This conclusion discusses in a preliminary fashion private homophobia and private economic injustice. These are two other kinds of injustice that happen in the private sphere. I show that this book can provide intellectual support for the conclusion that homophobia and economic injustice in our private lives are also wrong.

This chapter considers two kinds of injustice that happen online: digital discrimination and digital steering. Digital discrimination occurs when users discriminate on the basis of race. The motivating question of this chapter is how to combat this kind of discrimination. Even though digital discrimination is wrong, the law makes it difficult to hold websites responsible for it. However, this chapter argues that we can hold websites responsible for facilitating discrimination, what I call “digital steering.” We can hold websites responsible for encouraging or directing their users to discriminate on the basis of race. These platforms structure how we interact online. They make decisions, for instance, about website design, user interface, profile creation, and filtering and searching mechanisms. If these websites make it easy for us to discriminate on the basis of race, they engage in digital steering. In short, this chapter distinguishes steering from discrimination as an important way to combat racism in our digital lives.

This chapter argues that reproductive banks provide buyers the option to segregate on the basis of race. I define “segregation” here as discriminating on the basis of race in order to avoid racial integration. In selling sperm and ova, reproductive banks both discriminate against potential donors on the basis of race and steer buyers to do the same. Most notably, these banks engage in racial steering by disclosing the race of the donor. In doing so, they provide buyers the option to form a biological family that is racially homogenous. This allows buyers the option to avoid racially integrating their families. This is how banks sell segregation. Drawing on both the ideal society and actual society approaches to racial justice, this chapter argues that selling segregation is wrong. I also show that this practice is unlawful and unenforceable under the Constitution.

This chapter provides the moral consensus that will motivate the book and each of the individual chapters. This moral consensus draws on the ideal and actual society approaches or methodologies of justice. I argue that both these approaches support an expansive view of the boundary of racial justice by recognizing that private racism is wrong. I show that civil rights law enforces this consensus by prohibiting racial discrimination and steering in our private lives.

This chapter argues that casting racism is wrong and illegal under federal law. First, according to the ideal society approach, I argue that formal equality of opportunity is an essential feature of a liberal constitution. Private employers that discriminate on the basis of race violate a just constitution where society treats race as a morally irrelevant characteristic. Second, according to the actual society approach, I argue that by denying employment opportunities on the basis of race, television and movie studios further the harm of cultural imperialism. Third, I explain that racially discriminatory casting is illegal under federal law. Employers may not discriminate simply to cater to their customers’ preferences. Fourth, I discuss whether television and movie studios can avail themselves of an expressive right to discriminate under the First Amendment in order to permit this kind of racial discrimination. Fifth, in light of the argument of this chapter, I analyze a federal case where two black men sued ABC for hiring only white men for the network’s realty show - The Bachelor.

This book is about enlarging the boundary of racial justice by recognizing and addressing private racism. This book defines “private racism” as racial injustice that happens in the private sphere. By focusing on racial injustice that happens outside the governmental or public sphere, we expand the scope or boundary of racial justice. Usually, when we discuss racial injustice, we discuss racism in our public or political life, namely public racism. This means that we often focus on how the state discriminates on the basis of race in its application and enforcement of laws and policies. This book draws on the synergy of political theory and civil rights law to expand the boundary of racial justice and consider the way in which racial discrimination happens outside the governmental or public sphere.

This chapter enlarges the boundary of racial justice by considering sexual racism as another form of private racism. Here too racial discrimination affects our private lives. This kind of discrimination concerns perhaps the most private of opportunities. It too is wrong, or so this chapter argues. I show that racism makes it more difficult for those who are not white to find intimacy, where intimacy is the opportunity to be in a romantic or sexual relationship. This chapter shows that racial discrimination, stereotypes, and intersectionality happen in our intimate lives, what I call “sexual racism.” Websites and platforms that steer its users to discriminate on the basis of race facilitate sexual racism. Because they are public accommodations, we should prohibit them from doing so. This is one way to address racism in our intimate lives.