1978 and Vietnam in 1986 have spurred the emergence of privately owned enterprises, leading to increased competition across state-owned and privately owned enterprises under communist authoritarian regimes. Upon joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), both countries faced unavoidable international competition, particularly excelling in labor-intensive manufacturing industries due to low labor costs. China’s pragmatic approach to market-oriented forces has resulted in a growth gap favoring China over Vietnam. Despite this, both nations have made significant economic strides, transitioning to fast-growing middle-income countries and reducing global inequality. The onset of the US–China trade war in 2018 has seen Vietnam emerge as a major beneficiary, challenging China’s dominance in labor-intensive manufacturing industries. This shift highlights the potential for hegemonic transitions in competition dynamics. Additionally, this chapter illuminates pre-reform competition in both countries, where shortages of goods led to resource competition among citizens – an aspect often overlooked in existing literature focused on market competition post-reform.

Little is known about how competitive attitudes differ between refugees and their host citizens. Study 1 investigated the relationship between refugee background and competitive attitudes, alongside demographic characteristics, social comparison concerns, and exposure to competition, using data from 190 North Korean refugees (NKRs) and 445 South Koreans (SKs). Refugee background and social comparison concerns had significantly more effect on competitive attitudes compared to other demographic characteristics and the ranking variable. In Study 2, cultural scores based on Hofstede’s theory were examined, alongside demographic factors, refugee background, and social comparison concerns. Refugee background and social comparison concerns showed stronger associations with competitive attitudes than cultural scores. Study 3 divided the sample into NKRs and SKs, revealing social comparison concerns’ predominant influence on competitive attitudes in both groups. However, the impact of the ranking variable varied between NKRs and SKs. These findings underscore the importance of understanding the experiences of refugees in shaping their competitive attitudes, from migration to resettlement.

Using the World Value Survey from Wave 2 (1989–1993) to Wave 7 (2017–2020), Study 1 demonstrates that individuals in individualistic regions exhibit more anti-competition attitudes compared to those in collectivist regions. Additionally, individuals in authoritarian, socialist, and collectivist Asian regions show the highest level of pro-competition attitudes, followed by those in democratic, capitalist, and individualistic Western regions and those in democratic, capitalist, and collectivist Asian regions. Study 2 reveals that competition is more likely to be endorsed by individuals who prioritize the individual’s responsibility over the government’s responsibility, value private ownership of businesses over government ownership of businesses, emphasize hard work for success, and prefer income incentives over income equality. Moreover, individuals with higher levels of materialism and self-determination are also inclined to endorse competition. Notably, variations exist in the relationship between individual difference variables and attitudes toward competition among the regions.

One of the concerns of postmodern British fiction was the textual and discursive means by which historical events are communicated to the present through story-telling. Much post-millennial fiction still dips into the postmodern toolbox; it is not unusual to read novels with a fragmented and non-linear narrative, for example, but these novels focus instead on the now, while asking what does it mean to be now, to recognise that the past and the present exist simultaneously, and how does this translate into an understanding of temporality. As Lauren Berlant has argued, neoliberal economic policies mobilize instability, and that instability is evident in contemporary fiction’s representations of history, genre and identity. Some novels examined here invoke past and present through an illusion of narrative simultaneity, while others investigate how the powerful can write and rewrite the present and the past and in doing so can disrupt perceptions of temporality.

Since the North Korean Famine in the mid-1990s, survivors have turned to cross-border activities for sustenance, evolving into commercial activities in black markets known as jangmadang. With the collapse of the socialist Public Distribution System, the majority of North Koreans now rely on these black markets to earn money and meet their basic needs. However, such commercial activities for personal gain are illegal in the country, symbolizing the emergence of North Korea’s hidden market economy. This hidden economy is characterized by various types of “shadowy private enterprises (SPEs),” ranging from entities officially registered as state-owned enterprises but run by private individuals to home-based enterprises. These SPEs sustain their operations and evade punishment by bribing bureaucrats. However, systematic corruption poses threats to the survival, safety, and well-being of marginalized groups who struggle to pay bribes, exacerbating inequality between privileged and unprivileged segments of society. Consequently, the hidden economy engenders various forms of competition, spanning from market competition to an invisible competition for safety and wellbeing.

The dominant assumptions positing a linear relationship among individualism, capitalism, competition, and inequality are often rooted in the perspectives of social scientists, whose focus is frequently confined to the West in modern times. I argue that these dominant assumptions have been formulated without sufficient opportunities or willingness to consider societies with cultures and systems different from those of the West. In this regard, this book challenges these dominant assumptions by presenting compelling counter-evidence that (1) competition occurs in every society throughout history whenever humans seek to survive and thrive; and (2) competition does not necessarily lead to inequality, but often serves as a tool to mitigate it, as competitions prevent absolute hegemony and allow individuals to challenge incumbent powers or privileged groups across cultures, systems, and eras. This closing chapter encourages readers to reassess their existing beliefs about the sources and consequences of competition and to strive for a deep understanding of competition arenas that they may choose to enter or inadvertently launch.

The ideology of Marxism–Leninism seemingly contradicts competition, yet competition was prevalent in former communist countries to foster productivity and economic growth. The Stakhanovite movement, originating in the Soviet Union, incentivized laborers to excel as an economic propaganda tool, while also honoring them as socialist heroes but also penalizing dissent as a political propaganda tool. Competition extended to managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) vying for government resources. Consumer competition arose from pervasive shortages, driving black market economies. Underground enterprises, which were protected from competition, resisted economic reform from a planned economic system to a more market-oriented system to maintain their privileged status. Post-World War II, some SOEs adopted market-based approaches, competing domestically and globally. This chapter argues that such forms of competition emerge when humans struggle for survival amid perceived inequalities in the existing system, prompting them to seek opportunities and thrive.

Little attention has been paid to competitive dynamics from a political perspective, despite numerous instances of political competition across cultures and systems. In liberal democratic societies, political competition is legalized, allowing citizens to elect leaders who represent their ideas. Conversely, in totalitarian societies, citizens lack voting rights, and political authority is not challenged through democratic means. However, political competitions still occur among ruling elites, often through purges to seize power. This chapter explores political competition, particularly in totalitarian regimes, where purges eliminate rivals among ruling elites. The collapse of such regimes has marked an evolution toward freedom and equal opportunities for all individuals, regardless of background, which aligns with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Highlighting the lack of research on political competitions from an evolutionary psychology perspective, this chapter underscores the need for future research on human emotions and competitive behaviors in the political arena.