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This chapter investigates how the challenging questions and tensions caused by migrants and their universalist claims for inclusion, have been approached and resolved in liberal democracies. By regarding the development of populism as a real and dangerous political phenomenon that has significant traction, the chapter asks whether populism adds something new to this approach and resolution. More specifically, does populism add some distinctiveness that we should be more sensitive to? With reference to the requirement that the state has to provide justifications for measures that affect individuals, the chapter asks how the tensions between exclusion versus inclusion and particularism versus cosmopolitanism, have been adjusted. It concludes that the adjustment has been in favour of exclusion and particularism. The concern that arises is that populism might further shape this adjustment to the point where the balance is completely tipped in favour of exclusion and statism. This raises general concerns about the nature of the community and its organizing liberal values.
This chapter aims to offer insights into the wider implications for the rule of law, including for the EU constitutional order, of the restrictions of migrants’ and asylum-seeker’ rights that follow from systematic noncompliance with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by certain Member States. It asks: Has the migration and asylum crisis developed into an EU constitutional crisis? There is a growing body of literature about the constitutional crisis of the EU. A rich debate also exists as to the failures of the CEAS. The chapter brings these two into conversation to demonstrate that migration governance plays a constitutive role for the EU. If the EU fails to treat the migration crisis as an EU constitutional crisis, it might risk disintegration and return to the national. This would take the evolution of the European project further away from its telos.
The Introduction contextualizes the volume’s objectives, introduces its research questions and defines basic terms. A starting point is the finding in the literature that migration is ’merely’ one of several contributing factors to democratic decay, in the sense that (authoritarian) populists have seized on the ‘migration crisis’ to further undermine constitutional democracy. Yet, in our estimation the relationship between the three forces that reside at the core of this volume – populism, democratic decay and migration – is more multifaceted and complex. After engaging with this relationship, the Introduction examines avenues for legal resilience against (authoritarian) populism. By drawing inspiration from the scholarship on environmental law, a definition of legal resilience is proposed, on the basis of which a two-stage analysis is developed to evaluate the possibilities and limitations of legal resilience against (overly) restrictive migration laws and policy. In a first stage, it should be determined how resilient the legal system itself has been in the face of populist onslaught. In the second stage, once we know how resilient the legal system as a whole has proven to be, we can identify the extent to which it provides for legal resilience against restrictive migration laws and policies.
The Introduction contextualizes the volume’s objectives, introduces its research questions and defines basic terms. A starting point is the finding in the literature that migration is ’merely’ one of several contributing factors to democratic decay, in the sense that (authoritarian) populists have seized on the ‘migration crisis’ to further undermine constitutional democracy. Yet, in our estimation the relationship between the three forces that reside at the core of this volume – populism, democratic decay and migration – is more multifaceted and complex. After engaging with this relationship, the Introduction examines avenues for legal resilience against (authoritarian) populism. By drawing inspiration from the scholarship on environmental law, a definition of legal resilience is proposed, on the basis of which a two-stage analysis is developed to evaluate the possibilities and limitations of legal resilience against (overly) restrictive migration laws and policy. In a first stage, it should be determined how resilient the legal system itself has been in the face of populist onslaught. In the second stage, once we know how resilient the legal system as a whole has proven to be, we can identify the extent to which it provides for legal resilience against restrictive migration laws and policies.
This chapter aims to offer insights into the wider implications for the rule of law, including for the EU constitutional order, of the restrictions of migrants’ and asylum-seeker’ rights that follow from systematic noncompliance with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by certain Member States. It asks: Has the migration and asylum crisis developed into an EU constitutional crisis? There is a growing body of literature about the constitutional crisis of the EU. A rich debate also exists as to the failures of the CEAS. The chapter brings these two into conversation to demonstrate that migration governance plays a constitutive role for the EU. If the EU fails to treat the migration crisis as an EU constitutional crisis, it might risk disintegration and return to the national. This would take the evolution of the European project further away from its telos.