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At the start of the 1990s, the world was still a relatively hospitable place for cartels. Many enforcers, such as the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, viewed cartels as largely operating in local or at most domestic markets and that senior executives of major corporations were not so audacious as to operate a global cartel. Turning to the European Commission, it pursued several national business arrangements that affected trade between the member states as part of its European integration objective, but mostly with injunctive relief, and not punishing fines. Some of its countries, such as The Netherlands, did not even have a competition law prohibiting cartels. However, by the end of the 1990s, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition were aggressively prosecuting a slew of international cartels that had been operating for years, while the Netherlands had at long last adopted a competition law and were prosecuting a massive construction cartel with hundreds of members.
Collusion remains a strong undercurrent of business practice despite anti-cartel enforcement being a top priority of competition authorities. Alongside active prosecution of cartels, the study of cartels is a vibrant area of research for economic and legal scholars. A challenge for both practice and scholarship is that cartels evolve, as colluding firms continuously devise new methods to circumvent competition. Cartels Diagnosed presents twelve gripping cartel case studies of collusion from key business sectors such as the airline industry, the gasoline industry, and big pharma. Written by renowned economists, these concise and accessible case studies deliver novel insights into cartel formation, facilitating practices, cartels' modus operandi, and the efficacy of cartels. Assisting in understanding new cartel mechanisms and their effects, developing new policies to deter and destabilize cartels, and measuring harm, this volume on cartel morphology is an invaluable reference for supporting public and private enforcers in detecting and prosecuting cartels.
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