the basic purpose of an Ombudsman is provision of a ‘watchdog’ designed to look into the entire workings of administrative cases…[he or she] can bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark places even over the resistance of those who would draw the blinds. If [his or her] scrutiny and reservations are well founded, corrective measure can be taken in due democratic process, if not no harm can be done in looking at that which is good.
Re Ombudsman Act (1970) 72 WWR 176, 190, 192 (Milvain CJ)Introduction
The riddle for legal observers is not whether the ombudsman institution is a success. If proliferation and evolution are measures of success, the Australian ombudsman institution is the ‘poster child’ for administrative law institutions. Since their original introduction to Australia in the 1970s, to provide a mechanism for individual citizens to complain about government administration, public Ombudsmen now review a wide range of government action. Their jurisdiction includes: deaths in custody; oversight of the police force; monitoring of whistleblowing legislation; and auditing of records for telecommunication interception. The institution itself has also been adapted to provide a forum for complaint handling across private industry and large organisations. Calls have recently been made for the creation of a vast array of new ombudsmen, including an internet ombudsman and a supermarket ombudsman, and for ombudsmen to cover sport, the arts, gambling, crime, franchising and the motor industry.
In the face of such success, the real riddle for legal observers is why ombudsmen are effective at all in resolving disputes. As lawyers and students of law we are well primed to accept, largely without question, the effectiveness of legal institutions such as courts, which make orders and provide binding remedies in the resolution of disputes. It follows that we will be more sceptical in our appreciation of institutions, such as the government Ombudsman, which make recommendations that are neither legally enforceable nor binding. This scepticism is arguably reflected in the historical treatment of the Ombudsman, which is often relegated to last place in administrative law textbooks, rarely the focus of rigorous critical independent analysis, and often subject to disparaging word plays on the Swedish title of the office (such as ‘Ombudsmouse’, Ombudsboob’ and ‘Ombudsflop’). The challenge for legal observers is to put aside such anachronistic views and ask why Ombudsmen have become central to the landscape of Australian dispute resolution.