This chapter explores the role of context in the computation of implicit pragmatic meanings (implicatures). In the classic view of Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics, conversational implicatures are triggered by the Cooperative Principle and the maxims of conversation, and are defined as non-contextual, with the exception of particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs). On the other hand, it is assumed that generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs) and conventional implicatures (CIs) are not contextual, although GCIs can be defeated by the context or denied by the speaker. This non-contextual approach to pragmatics (the Gricean turn) has given rise to a default approach to implicatures. The second purpose of this chapter is to tackle the contextual dimension of neo-Gricean pragmatics, which has been developed by exponents of neo-Gricean pragmatics. Their approaches to pragmatics, limited to GCIs as scalar implicatures, are based either on pragmatic principles, the Q-Principle and R- or I-principle (Horn, Levinson), or on the reformulation of conversational maxims and reasoning (Gazdar, Chierchia, Fox). It is argued that the focus on GCIs, although it should minimize the role of context in the generation of implicatures, demonstrates on the contrary the pervasive function of context, which is not limited to implicature cancellation.

Relevance Theory is a cognitive pragmatic theory devoted to utterance interpretation. Its main assumption is that linguistic communication is guided by the communicative principle of relevance, which states that the addressee is invited to take the speaker’s contribution as optimally relevant. In intracultural communication, the crucial point is to understand how communication succeeds, since its success depends not on a complete linguistic decoding but rather on accessing the relevant contextual assumptions; that is, the assumptions that are closest to the speaker’s informative intention. This chapter’s first aim is to elucidate both how Relevance Theory is included in Grice’s legacy, and how it diverges from Grice. Its second aim is to discuss the place of Relevance Theory in pragmatics today, and more specifically to explore whether Relevance Theory makes different predictions than do neo-Gricean approaches. Its third aim is to give insights into Relevance Theory’s contributions to the intercultural pragmatics agenda, and in particular to discuss how Relevance Theory converges with but also diverges from the intercultural pragmatics paradigm initiated by Kecskes in 2014.

In this chapter, Jacques Moeschler addresses some complex issues about the function of negation and its interaction with metarepresentation.He identifies three distinct uses of negation, namely, descriptive negation and two kinds of metarepresentational negation (one metalinguistic, the other presupposition-cancelling), which differ in their semantic entailments. His key claim is that all three of them have what he calls ‘representational’ (or propositional) effects on the context, specifically the elimination and/or the strengthening of existing assumptions, albeit different for each of the uses.

This chapter addresses the issue of the place of pragmatics within various linguistic frameworks. It starts with formal linguistic theories in the Chomskyan tradition, before moving on to functional theories. It is argued that in both cases, pragmatics is not really accounted for, and is deemed to fall outside the scope of linguistics per se. The reason pragmatics is not accounted for is that all these models rely on a code model of communication, whereas pragmatic theories presuppose an inferential model of communication.

This chapter starts by summarizing the predictions made by various theories of implicature that have consequences for language processing. It then presents empirical evidence bearing on a number of questions related to the processing of implicatures, namely: their processing cost, the difference between particularized and generalized implicatures, the role of mental state attribution for the derivation of implicatures, the role of politeness for the derivation of implicatures.

The notion of implicature, defined as a specific type of meaning, has been one of the departure points for Grice’s theory of communication and has remained a central topic in all frameworks of pragmatics ever since

This chapter focuses on relevance theory. It first introduces its main tenets, before giving a detailed presentation of the cognitive and the communicative principles of relevance. With this framework in mind, the chapter goes on to illustrate how relevance theory deals with different cases involving pragmatic enrichment. It also introduces the notion of explicature, parallel to that of implicature that was introduced in relevance theory. Finally, the chapter illustrates how some pragmatic phenomena that were previously treated as cases of implicature have been reclassified as explicatures in relevance theory.

This chapter presents empirical studies that have tested children’s ability to understand implicatures. It starts with the category of relevance implicatures, before moving to scalar implicatures. In both cases, the conclusion is that even young children during the preschool years have the ability to derive implicatures when the task is kept simple enough. The chapter then presents studies that have focused on cases of atypical development, such as autism spectrum disorders, SLI and deafness.

This chapter introduces the context in which Grice presented his theory of implicatures, with special reference to speech act theory. It goes on to present Grice’s main contribution to pragmatics, detailing his principle of cooperation and presenting an overview of the different types of implicatures that he defined. Finally, the chapter presents a number of criticisms that have been levelled at his theory.

This chapter discusses generalized conversational implicatures, especially quantitative or scalar implicatures, clausal implicatures and informative implicatures. First, the notion of quantitative scale is introduced as well as its relation to the logical square and its role in the computation of scalar implicatures. Then the reduction of Grice’s nine maxims to two general principles, as proposed by neo-Gricean models of pragmatics, is illustrated and critically discussed. Finally, the chapter presents an alternative to the neo-Gricean approach to scalar implicatures, involving a covert exhaustification operator (only) that operates at the syntax-semantics interface.

This chapter introduces the context in which Grice presented his theory of implicatures, with special reference to speech act theory. It goes on to present Grice’s main contribution to pragmatics, detailing his principle of cooperation and presenting an overview of the different types of implicatures that he defined. Finally, the chapter presents a number of criticisms that have been levelled at his theory.

This chapter starts by summarizing the predictions made by various theories of implicature that have consequences for language processing. It then presents empirical evidence bearing on a number of questions related to the processing of implicatures, namely: their processing cost, the difference between particularized and generalized implicatures, the role of mental state attribution for the derivation of implicatures, the role of politeness for the derivation of implicatures.

This chapter discusses the ability of second language learners to derive implicatures. It starts from the observation that Grice’s maxims do not seem to apply in all cultures. These cultural differences explain in part why second language learners experience difficulties with implicatures. The chapter also reviews the roles of other factors, such as the level of linguistic proficiency. The chapter also addresses the main similarities between children acquiring their first language and second language learners. One of the main differences is the existence of language transfer in the case of learners, a notion that is discussed and illustrated with respect to its relation to the phenomenon of implicatures.

This chapter discusses a special case of implicature that since Grice has been labelled conventional implicature and explains how it differs from both particularized and generalized conversational implicatures. The second purpose of this chapter is to show the analogies and differences between presuppositions and implicatures. It is argued that the two notions are clearly distinct because, unlike presuppositions, conventional implicatures cannot be backgrounded and cannot project.