To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Returnee executives have been found to be able to predict a variety of strategic actions effectively; however, less attention has been given to how these executives influence nonmarket strategic actions, especially bribery. We integrate upper echelons theory and institutional theory to examine whether and when returnee executives influence enterprise bribery. We argue that returnee executives may develop moral relativism, which makes them more likely to view bribery as an ethical means of competition. This, in turn, increases the extent to which enterprises engage in bribery. In addition, we argue that anticorruption initiatives (formal institutions) and Confucian culture (informal institutions) moderate the above relationships. The empirical discussion of data from 2,241 nonstate-owned listed companies in China confirms most of the above theoretical speculations. This study helps us recognize the dark side of returnee executives in emerging economies.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.
Unfortunately you do not have access to this content, please use the Get access link below for information on how to access this content.