The growing use of drones is discussed in detail in this chapter. The chapter shows that their intensive use by both state and non-state actors is largely due to the fact that they provide a significant enhancement in aerial awareness at a relatively low cost and low risk. In the Middle East and North Africa, armed drones have been deployed in the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and other theaters. The roots of Iran’s drone program go back to the 1980–8 war with Iraq. Since the early 1980s, Iran has developed strong and diversified drone capabilities. Its arsenal today includes a broad and sophisticated range of non-weaponized surveillance and armed drones.

For millennia, Iranian leaders have perceived strong naval forces as crucial to securing foreign trade and cementing the country’s predominance in the strategic Persian Gulf. Furthermore, given Iran’s huge size, long history, and strong national identity, its leaders have seen themselves and their maritime presence as the guarantor of regional security and the presence of foreign troops in the region as its impediment. Iranian strategists learned important lessons from the direct confrontation with the technologically superior US Navy at the end of the war with Iraq. Based on these lessons, since the 1980s, Iran has maintained two naval forces – the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) – which are examined in detail in this chapter.

A close examination of Iran’s defense policy and its carefully crafted and developed asymmetric warfare doctrine since the early 1980s points to a great deal of pragmatism and flexibility and a willingness to adjust to the changing strategic environment. The strategy has pursued four major goals: To ensure regime survival, to protect the homeland, to deter potential enemies, and to project power. In pursuing these broad objectives, the republic’s core priorities have been influenced by a combination of geopolitical forces, ideological orientation, and the revolutionary elite’s definition of security and threat perceptions.

The chapter examines the recent changes in the nature of modern warfare. It argues that most recent military conflicts take the form of “low-intensity conflict,” “gray-zone competition,” “asymmetric warfare,” “fourth-generation warfare,” and “irregular warfare.” Given the huge military spending gap between Iran and its regional and global adversaries, Iranian leaders have articulated and adopted an asymmetric warfare doctrine since the 1979 revolution.

For millennia, Iran’s geography has been a cornerstone of its geopolitical strength, but at critical junctures also its Achilles heel. Time and space are the factors that have shaped the Iranian identity and at the same time generate the conditions that threaten the country’s national security. Geography is the percolator for generational grievances against foreign machinations and interventions. Abuse by world powers has loomed large in Iran’s threat narratives and perceptions. The chapter argues that Tehran’s threat perceptions have evolved over the years and Iranians have shown a remarkable ability to adapt their doctrine and posture in response.

Cyber warfare plays a major role in Iran’s asymmetric defense strategy. Since the early 2000s, the Iranian government has invested substantial resources in both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities and has demonstrated a willingness to and relative effectiveness in using these capabilities against its opponents both at home and abroad. Iran’s presence in cyberspace has played a central role in the country’s domestic and foreign policies strategies. Cyber tools have enabled Tehran to address domestic threats to the sanctity of the Islamic regime while simultaneously providing an offensive toolkit aimed at punishing its regional and international adversaries.

The Iranian state is a complex political machine. Today’s Iran is a product of the combined forces of evolutionary change and abrupt political upheavals. The Iranian state is remarkable for its longevity and its combination of traditional and modern (Western) features, which has resulted from its long and varied life. The Islamic Republic is a product of a series of political compromises that have their origins partly in the bureaucracy created by the Pahlavis and partly in the interactions of the revolutionary coalition that wrested power from the monarch in 1979.

For millennia, Iran’s leaders have seen a powerful military as the major guarantor of the country’s independence. In this context, self-reliance has been considered the best strategy for providing the armed forces with the space to act as an independent arm of the state and for defending the nation’s interests overseas. The chapter examines the evolution of Iran’s military–industrial complex from the early twentieth century to the present. The analysis suggests that the Islamic Republic has successfully established itself as a major manufacturer of arms in the Global South. Iran’s long experience with strategic isolation has further fueled the momentum for self-reliance in defense. Essentially, Tehran has no other option but to develop indigenous military capabilities.

This chapter shows that, under the Pahlavi monarchy, the country had one of, if not the, best-equipped and best-trained military in the Middle East and North Africa region. In this chapter, the focus is on how the Imperial Armed Forces changed following the revolution. Attention is drawn to the structure of the Islamic Republic’s military machine and to the historical and strategic forces that have come to determine the shape, doctrine, and capabilities of the country’s armed forces. The impact of the revolution itself on the armed forces was significant, compounded by the role-defining war with Iraq (1980–8). As a consequence of developments since 1979, the Sepah has emerged as the republic’s most powerful fighting force, the establishment’s trusted weapon against domestic dissent, and the regime’s leading weapon in regional conflicts. This centrality is largely attributed to the IRGC Command Network.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Iran was a victim of a foreign power (Soviet Union) using ethnic groups (Kurds and Azeris) as proxies in efforts to destabilize the country. Ironically, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah used the same tactic against Iran’s regional adversaries by cultivating ties with the Kurds in Iraq and the Shia communities of Lebanon. After the 1979 revolution, supporting proxies has become a cornerstone of the Islamic Republic’s security doctrine and its regional policy. Indeed, the republic’s network of proxies is an essential part of Tehran’s asymmetric warfare strategy and has been extensively used for both offensive and defensive purposes.

This chapter examines Iran’s ballistic missiles and space program. It provides a historical background to the program from the Shah’s initiatives to the present. Given that the Islamic Republic has been under a strict arms embargo for decades, the power of its air force in particular has deteriorated significantly. Iranian military leaders have invested military and human resources in building and developing strong missile and space capabilities to make up for this weakness. Initially, Tehran relied on foreign assistance, particularly from China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but it has developed significant indigenous capabilities since the 1980s. The chapter compares Iran’s extensive missile and space program with the leading militaries of the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel.