This article examines the democratic control over the European Union’s unilateral trade policy. It takes as a starting point how crises like COVID-19 and geopolitical tensions have led to the “weaponisation” of trade, making global commerce unpredictable. The EU has responded by modernising its trade instruments, such as anti-dumping measures and new regulations like the Anti-Coercion Instrument. However, these instruments often allow the European Commission to act without parliamentary approval, challenging democratic accountability. The article questions whether a democratic, yet effective, unilateral trade policy is possible for the EU. It reviews the processes behind the EU’s unilateral trade policy, critiques current legitimacy mechanisms and proposes reforms to enhance democratic oversight. Ultimately, it argues that a degree of democratisation of trade policy is feasible without Treaty changes, contributing to broader discussions on maintaining democratic control over executive actions in crises.

Faced with a changing geopolitical environment, the European Union has embarked on a legislative program to upgrade its unilateral trade instruments toolbox. By reforming existing instruments—for example, anti-dumping—and by adding new instruments to the European Commission’s toolbox (foreign subsidies instrument, international procurement instrument, anti-coercion instrument, and others), the EU legislature is significantly strengthening the position of the Commission in the governance of unilateral trade policy in the EU. This development raises accountability questions. By means of a comparative analysis of democratic accountability in unilateral trade policy in the United States and the EU, I describe this transformation of executive power in the EU and I argue that a further strengthening of democratic accountability mechanisms is needed to match the Commission’s growing responsibilities in this underexamined corner of EU trade policy.