As Chief of State and head of government, the President is the epicenter of the management of American external relations and the formulation of foreign policy. Not only does he welcome the leaders of other countries who come on summit visits, receive personally the diplomatic emissaries of foreign governments accredited to the United States, and participate in many other formal diplomatic functions, but he also is responsible for executing those segments of the law that pertain to international affairs, for appointing United States diplomats and communicating with other governments, for making treaties, and for initiating and enunciating foreign policy. Addressing himself to the last of these, President Truman cryptically declared: “The President makes foreign policy.” Dean Rusk later commented that this “is not the whole story,” but “it serves very well if one wishes to deal with the matter in five words.”

This article describes and analyzes a number of complications involved in presidential image identification and assessment (including distinctions among the various categories of summit diplomacy), selected images of past presidents, the role of the media, opinion polls, and surveys of “experts” in reflecting presidential images and prestige, and more precisely the president's image as diplomat in chief. Included are a description of the fluctuation in individual president's popularity ratings as related to selected foreign relations events, a comparative table of high, low, and average popular approval ratings for recent presidents beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, a comparative table of superior presidential rankings by “experts” throughout our history, and a table, with commentary, of presidential popular rating shifts following major summit ventures of the president since 1941. This article constitutes an introductory macro-treatment of the generalized aggregate of contemporary and historical perceptions of the president as diplomat in chief.

“What shall be done with Germany upon her defeat?” For many months prior to the surrender of the Wehrmacht this vital question evoked a host of conflicting proposals, official and unofficial, in both Military Government planning staffs and in higher policy-formation circles. Despite many differences, these proposals uniformly demanded immediate disarmament, demilitarization, and—denazification.

Early plans called for the occupation of Germany with the objective of insuring that she never again would threaten her neighbors and the rest of the world. The demilitarization and disarmament of the German armed forces was undertaken rapidly and resolutely by our occupation forces and those of our Allies as a preliminary step in securing this objective. But the more difficult task of denazification—that is, the permanent elimination of the institutions, leadership, and psychology in German life which produced and supported the Nazi regime—is still far from completed.