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33 results

Page 1 of 2

  • Chapter 4 - Kennedy and Cuba

  • from Part II - Self-Deception in Politics
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Political Self-Deception
    Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018, pp 115-149

  • Summary

    In this chapter, two episodes characterizing Kennedy’s policy toward Cuba are examined: the Bay of Pigs expedition and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first exemplifies a case of SD of the first type: one where the self-deceptive belief induces the deception of others as a byproduct. The second exemplifies a case of SD of the third type, where SD provides a justification for a lie. In the first case, it is argued that the two CIA officials had to be self-deceived about the operation for it was against their own self-interest to lie about it, and as a consequence they misled Kennedy, at least up to a point. In the second case, the lie about the successful conclusion of the Crisis was covered by a self-deceptive rationalization that, on the one hand, presented the lie as necessary and, on the other, downplayed its role in the solution

  • Introduction

  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Political Self-Deception
    Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018, pp 1-16

  • Summary

    Political theory has mainly considered political deception as induced either by lies and manipulation or as the unintended consequence of misperceptions and illusions. This work aims to show that the misperception of reality, under psychological and emotional pressure, is often driven by the desire to believe what one wishes to be the case even if a dispassionate consideration would lead to the opposite conclusion. The phenomenon of self-deception has sometimes been hinted at in political analysis but rarely pursued and analyzed properly. This book is in two parts: in the first, the philosophy of self-deception will be considered in order to provide a clear definition and an adequate account of the phenomenon, and to explore the issue of responsibility for one’s self-deception. In the second part of the book, self-deception will be applied to political analysis.

  • Chapter 6 - Bush and the Weapons of Mass Destruction

  • from Part II - Self-Deception in Politics
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Political Self-Deception
    Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018, pp 189-233

  • Summary

    In this chapter, the process leading to the controversial 2003 invasion of Iraq is examined. More specifically, the WMD, which had been cited as the reason for the invasion, is argued to be a genuine belief produced by a self-deceptive process, contrary to the supporters of the straight lie view and of the honest mistake view. The argument develops from the consideration that, granted the gap between the selling reasons and the true reasons of the invasion, the true reasons are hard to tell. Then it proceeds to analyze the effect of 9/11 on the beliefs of the government, and how they were affected by motivated twists in reasoning, causing two self-deceptive beliefs, one of the straight case, that is the equation between terrorists and supporting state, and the other of the twisted case, relative to the conviction that the danger of an imminent possibly nuclear attack was a real probability. The chapter ends by considering the SD of the people concerning the belief in the WMD’s presence in Iraq.

  • Chapter 3 - The Self-Deception of Political Leaders, Officials, and Governments

  • from Part II - Self-Deception in Politics
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Political Self-Deception
    Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018, pp 79-114

  • Summary

    In this chapter, the importance of applying SD to politics is argued by rebutting some objections, one based on the reduction of SD to cold mistakes, and the other on the reduction of SD to straight lies. In fact, SD is not meant to replace straight deception, but to supplement it, because SD is always intertwined with deception of others as a consequence of its make-belief effect. A typology of political SD is provided, grounded on the different relation with deception of others, for the latter can be (a) the byproduct of SD, or (b) ancillary to SD and the make-believe effect, and (c) can be the justification of a lie. Finally, the collective dimension of political SD is analyzed and the possibility of institutional preventive measures considered.

  • Chapter 5 - Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

  • from Part II - Self-Deception in Politics
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Political Self-Deception
    Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018, pp 150-188

  • Summary

    In this chapter, some episodes from the Vietnam War are examined in order to see whether they fit the self-deception model. The focus is on the plans for escalation of American involvement in 1964, which eventually resulted in the Congress Resolution of August 7, giving President Johnson a blank check on what to do in Vietnam. The Resolution came after the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Incident that never took place but that is argued to represent a typical case of SD of the second type, the one where SD is ancillary to deception of others.

  • Conclusion

  • from Part II - Self-Deception in Politics
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Political Self-Deception
    Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018, pp 234-246

  • Summary

    The conclusions summarize the arguments of the two parts, and then point out the following: (1) SD can be singled out distinctively in the complex and blurred reality of international affairs, dint to the three minimal necessary conditions outlined in the first part of the book (contextual, cognitive, and motivational); (2) The context in which SD takes place is always imbued of ideology, which provided the fixed convictions from which political motivations are derived; and (3) The process of SD is usually conditional to low costs of inaccuracy, and yet in political decision making the costs of inaccuracy are actually high. The apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that they are discounted due to different factors. Finally, the issue of prophylactic measures is taken up.

  • Chapter 2 - The Attribution of Responsibility to Self-Deceivers

  • from Part I - The Philosophy of Self-Deception
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Political Self-Deception
    Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018, pp 58-76

  • Summary

    Whether responsibility can be attributed to one’s self-deception is unclear, yet it is a crucial issue for applying SD in politics. The issue seems particularly problematic with causal accounts. The solutions suggested by causalists are all informed by the traditional notion of responsibility as control and are all unsatisfactory. The solution proposed here is based on George Sher’s theory, meant to provide an account of responsibility dispensing with the control condition. The attribution of responsibility to self-deceivers is linked to the possibility of future prevention, by learning the lesson and coming to see SD as bad and wrong. Given the nature of SD, prevention cannot be entrusted to good will but must rely on indirect strategy, especially precommitment.

  • Chapter 1 - Investigating Self-Deception

  • from Part I - The Philosophy of Self-Deception
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Political Self-Deception
    Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018, pp 19-57

  • Summary

    In this chapter, alternative conceptions of self-deception are critically considered: the skeptical view, according to which self-deception is literally impossible and what seems to be SD is actually only pretense; the intentional view, according to which SD is intentionally produced by the subject; and the causal-motivationist view, according to which SD is caused by cognitive biases triggered by a motivational state. An alternative view is then proposed, the “invisible hand” account: the author argues that this view can solve some of the open issues of the others.

Political Self-Deception
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
  • Published online:
    24 August 2018
    Print publication:
    13 September 2018
  • Self-deception, that is the distortion of reality against the available evidence and according to one's wishes, represents a distinctive component in the wide realm of political deception. It has received relatively little attention but is well worth examining for its explanatory and normative dimensions. In this book Anna Elisabetta Galeotti shows how self-deception can explain political occurrences where public deception intertwines with political failure - from bad decisions based on false beliefs, through the self-serving nature of those beliefs, to the deception of the public as a by-product of a leader's self-deception. Her discussion uses close analysis of three well-known case studies: John F. Kennedy and the Cuba Crisis, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and George W. Bush and the weapons of mass destruction. Her book will appeal to a range of readers in political philosophy, political theory, and international relations.

Toleration as Recognition
  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
  • Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    14 March 2002
  • In this 2002 book, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti examines the most intractable problems which toleration encounters and argues that what is really at stake is not religious or moral disagreement but the unequal status of different social groups. Liberal theories of toleration fail to grasp this and consequently come up with normative solutions that are inadequate when confronted with controversial cases. Galeotti proposes, as an alternative, toleration as recognition, which addresses the problem of according equal respect to groups as well as equal liberty to individuals. She offers an interpretation that is both a revision and an expansion of liberal theory, in which toleration constitutes an important component not only of a theory of justice, but also of the politics of identity. Her study will appeal to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory, and law.

  • 7 - Toleration and identity politics

  • Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro
  • Book:
    Toleration as Recognition
    Published online:
    22 September 2009
    Print publication:
    14 March 2002, pp 192-224

  • Summary

    THE ARGUMENT FOR TOLERATION AS RECOGNITION

    In this final chapter I want first of all to summarize the normative conception behind toleration as recognition, and then to consider some objections to it. The first and most common objection is that toleration as recognition is incompatible with liberal politics and a risk to the liberal order. Though the allegation of incompatibility is not incomprehensible in that public toleration of differences will lead to a redrawing of societal standards, and, consequently, worsen the majority's status, I argue that toleration as recognition is nevertheless compatible with liberal principles and does not infringe any right or fundamental value.

    A second common objection concerns further claims for recognition, which are considered dangerous consequences of the public toleration of differences. Even though toleration as recognition can ultimately be made compatible with liberal politics, it opens the way to the arena of identity politics, whose tendencies towards particularism and tribalism are deeply at odds with liberal justice. In response, I will map out the key arguments in the politics of identity, sorting out the different claims and assessing whether adopting toleration as recognition commits the government to meeting further claims as well. Then I outline a general strategy for dealing with demands for recognition which suggests that from the perspective of social justice only some can be met, while others should be rejected and most can be negotiated.

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