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21 results

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  • Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design

  • Lucy F. Ackert, Ann B. Gillette, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Mark Rider
  • Journal:
    Experimental Economics / Volume 14 / Issue 3 / September 2011
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 March 2025, pp. 307-321

  • We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.

Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance
  • Economic and Political Perspectives
  • Edited by Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Stanley L. Winer
  • Published online:
    05 July 2014
    Print publication:
    22 May 2014
  • Although coercion is a fundamental and unavoidable part of our social lives, economists have not offered an integrated analysis of its role in the public economy. The essays in this book focus on coercion arising from the operation of the fiscal system, a major part of the public sector. Collective choices on fiscal matters emerge from and have all the essential characteristics of social interaction, including the necessity to force unwanted actions on some citizens. This was recognized in an older tradition in public finance which can still serve as a starting point for modern work. The contributors to the volume recognize this tradition, but add to it by using contemporary frameworks to study a set of related issues concerning fiscal coercion and economic welfare. These issues range from the compatibility of an open access society with the original Wicksellian vision to the productivity of coercion in experimental games.

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