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The adoption of the policy of “terror” by the Convention in 1793-1794 emerged in large part from a position of relative weakness in the context of external war and internal unrest. While Jacobin deputies were prominent in revolutionary leadership, the policy was endorsed by deputies in the Convention. The “terror” policy was seen by those who perpetrated it as a temporary form of justice, albeit harsh justice, necessitated by war and revolutionary crisis. The Revolutionary Tribunal and the guillotine were designed as examples of spectacular violence, to show the strength of the revolutionary government, and intimidate counter-revolutionary opponents. The actual application of these laws was very uneven, and fell most heavily in frontier departments, and in those regions where there were armed uprisings against revolutionary government. By far the greatest number of deaths occurred in the context of the civil war in the Vendée.
In common with most of Europe, both Catholic and Protestant, in France there was very little support for religious toleration at the start of the eighteenth century. France was unique amongst the major Catholic powers in having a sizeable Calvinist minority which had developed without the protection of a civil power. This meant that the question of toleration could not be ignored as it was in those countries where religious uniformity prevailed. In some ways France appeared to take a step backward in this respect, in that a measure of official toleration had existed in the shape of the Edict of Nantes of 1598 which was then revoked in 1685. But the Edict was never intended as an endorsement of the principle of toleration. On the contrary, it was a pragmatic measure to end the religious wars of the sixteenth century and a recognition of the military force of the Huguenots, rather than a positive statement of toleration. Nevertheless, the Revocation of the Edict meant that the situation for France's Calvinist minority at the start of the eighteenth century was in many ways worse than it had been for much of the seventeenth. In terms of ideas, France is often seen as being at the forefront of the debate on religious toleration during the eighteenth century, as the French philosophes such as Voltaire formulated arguments which were to influence much of Europe towards a new recognition of rights of private conscience. But as we shall see, the French monarchy, like other Catholic leaders, tended to be hostile to such ideas.
Robespierre's politics have often been seen as synonymous with the Revolution itself. He encapsulated what was best – and worst – about the Revolution. He was a tireless advocate for liberty and equality, yet, to defend these principles, he was prepared to adopt the Terror. Nevertheless, he was only one man amongst many, and we may ask why it is that revolutionary ideology as a whole has so often been identified with this one individual. The reasons for this are complex and manifold. For one thing, Robespierre held a place at the centre of revolutionary events longer than any of his contemporaries, successfully negotiating the turbulent seas of rapidly changing politics. In the years from 1789 to 1794, he became adept as a political tactician, surviving many changes of fortune and seeing off a number of political opponents. Almost from the very outset, he was a focus for radical opposition. At times, he was a lone critic of government policy. When the political coup of June 1793 brought the Montagnards to government, Robespierre's moment came and he took his place at the heart of policy-making during the Revolution's most critical period. Although he never dominated executive power to the extent that has often been credited, as a member of the Committee of Public Safety he was the most articulate spokesman of the politics of the revolutionary government, both in the Convention and at the Jacobin club. He preferred, whenever possible, to speak about general political principles, leaving the details of organisation to others, and his speeches offer some of the most powerful expositions of Jacobin ideology.
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