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From the local level to international politics, deliberation helps to increase mutual understanding and trust, in order to arrive at political decisions of high epistemic value and legitimacy. This book gives deliberation a dynamic dimension, analysing how levels of deliberation rise and fall in group discussions, and introducing the concept of 'deliberative transformative moments' and how they can be applied to deeply divided societies, where deliberation is most needed but also most difficult to work. Discussions between ex-guerrillas and ex-paramilitaries in Colombia, Serbs and Bosnjaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and police officers and locals in Brazilian favelas are used as case studies, with participants addressing how peace can be attained in their countries. Allowing access to the records and transcripts of the discussions opens an opportunity for practitioners of conflict resolution to apply this research to their work in trouble spots of the world, creating a link between the theory and practice of deliberation.
Deliberative spoilers frequently transform a discussion from a high to a low level of deliberation and often keep it at a low level. At the same time, they are rarely responsible that the discussion is transformed from a low to a high level of deliberation, and they also rarely keep it at a high level. In all groups, we could identify such deliberative spoilers. An example comes from a group in a Brazilian favela with three police officers and seven local inhabitants, four of whom teenagers. Police officer Suzana emerged as a deliberative spoiler. Six times the discussion was transformed from a high to a low level of deliberation, five times by Suzana. There were 40 speech acts at a low level of deliberation, 21 due to Suzana. Six times the discussion was transformed from a low to a high level of dliberation, not a single time by Suzana. There were 26 speech acts at a high level of deliberation, only one by Suzana. Thus, she was a clear deliberative spoiler. Actors like Suzana are a real problem for the deliberative atmosphere in a group. The best hope is deliberative education from early on in childhood in families and schools.
Deliberative leaders are actors who are frequently able to transform a discussion from a low to a high level of deliberation and to keep it at a high level. At the same time, they are rarely responsible that the discussion drops to a low deliberative level, and they rarely keep the discussion at a low level of deliberation. In all groups, we could identify such deliberative leaders. One example comes from a Colombian group of four ex-guerillas and three ex-paramilitaries. Ex-guerrilla Ana and ex-paramilitary Diana emerged as deliberative leaders. Seven times the discussion was transformed from a low to a high level of deliberation, three times by Diana, two times by Ana. There were 57 speech acts at a high level of deliberation, 23 by Diana, 12 by Ana. Seven times the discussion was transformed from a high to a low deliberative level, never by Ana and only once by Diana. There were 71 speech acts at a low level of deliberation, only six by Diana and two by Ana. Thus, the two women greatly helped with deliberation. Although it is often postulated that all actors should equally contribute to deliberation, our data show that spontaneously some actors emerge as deliberative leaders.
In Chapter 1 we set the historical context in which we did our research in the deeply divided societies of Colombia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Brazil. We describe how we selected the participants for our discussion groups, which was done as randomly as possible. We took great care to follow strict rules of research ethics for the safety of the moderators and the participants. The discussions took place at safe locations. The moderators did not raise sensitive questions about the past involvement of the participants in war actions and violence in general. The only topic for discussion was ways for more peace and a better life. For the records on our website the voices of the participants were altered , and for the transcripts the names were changed. Therefore the confidentiality of what was said in the discussions was secured.
Rationality means that a proposed course of action is justified with reasons and that these reasons are logically linked with the postulated conclusion. Although rationality is no longer considered as so central for good deliberation, our data show that rational arguments had about the same importance as personal stories to transform a discussion from a low to a high level of deliberation. By contrast, personal stories often also had a negative effect on deliberation, while we found only a single case, where a rational argumentation transformed a discussion from a high to a low level of deliberation. An example of a rational argument came from an ex-paramilitary in Colombia, who proposed that in order to procure more jobs for ex-combatants, business companies should get tax incentives for hiring them. Behind this argument is a logic that could stem from a textbook on taxes. The case where rational argumentation decreased deliberation was a nine minute long speech by a high police officer in a Brazilian favela, which was presented in such a hauty and arrogant way that it brought the discussion to a standstill. Overall, rationality fared better than personal stories for deliberation.
The deliberative model is talk centered, so that to be mute does not seem to fit the model. We found, however, instances where muteness to aggressive remarks helped to transform a discussion back to a high level of deliberation. Such an instance occurred in a group of Colombian ex-combatants. An ex-paramilitary referred in an hostile manner to the guerrillas as cattle thieves and rapists. As the next speaker, an ex-guerrilla remained mute on this attack and returnd to the previous discussion on agricultural reform proposing micro credits for poor farmers to raise cattle. According to usual deliberative thinking, this ex-guerrilla should have engaged the ex-paramilitary in a conversation, asking him from where he had the information that guerrillas are cattle thieves and rapists. A shouting match may have developed, bringing the discussion to a premature end. Therefore, it was in the interest of deliberation that the ex-guerrilla did not react to the remark of the ex-paramilitary, who in turn did not continue with his hostile statements. Thus, the discussion continued as if the ex-paramilitary never would have made his hostile remark. Muteness helped deliberation.
In the Introduction we define what we mean by deliberation. We then turn to the concept of Deliberative Transformative Moments (DTM) and present the coding categories to get a handle at the concept. We explain why we use an interpretative qualitative approach and give justification why we focus our research on deeply divided societies and why we chose group discussions between ex-guerrillas and ex-paramilitaries in Colombia, Serbs and Bosnjaks in Srebrenica and police officers and local inhabitants in Brazilian favelas. We also show how our research fits the general literature on conflict resolution in deeply divided societies. To make the research transparent we have established a website with the records, transcripts and English translations of all the group discussions (www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/research/deliberation). Our coding resulted in high reliability.
Deliberation has a value in itself. Ideally, however, deliberation should also lead to valuable outcomes. We checked whether long stretches of deliberation led to such good outcomes. This was indeed the case. An example comes from a group in a Brazilian favela with five police officers and eleven local inhabitants. In one sequence of the discussion, there was a stretch of 29 speech at a high level of deliberation. At the end of this stretch there were calls to reach agreements on concrete issues. A community resident, for example, argued that "the problems have been discussed, now let us move on to solutions." Agreement was reached from both sides that police officers should be recruited from the community itself and not from the outside. There was also agreement that police officers should get a better training in skills of communication. On the side of the community, there was agreement that it needs more leadership to represent its interests. These were all valuable outcomes resulting from a long stretch of a high level deliberation. According to the task of the group, these outcomes were helpful for a more peaceful culture in the favela. Deliberation had fulfilled its goal.
With his emphasis on rationality, Jürgen Habermas does not see any merit of humor for deliberation, since it leads only to confusion. It was Sammy Basu who most forcefully has argued that humor can have a positive effect on deliberation serving as social lubricant and breaking ice. An illustration of humor favoring deliberation comes from Srebrenica, where one of the discussion groups was despairing about the wild pigs that come down from the mountains causing severe damage in the yards. One of the Serbs lightens up the atmosphere saying that pigs also want to learn a little culture here. Another Serb picks
up on this humor with the remark that where we live is also wilderness, so for the pigs it is all the same. Both speakers get great laughters. They were able to laugh at themselves and the lack of culture in Srebrenica. There is often a fine line between humor and sarcasm; with humor one laughs with others, with sarcasm down at others. In one of the Brazilian favelas a teenager brought the discussion down to a low level of deliberation, when she mocked in a sacastic way a police officer that he took a leisurely walk rather than to do his job.
Initially, deliberative scholars like Jürgen Habermas dismissed personal stories as contributing to good deliberation and insisted on the importance of rationality. In more recent developments of deliberative theory, scholars like Jane Mansbridge gave more importance to the emotional aspect expressed with personal stories for good deliberation. In our discussion groups, personal stories were frequently brought into play, and in many cases they had a positive effect on deliberation, equally often, however, the effect was negative. Favorable stories for deliberation went into useful details for understanding and were related to the issue under discussion. A good illustration of this type of story is when an ex-guerrilla reported in colourful detail how he was chased away from an affluent Bogota neighborhood and linked this story to discrimination of ex-combatants, a relevant issue for the advancement of peace. Harmful stories for deliberation were superficial and did not link them to the issue under discussion. Here, a good illustration is when another ex-guerrilla told the story that he was put to jail without saying why and did not relate the story to the advancing of peace.
Deliberative democracy is now an influential approach to the study of democracy and political behaviour. Its key proposition is that, in politics, it is not only power that counts, but good discussions and arguments too. This book examines the interplay between the normative and empirical aspects of the deliberative model of democracy. Jürg Steiner presents the main normative controversies in the literature on deliberation, including self-interest, civility and truthfulness. He then summarizes the empirical literature on deliberation and proposes methods by which the level of deliberation can be measured rather than just assumed. Steiner's empirical research is based in the work of various research groups, including experiments with ordinary citizens in the deeply divided societies of Colombia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Belgium, as well as Finland and the European Union. Steiner draws normative implications from a combination of both normative controversies and empirical findings.
According to deliberative theory, arguments need to be justified. This element of the theory has two aspects: the form and the substance of justification. This chapter deals with the form, the next chapter with the substance. With regard to the form, the key question is whether in deliberation only rational arguments are allowed or whether personal stories can also be used.
Normative controversies in the literature
In the Habermasian version of deliberation, arguments need to be justified in a rational, logical, and elaborate way. Assertions should be introduced and critically assessed through “the orderly exchange of information and reasons between parties.” The arguments must have intrinsic characteristics that make them compelling to others. “Communicative action refers to a process of argumentation in which those taking part justify their validity claims before an ideally expanded audience.” Jürgen Habermas, as a normative standard, explicitly excludes narratives and images as deliberative justification. This does not mean, however, as Michael A. Neblo points out, that Habermas excludes narratives and images as a practical matter or considers such discourses as necessarily inferior. There is controversy in the philosophical literature about this focus of Habermas on rationality in the justification of arguments. Theorists like Jane Mansbridge argue that testimonies about personal stories should also count as valid justifications. She justifies this position in the following way: “Stories can establish credibility, create empathy, and trigger a sense of injustice, all of which contribute directly or indirectly to justification.”