This chapter looks at how the government should be held accountable for the purpose of the ideal accountability benchmark. This requires attention both to the procedures by which accountability is delivered (eg the nature of the accountability forum and how it performs its role) as well as the ultimate consequences of the accountability process (eg sanctions and remedies). This chapter explores these two ideas, asking what processes and consequences might be most relevant for the purpose of each of the various accountability rationales. For example, if the goal is to punish wrongdoing, it might be appropriate to apply highly punitive sanctions tempered by procedures with built-in protection such as a high burden of proof. On the other hand, if the goal is to ensure redress for those who suffer harm as a consequence of government wrongdoing, it might be more appropriate to apply restorative remedies via victim-friendly procedures. In order to design an accountability benchmark that can be used to identify accountability deficits and overloads, it is necessary to consider the most suitable means to achieve whatever ends we assign to the overarching concept of accountability.

This chapter demonstrates the utility of adopting a ‘systemic’ view of accountability mechanisms by analysing the operation of the mechanisms which were brought to bear in three real-world scenarios of government wrongdoing and maladministration. So, for example, this chapter notes that anti-corruption commissions and the criminal law can operate in a staged and co-operative manner, and that judicial review and tort law can operate in an interdependent manner. This chapter makes clear that any potential deficits and overloads identified using an accountability benchmark may be resolved or ameliorated by mapping out the ways in which accountability mechanisms interact with one another.

This chapter explores the complex question of for what an agent should be held accountable for the purpose of defining the ideal accountability benchmark. Given the breadth of this question, this chapter focuses on two of the 'building blocks' that might be relevant in defining the standards of conduct against which government performance might be measured: fault and outcomes. Even at this level of abstraction, the task of establishing an accountability benchmark is a difficult one, with each accountability rationale suggesting a different approach. For instance, if our goal is punishment we might think it appropriate to limit accountability to cases of intentional wrongdoing. On the other hand, if our goal is redress we might be more concerned with the outcomes of an official's actions rather than their intentions. In order to define a benchmark, it would be necessary to engage with difficult philosophical questions about when it is appropriate to hold another person accountable for their actions, and the inherent complexity of this task might be one explanation for the lack of detailed consideration of these ideas in the existing literature.

This chapter explores two key difficulties encountered in deciding to whom an agent should be accountable for the purpose of an ideal accountability benchmark. First, there are a multiplicity of factors that might influence a prosecutor’s capacity and interest to undertake that role (eg resources, skills and motives). Secondly, we will likely reach differing views on the best choice of prosecutor depending on which accountability rationale we are interested in promoting. So, for instance, if our goal is punishment of wrongdoing we might think it appropriate that this is managed by a state prosecutor to reinforce the seriousness of a transgression. On the other hand, if our goal is to control public power we might think it appropriate to have a very open regime in order to maximise the likelihood that a prosecutor will volunteer for the task. It would be necessary to confront and resolve these difficult questions in order to define a benchmark of accountability.

Part one of this book introduces readers to the concept of accountability, setting out the range of current theoretical debates on the meaning and scope of the concept. It further introduces readers to the concepts of accountability deficits (ie too little accountability) and accountability overloads (ie too much accountability), explaining the role that these concepts play in the context of discussions about public governance. Ultimately, it is argued that more theoretical work needs to be done to give shape to these ideas.

Accountability is often referred to as an essential feature of modern democratic society, said to underpin the legitimacy of government. In this context, it is common to hear claims of accountability ‘deficit’ (ie that a particular mechanism or area is lacking in accountability) and ‘overload’ (ie that a particular mechanism or area over-delivers on accountability). Despite the frequency of references to these concepts, their precise content remains undeveloped. This book offers an explanation of the concepts of accountability deficit and overload, as well as a framework for future discussion and exploration of these ideas. It outlines the scale of the challenges of defining an accountability benchmark and developing a picture of accountability mechanisms as a system. While difficult, if accountability is indeed a foundational concept underpinning our system of government, there is merit in meeting these challenges head-on.

In order to further demonstrate the difficulties inherent in defining an accountability benchmark, this chapter describes a hypothetical benchmark which offers tentative answers to the series of questions posed in foregoing chapters. It then deploys that benchmark in three real-world scenarios of government maladministration and wrongdoing that might be thought to demand an accountability response. This exercise reveals the difficulty of defining and deploying a benchmark of accountability in the effort to identify areas of deficit and overload, as well as offering a number of areas for further investigation in future accountability studies.

This chapter explores the first key idea that must be considered in order to understand accountability mechanisms as a system, which is to appreciate that the system strikes a delicate balance of features as between mechanisms. In many cases, claims about accountability deficits or overload rest on assumptions about particular ‘strengths’ or ‘weaknesses’ of a mechanism. For instance, the high costs of legal proceedings might be cast as a ‘weakness’ of that accountability mechanism and therefore as an accountability deficit. The argument made in this chapter is that these features must be contextualised within the system before such a claim can be made, as the ‘weaknesses’ in one mechanism might be ameliorated by the ‘strengths’ in another. The features reviewed include accessibility, cost, flexibility, coerciveness, autonomy, independence and permanence.

One of the most prevalent themes in the accountability literature is claims about the ‘amount’ of accountability that applies in a given situation. There are claims of accountability ‘deficits’ (ie too little accountability) on the one hand, and claims of accountability ‘overload’ (ie too much accountability) on the other. This chapter draws out these claims and argues that, while these claims presuppose that accountability is a measurable concept, the literature often glosses over the underlying question of what is being measured, or how the measurement is to be conducted. This missing dimension of the literature is the core problem tackled in this book, which unpacks two of the hidden assumptions that underlie these claims. The first of these assumptions is that it is possible to identify some form of accountability benchmark, being a normative judgement as to the ‘ideal amount’ of accountability against which an arrangement can be measured and found wanting. The second is that it is possible to assess the universe of applicable accountability mechanisms against that benchmark, and to form a judgement as to whether the system underperforms (deficit) or overperforms (overload).

Part two of this book explores the various challenges that must be confronted in defining a ‘benchmark’ of accountability. It commences by identifying the underlying rationales for accountability, and then addresses the various issues thrown up when seeking to transform the mechanistic description of accountability (ie who is accountable, to whom, for what and how) into a normative account (ie who should be accountable to whom, for what and how). If we were able to do so, we would then have a yardstick against which we could measure the performance of accountability mechanisms and find them wanting.

Part three of this book unpacks the second hidden assumption underpinning claims of accountability deficit and overload, which is that the claimant has considered all available accountability mechanisms and identified either a gap or overlap in the operation of that system. The chapters in this part explore the ideas that must be addressed in order to conceive of accountability mechanisms as a system.