The case law on non-precluded measures clauses, when they are successful, and the customary rule of necessity, when it fails, transfers significant risks to foreign investors and host States, respectively, during severe economic crises. Some risk-sharing mechanisms should be explored to achieve a more balanced result. This article presents the policy reasons in support of this approach and its normative basis: the principle of acceptable compensation, and illustrates that one way to introduce such mechanisms is through the determination by investor/State tribunals of the length of the breakdown, which is marked by the dates for its beginning and end. The article discusses economic research on when crises conclude, which could be useful to tribunals, and explores the determination on the beginning of economic collapses as a risk-sharing tool and shows how decisions of the Argentinean saga have achieved this result.

Alan Sykes’ editorial comment, Economic “Necessity” in International Law, provides a multi-layered analysis of the defense of “necessity” in international investment disputes. Sykes’ main proposition is that the obligation to compensate investors for government measures prejudicing their investments during economic emergencies mitigates the risk of moral hazard and incentivizes States to “select the least expensive way to protect their interests (the optimal policy instrument).” Otherwise, he contends, “actors will take risks that imperil them to an excessive degree if they can save themselves by imposing costs on others.” Sykes nonetheless argues that payment of the compensation could be deferred in light of the emergency, and not be subject to market interest rates.

Boundary disputes constitute one of the most delicate issues for states,such that it is not surprising that frontier issues are among the mostrecurrent before the International Court of Justice (IC J) and have givenrise to a rich jurisprudence. This jurisprudence comprises traditionalareas: consent in boundary treaties, the principle of uti possidetis juris, the notion of effectivités, and maritimedelimitation. However, it also includes other topics that usually receiveless attention, but which are nonetheless important to states and sometimesunderlie their significant interest in boundary disputes. This article dealswith such topics in order to show how the IC J has handled them in itsboundary jurisprudence of the first decade of the new millennium. The authordiscusses IC J decisions addressing types of territory that cannot beappropriated, terra nullius, private rights, statesuccession, unilateral donations as sources of title to territory,irrelevant criteria in establishing title to territory (particularlyhistorical consolidation), the use of maps, and state responsibility inconnection with boundary disputes.

‘Sometimes the most important historical events are the non-events: the things that did not occur,’ says the British historian Niall Ferguson.1 Such a statement may well describe in large measure the International Court of Justice's case-law regarding the methods for the identification of rules of customary international law during the period 2000–2009. The previous two decades had been marked by two milestones in this domain: the eighties by the judgment on the merits in Nicaragua,2 and the nineties by the Court's advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons.3 There was, though, no single decision by the Court of comparative significance regarding methods of customary international law during the first decade of the new millennium. Further, some of the most important determinations in this domain were those in which the Court did not declare the existence of a customary international rule. However, this is not to say that the above-mentioned conclusion applies to all of the Court's jurisprudence related to customary international law. The conclusion is limited to the Court's decisions regarding the methods for the recognition of norms of this character. In fact, the Court made very important pronouncements as to the content of customary international law in many domains, such as the use of force, territorial occupation, diplomatic protection, and international humanitarian law.

The unprecedented enforcement of the mutually agreed solution (MAS) in the WTO Softwood Lumber disputes – but outside the WTO dispute settlement system – and the recent use of MAS to resolve important trade disputes should trigger a hard look at these dispute settlement instruments provided for by the DSU. This article seeks to provide a detailed framework of analysis of MAS under the DSU that allows the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate MAS-related disputes. WTO Members should not go outside the system to enforce MAS. The article illustrates that MAS can create binding obligations and that MAS are WTO law, given the explicit reference to them in the DSU, their intimate relation with the WTO-covered agreements and the requirement for compliance with these agreements. In addition, the article offers an interpretation of the DSU that allows panels and the Appellate Body to regard MAS as applicable law. This interpretation is offered in the view that there is no policy reason to sustain that these controversies – always fully related to WTO rights and obligations and framed under the corners of the covered agreements – have to be resolved by an adjudication system other than that of the WTO.

The WTO Appellate Body has so far authorized public appeal hearings as the exception, not the rule: it is limited to those instances in which the main parties request it. Such authorization constitutes a very positive development for the WTO dispute settlement system, for it enhances the transparency of the system at its highest stage. Indeed, the Appellate Body is becoming a leading actor in the formation of international law1 owing to the fact that it is the most active international court of the world, the relevance of the issues it deals with and the fact that it is at the apex of a dispute settlement system with permanent and exclusive jurisdiction over 153 States. Nonetheless, it is not in tune with inter-state international adjudication where the trend concerning hearings is, for good reason, geared towards openness and transparency, not privacy, as the rule.