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Could Turkey dam the Tigris and Euphrates and deprive its downstream neighbors of vital water resources? Could Brazil over-pump the Guarani Aquifer System to the detriment of the other aquifer states? Could Egypt put pressure on upstream Nile states and prevent them from developing river related infrastructure that might limit downstream flow? International law in the field of transboundary water cooperation has evolved and would appear to condemn unilateral practices such as the ones suggested above. However, hydro politics and the lack of reception of international water law instruments by many countries sometimes make it difficult to see international law properly reflected in the management of major rivers, lakes and aquifers around the world. In this essay, I first highlight what international law dictates when it comes to the tension between national sovereignty and transboundary water cooperation. I then explore how this tension plays out in the three examples noted above. Due to limited acceptance of the existing international, bilateral, or regional legal instruments, the resolution of the tension between national sovereignty and transboundary water cooperation will often be left to customary international law.
There is no doubt that the discourse around climate change has matured over the years and has become one of the central features of international relations. We all know of the international legal regime that has developed to deal with climate change, starting from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and finishing with the Paris Agreement. Climate change is also either at the core or on the fringes of many other international debates, from international security to international economic relations. In 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a (yet again) stark warning alerting to the risks of not moving towards a 1.5 degrees goal, rather than a 2.0 degrees as the Paris Agreement seems to be suggesting. The truth is that the trend countries are moving toward with their pledges in their nationally determined contributions is not going to meet the 2.0 objective, let alone the 1.5 degrees objective. Against this background, it is not surprising that sectors of society interested in pursuing stronger climate change policies have explored multiple governance routes to take forward their agenda. This has led to the emergence of a polycentric and multilevel governance in the field of climate change. It is within this greater picture that climate change litigation has become a key facet in the fight against climate change.
John J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock (eds.), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004, ISBN 0754609669, 372 pp.
The Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report made it very clear that current climate change trends have been human induced, and that serious efforts must be undertaken by the international community if we wish to avoid a global average temperature increase of more than 2°C from pre-industrial periods. This fact has now been acknowledged both in the Copenhagen Accord, and in the Cancun Agreements.
At this stage, what is needed goes beyond minor efforts from some key countries, but involves a drive from the entire international community towards a low carbon society. International emissions trading and offsets (the carbon market) have been identified by the Kyoto Protocol as part of this global effort and as key instruments to assist countries to comply with their quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs). Against this background, this chapter addresses two core questions: (1) to what extent will a post-2012 agreement on climate change strengthen or weaken the linkage between compliance and the carbon market; and (2) to what extent can a post-2012 regime’s compliance mechanism secure improvements to the design of the carbon market?
Edited by
Philippe Cullet, School of Oriental and African Studeis, University of London,Alix Gowlland-Gualtieri, School of Oriental and African Studeis, University of London,Roopa Madhav, School of Oriental and African Studeis, University of London,Usha Ramanathan, School of Oriental and African Studeis, University of London
Water cannot be replaced and is crucial for human and animal life on earth. These two simple statements clearly highlight the importance of water for the international community and its unique nature among other natural resources. The fact that more than a billion people lack adequate access to water should give a picture of the gravity of the problem we are facing. The problem has two main dimensions – the individual access to water services and the overall availability of water as a physical resource.
Against this background the paper seeks to address both these dimensions, by first considering whether foreign direct investments and international trade can be seen as instruments for coping with inadequate access to water for the individuals (2.1) and water scarcity (2.2) respectively. Then the paper explores the impact of both the international investment system (3) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) regime (4) on States' capacity to deal with these problems. The main aim is to evaluate whether these two international regimes are capable of reconciling the conflicting needs in relation to access to water services and water scarcity.
Coping with Access to Water and Water Scarcity through Foreign Investments and International Trade
Ensuring universal access to water services and the fight against water scarcity are daunting challenges for several States. Financial constraints, infrastructural inadequacies and adverse natural events affecting the availability of the resource are just some of the factors that may hamper the pursuit of such objectives.
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