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81 results

Page 1 of 5

  • Appendix 1 - The Composite Index of National Capability Score

  • from Appendices
  • Roger L. Ransom, University of California, Riverside
  • Book:
    Gambling on War
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    28 June 2018, pp 273-278

  • Summary

    Appendix A.1 discusses the Composite Index of National Capability [CINC] Score developed by the Correlates of War Project. The CINC uses data on six broad measures to estimate the ability of a country to wage war: military personnel and Expenditures, total and urban population, energy consumption, and production of iron and steel. The CINC scores for the major powers is provided for selected years from 1850 to 1935.

  • 1 - Confidence, Fear, and a Propensity to Gamble

  • Roger L. Ransom, University of California, Riverside
  • Book:
    Gambling on War
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    28 June 2018, pp 5-32

  • Summary

    Chapter 1 presents a conceptual framework to examine the ways in which the interaction of “animal spirits” – confidence, fear and a propensity to gamble – produced a tendency for decision-makers to gamble that massive battles would produce “victories” that could win the war. The puzzle of why both sides continued to resort to risky military strategies is explained by a combination of overconfidence on the part of generals that their military strategy would succeed, and a deep-seated fear if they did not continue to press their attacks they might lose the war. The result was a series of military disasters that led to a war of attrition which gradually exhausted the belligerents without producing any hope of ending the war. Ultimately, I argue that the outcome of the war rested as much on the ability of the Allied Powers to muster their superior economic resources to continue the fight, as it did by the success of military strategies on the battlefield.

  • 7 - The Last Gamble

  • Roger L. Ransom, University of California, Riverside
  • Book:
    Gambling on War
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    28 June 2018, pp 195-232

  • Summary

    Chapter 7 details the final struggles of the war. In April of 1918 the Germans unleashed one last attempt to end the stalemate on the Western front. The Allied lines bent, but they did not break. The German troops were again stopped at the Marne, and when the Allied forces launched a series of successful counteroffensives, the GermanS asked for a cease-fire. Surprised by the sudden German collapse, Allied leaders did not have a ready response to this request. No Allied troops occupied any German territory at the time of the request, and the war councils were split on the question of whether they should continue their attacks onto German soil. However, both sides were thoroughly exhausted by this time, and the pressures to end the fighting produced an agreement on a cease-fire. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire had already signed cease-fires with the British, the French, and the Italians, so the war that began in 1914 had finally ended. What remained was the task of rebuilding the national boundaries of Europe and establishing institutional arrangements to preserve the peace. That would take several more years.

  • 4 - A War of Attrition

  • Roger L. Ransom, University of California, Riverside
  • Book:
    Gambling on War
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    28 June 2018, pp 85-117

  • Summary

    Chapter 4 examines why both sides aggressively pursued in their attempts to break the stalemate that had emerged by the end of 1914. They spent 1915 mobilizing their resources and launching a series of bloody, but futile assaults on enemy positions. The misguided logic behind these attacks was overconfidence that the outdated strategy of previous wars was working, combined with a deep-seated fear that they might lose the war if they did nothing. In 1916 decision-makers chose to pursue a war of attrition by launching even larger and riskier military campaigns in their search for victory. The war got wider. Italy joined the Entente Powers and the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in 1915; while other countries in Northern Europe and the United States tried to maintain their neutrality in the face of blockades that interrupted global trade. However neutrality was becoming increasingly difficult, and as 1916 ended, things were finally changing. The Germans put Paul Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff in command of a new strategy focusing on victory in the East, and the United States moved closer to joining the Entente.

  • 6 - War and Revolution

  • Roger L. Ransom, University of California, Riverside
  • Book:
    Gambling on War
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    28 June 2018, pp 154-194

  • Summary

    Chapter 6. Examines impact of war on the political and military situations in 1917. New governments emerged in Britain (David Lloyd-George), France (Georges Clemenceau) and Germany (Paul Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff). In Russia the establishment of a Bolshevik government led by Vladimir Lenin resulted in a cease-fire in December, followed by the Treaty Brest Litovsk that ended the war between Russia and Germany three months later. The Germans were prepared to gamble that victory on the Western Front was within reach. The failure of the German economy to meet the military and civilian needs, and decision by the United States to join the war produced a need for quick military success. The Allied generals still believed their war of attrition was working. They launched offensives that produced huge losses and no significant gains. For the Germans, 1918 offered some confidence that their military efforts might succeed before the Americans arrived; for the Allies it offered a hope that they could hold on until the Americans arrived. Both sides remained convinced that continuing the war was worth the risks.

  • 8 - The Chaos of Victory

  • Roger L. Ransom, University of California, Riverside
  • Book:
    Gambling on War
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    28 June 2018, pp 233-269

  • Summary

    Chapter 8 addresses the issues facing the victorious Allies in their effort to produce peace agreements after the war. In January 1919 more than 30 delegations from around the world gathered in Paris to work out the arrangements for a postwar world. They faced a Herculean task for which they were woefully unprepared. The German, Habsburg, and Ottoman Empires had disappeared, creating a political vacuum that stretched across Central Europe and the Middle East. There was a pervasive sense of fear and uncertainty which undercut the confidence of the peacemakers in their efforts to define boundaries for new and existing states. There would be several years of additional conflict before the new map of Europe and the Middle East was finally settled. Historians continue to debate whether John Maynard Keynes’ indictment of the peacemakers’ efforts was justified. More recent assessments suggest that the accomplishments of Paris peace conference were probably as much as could be reasonably expected given the magnitude of the task before them. The First World War was a tragic catastrophe whose dark legacy remains part of the modern world.

  • Epilogue: The Tragedy of a World War

  • Roger L. Ransom, University of California, Riverside
  • Book:
    Gambling on War
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    28 June 2018, pp 270-272

  • Summary

    The argument of this book is that the Great War was a series of enigmatic tragedies that changed the world in a way that made it impossible to return to the antebellum state of affairs. The inability of leaders to constrain the “animal spirits” that led to overconfidence and fear resulted in a war that nobody wanted, nobody understood, and nobody can forget. A century later we are still struggling to adjust to the tragic legacy of the Great War

  • 3 - Schlieffen’s Gamble

  • Roger L. Ransom, University of California, Riverside
  • Book:
    Gambling on War
    Published online:
    21 June 2018
    Print publication:
    28 June 2018, pp 51-84

  • Summary

    Chapter 3 examines how the “Schlieffen Plan” turned the 1914 crisis between Austria and Serbia and Russia into a world war. The only plan the Germans had for dealing with a war with Russia in 1914 was based on a 1906 memo by General Alfred von Schlieffen arguing that the Germans must invade France before dealing with the Russians. In August 1914 the Germans had to quickly decide whether to implement Schlieffen’s plan, even though it would expand the war to include both the French British. Under pressure to do something right away the Kaiser was willing to say that Schlieffen’s gamble was worth the risk. Unfortunately for the Germans, things did not work out in their favor. German troops were finally stopped at the River Marne and both sides settled for a line of trenches that stretched from the English Channel to the Swiss border. The Schlieffen Plan was not, however, a complete failure. By the end of 1914 Germany controlled Belgium and a significant area of Northern France, and German victories at the battles of Masurian Lakes and Tannenberg had turned back the Russian invasion in East Prussia. That success boosted German confidence to continue the war.

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