The perspective of the Greek historian Procopius, narrating the campaigns under Justinian in the East, North Africa, and Italy, proves to coincide with that of Cassiodorus. Procopius’ world is one of cities, with the exception of barbarian zones, which are city free. In Persia, Africa, and Italy was is fought over cities in a series of sieges. Adversaries are judged on their appreciation of critical elements of cities. The Persian Chosroes sacks Roman cities, but builds his own. The Vandals in Africa are sharply criticised for their demolition of city walls, which proves their military undoing. The Goths in Italy have a varied record: Theoderic is given credit for the sort of respect for Roman law, tradition, and city fabric which Cassiodorus documents, but his last successors, especially Totila, earn criticism, and ultimately defeat, for demolishing city walls.

Chapter 3 discusses the process by which Vandal Africa was transformed under Justinian’s reign into a province of the Roman Empire in which the Homoian presence declined and is no longer traceable in the sources. Our understanding of this development depends on two main aspects: the role of religious conflicts before and during the East Roman offensive on Africa and the measures (political, legal, ecclesiastical) taken to change the religious situation in Africa after the defeat of the Vandals.

Chapter 2 addresses the history of Byzantine Africa 533–46. It argues that the principal challenges to imperial rule in Africa came from within the administration, rather than external pressure from hostile ‘Moorish’ groups as has conventionally been assumed. These internal tensions were manifested most clearly in a series of mutinies and revolts within the army, leading ultimately to a coup, probably in early 546, when the Dux Numidiarum Guntharith seized authority in Carthage. That many of the leading figures in the administration seem to have come to terms with this tyrant testifies to the weaknesses within the imperial system, and the challenges which faced John at the time of his landing around six months later. This chapter briefly explores the nature of relations between frontier commanders and their ‘barbarian’ neighbours, many of whom aspired to office within the imperial system. It suggests that the ‘Moorish’ crisis John faced in 546 (which had smouldered for three or four years by that stage), was the direct consequence of internecine struggles within the imperial system, as allies increasingly acted in their own interest

This chapter traces the gradual unwinding of the Notitia system in response to the shifting strategic needs of the east Roman empire. Anastasius began the process by deploying the praesental armies to the east, first against the Isaurians and then against the Persians, but it was Justinian who fully dismantled them. Beginning with his creation of a new military command for Armenia and continuing through the establishment of a standing field army for North Africa and Italy, Justinain cannibalized the praesental armies and dispersed the striking power of the armies of Oriens, Thrace, and Illyricum. The consequences of Justinian’s decisions were keenly felt by his successors who struggled to defend the empire against escalating threats in the Balkans and the east. By the time Herakleios came to the throne, the Romans could barely muster three field armies, those for Thrace, Armenia, and Oriens, and it was these depleted armies that Herakleios used to defeat Persia and lay the basis for the thematic armies of Byzantium.

After thirty years of Ostrogothic rule in Italy (493–534) that ended with the ensuing destruction of the Gothic War (535–54), the eastern emperor Justinian sought to reassert direct control over Italy. The sixth-century Wars of Procopius vividly describes three sieges and two sacks of Rome during the course of this war. But the focus of this chapter is rather on Roman recovery in the aftermath of the war. I emphasize the constitutions in an underappreciated document from this period, Justianian’s Pragmatic Sanction. These enactments, along with texts and material evidence, show how damaging the Justinianic reconstruction of Italy was to Rome and senatorial aristocratic society. In this vacuum, the popes of Rome took on an ever-greater secular role, as the letters of Pope Pelagius show.

In the tenth century the character of the bronze horseman grew even more complex. As the horseman became a preeminent imperial landmark, it made some Orthodox observers uncomfortable. A comparison of perspectives from different strata of Constantinopolitan society reveals tensions over the horseman. While both Constantine of Rhodes and the Narrative on the Construction of Hagia Sophia praise Constantinople, they create very different emotional and narrative frameworks for evaluating Justinian’s column and the emperor’s legacy. While for Constantine of Rhodes (and like-minded individuals at court) Justinian’s monument is the greatest wonder of Constantinople, for the pious author of the Narrative it signifies imperial hubris. Likewise, Constantine of Rhodes is at ease with elevating Justinian’s stupendous accomplishments, while the Narrative is cautious about his legacy. During this period the mosaic of the south-west vestibule of Hagia Sophia also attempted to institutionalize and normalize the discourse of Justinian’s greatness not only in the imperial sphere, but also in Orthodoxy.