Headquarters Burma Army

Burma Corps

Chinese Expeditionary Force

5th Army

6th Army

67th Army

To summarize, the purpose of this book was to examine the logistic influences on the design, conduct and outcome of British operations in the Burma campaign between 1942 and 1945. It set out to achieve this aim by identifying the principal logistic problems at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare; examining how those problems were addressed and assessing the impact on operations of the measures taken to overcome them. Part I established that, in May 1942, following the fall of Singapore and Burma, the main logistic challenges were the suitability of India as the strategic base of operations; the capacity of the operational LofC; and, at the tactical level, the lack of effective means to sustain forces cut off or manoeuvring away from fixed LofC in the jungle. All these problems were aggravated by lack of resources. Part II examined developments in these areas between May 1942 and early 1944. At the strategic level, it showed how India grew from a weak economic base sustaining an army of 180,000, employed principally on home defence duties, into one of the leading producers of warlike stores in the British Empire, providing armed forces of over 2 million people, every one of them a volunteer, and able to sustain on her soil an allied ground force equivalent to 16 divisions, as well as 86 air squadrons, all in addition to her own garrison. The strain of achieving that brought her domestic economy to the point of collapse. India had not been prepared at all for the role she had to assume after the fall of Singapore and Burma. Her defence posture faced west and, until the start of the Second World War, had been established only for internal security and to repel minor external aggression. She had not been expected to be a strategic base, that role in South-East Asia and the Far East having been given to Singapore.

By capturing Burma in May 1942 the Japanese achieved the planned limit of their westward exploitation, at least for the time being. Throughout the remainder of that year and most of 1943 they were content to consolidate and defend their gains, and it was not until late 1943 that they began to probe further in any strength. The allies were not to know that at the time, of course, and, with Burma lost, a Japanese attack on Assam or east Bengal after the 1942 monsoon appeared to be a distinct possibility. Operational thinking in GHQ(I) and the Eastern Army in early 1942 was focused, therefore, on the urgent deployment, training and maintenance of forces sufficient to prevent any further advance. Once an adequate defensive posture had been achieved, attention could turn to the possibility of building up sufficient strength for offensive operations, but that was destined to be a long, drawn-out process. The most pressing logistic concerns at the operational level during 1942 and 1943 surrounded the capacity of the poor quality, overstretched overland LofC between the developing strategic base in India and the two corps fighting at the tactical level. There were two distinct but linked corridors of communication. The river, road and rail routes following the general line of the Brahmaputra from Calcutta to north-east Assam were known as the Assam LofC or the ‘northern line’. Those to Chittagong were known as the east Bengal LofC or the ‘southern line’ (see Map 3). In addition to British operations in Assam, the northern line also had to sustain what rapidly became the allied strategic main point of effort in the South-East Asia theatre: the American-led operations to maintain and expand the link to China. Under the prevailing environmental and economic conditions, these were immense undertakings. Like the India base, the LofC were incapable of supporting the level of activity envisaged by the Combined COS in the time frames at first desired. It was not until monumental difficulties had been overcome that the China airlift could achieve the rate of delivery promised by the Americans, or any major offensive to open a new overland route could even be considered.

XV Corps: The Third Arakan Campaign, December 1944– April 1945

By December 1944 Christison had four infantry divisions, the 50th Tank Brigade and the 3rd Commando Brigade at his disposal in XV Corps. Intimate naval support was provided by Force 64, comprising the Arakan Coastal Forces of inshore gunboats and the 90-odd minor landing craft too decrepit to have been sent to the Mediterranean in 1943. These forces had been working closely alongside XV Corps throughout the previous campaigning season together with the corps’ own substantial IWT group, providing waterborne tactical and logistic support along the coast and rivers. In addition Amphibious Force W, which arrived at last from the Mediterranean at the end of 1944 with some 82 landing ships and heavier landing craft, was to support an amphibious assault on Akyab. Christison formed a joint service headquarters to command the forthcoming operations, with Rear Admiral Martin, commanding Force W as the Naval Commander, and Air Vice Marshal the Earl of Brandon commanding 224 Group, as the Air Commander.

The first phase of the advance was to be the 25th Indian Division's seizure of Foul Point, at the southern tip of the Mayu Peninsula, during January 1945. Once that had been achieved the 26th Indian Division was to make an amphibious assault on Akyab, landed by Force W, with a planning date of 20 January (see Map 4). ALFSEA LofC Command would then take control of Akyab and develop the new base to support the 14th Army while XV Corps carried on with the clearance of north Arakan, sustained by naval amphibious craft and its own IWT. The 25th Division's advance down the Mayu Peninsula began on 14 December 1944, just as the main breakout of XXXIII Corps was starting from the bridgehead east of the Chindwin at Kalewa, and it proceeded a good deal quicker than anticipated. The Mayu Peninsula was cleared by 27 December, three weeks before Force W and the 26th Division were ready to make the landing on Akyab.

Note that 10th USAAF included the 3rd US Combat Cargo Group, comprising 100 Dakotas, and the 443rd US Troop Carrier Group, comprising 48 Dakotas. Both these groups were reserved for the support of NCAC, and were not available to the 14th Army.

ALFSEA

CCTF

Headquarters Burma Army

Rangoon Garrison

1st Burma Division

17th Indian Division

The end of 1944 ushered in the final stages of the Burma campaign: the destruction of the Japanese Army in Burma and the recapture of Rangoon. At that time, although keeping pace with current operations, the strategic logistic build-up was still behind its planned schedule. Resources earmarked to be reassigned from Europe were still being withheld because of slower than anticipated progress in the war with Germany, and preparations to accommodate and support them when they finally arrived in India were not yet complete. The eventual allied force levels, for which India was to provide the base, had been increased again to 27⅔ divisions, 215 combat air squadrons and some 600 transport aircraft. In addition the LofC for a further 91 USAAF squadrons based in China would pass through India. The facilities to support these forces were still only 65 to 75 per cent complete, and they were not expected to be finished until late 1945. Although SEAC's current strength of 17 divisions and 119 air squadrons was being maintained adequately, resource constraints and India's capacity as a base continued to set limits on the force levels and logistic support that could be committed to operations and, consequently, the scope of strategic intentions and operational plans.

At the operational level, however, the position on the Assam and east Bengal LofC improved dramatically as 1944 progressed, and, by the end of the year, many of the problems identified earlier appeared to have been solved by the resources then being committed and the experience gained (see Map 3). The capacity of the northern line was expected to reach nearly 11,000 tons per day by the end of 1944, exceeding the estimated requirement at that time by some 500 tons. That of the southern line would be nearly 7,500 tons per day, some 800 tons above the anticipated demand. The rail-head and base depots at Dimapur were expected to be able to handle 3,200 tons per day, exclusive of POL, easily matching the estimated needs of the 14th Army and its supporting 221 Group of the Eastern Air Command on the Assam front.