Blockchain technology is emerging as one of the most profound and cutting-edge innovations of the twenty-first century, providing a decentralized, immutable system for recording transactions. It has enabled the tokenization of distinctive digital assets, including art, music and real estate, through non-fungible tokens (NFTs). NFTs enable asset transfers by operating on pseudonymous blockchain networks, thereby preventing the disclosure of the owner’s real-world identity. While it enhances user privacy and innovation, it also creates significant anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing challenges. Fraudsters and other bad-faith actors can use these assets to obfuscate dirty money and illicit financial transactions, given lax or non-existent regulations on NFTs and extremely lax Know-Your-Customer compliance. In light of the above, the authors explore the nexus between NFTs and financial crime (with a particular focus on the legal frameworks of the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom) in this article. The paper aims to evaluate how each jurisdiction’s response to NFT-related abuse has evolved and been effective in practice. This will be done through a review of existing laws, enforcement, regulations and regulatory gaps. The article ends with specific policy recommendations to enhance regulatory certainty, enforcement effectiveness and international cooperation, supporting an innovation-first approach to the NFT space tempered by necessary measures to prevent criminal abuse.

Medieval lex mercatoria refers to the customary commercial law developed by merchants to govern cross-border trade, operating alongside and sometimes independently of territorial legal systems. This paper compares that historical form of autonomous ordering with contemporary blockchain governance. Both create institutional frameworks that facilitate exchange among diverse actors and provide mechanisms that function, to varying degrees, outside traditional state authority. The key difference lies in how rules are generated and enforced: medieval merchant law relied on flexible norms interpreted by merchant courts and other human adjudicators, whereas blockchain systems seek to reduce ambiguity by encoding rules ex ante in smart contracts and automating enforcement. Decentralized decision-making and emerging forms of on-chain adjudication further reimagine dispute resolution without centralized judicial power. The central claim is that both represent polycentric legal orders whose significance ultimately depends on how they interact with, complement, or challenge formal governmental institutions.

This Practitioner's Note considers the disruptive function of Little Phil, a mobile app that seeks to democratize philanthropic giving. Although many of the cultural aspects of philanthropy – such as increased control over donation, tracking the impact of one's giving, and building interpersonal relationships with receivers – can be opened to any person with an app-hosting device and internet access, it cannot supplant the role of big philanthropy and solve Rob Reich's problem: how to domesticate private wealth so that it serves democratic purposes… Little Phil's disruption has in concept gotten us halfway to legitimizing philanthropy. Perhaps the uptake of citizens’ panels by large philanthropic foundations will cover the remaining distance.

In this article, I place the blockchain within competing interpretations of the present as either an emerging technofeudal mode of production, or as a relatively unchanged capitalism. Drawing on a wide literature on zones – spaces in nation-states where the usual rules do not apply – I highlight three reconfigurations of territory, authority, and rights (TAR) associated with the blockchain today. These are: (1) the transnational expansion of crypto-related practices; (2) the national regulation and legitimation of cryptoassets; and (3) the reemergence of a liberal discourse linking human rights to the global exchange of private property. Through these examples, I demonstrate how the blockchain is part of a broader reshaping of accumulation and legal legitimation, mirroring the emergence of capitalism and the nation-state, but on a global scale. I conclude by arguing against the position that the reemergence of fascism is a red herring distracting us from the coming technofeudalism; instead, I claim that technofeudalism obscures the links between today’s techno-authoritarian shift and the enforcement of global corporate private property relations.

Blockchain technology has attracted attention from public sector agencies, mainly for its perceived potential to improve transparency, data integrity, and administrative processes. However, its concrete value and applicability within government settings remain contested, and real-world adoption has been limited and uneven. This raises questions regarding the conditions that promote or impede adoption at the institutional level. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis is employed in this research to explore how the combined effects of national-level regulatory clarity, financial provision, digital readiness, and ecosystem engagement shape patterns of blockchain adoption in the European public sector. Rather than identifying any single factor as decisive, our findings reveal a plurality of institutional paths leading to high adoption intensity, with regulatory certainty and European Union funding appearing most frequently on high-consistency paths. In contrast, digital readiness indicators and national research and development budgets are substitutable, challenging resource-based perceptions of technology adoption and supporting a configurational understanding that accounts for institutional interdependence and contextuality. We argue that policy strategies cannot look for overall readiness but should place key institutional strengths relative to local conditions and public value objectives.

We examine the implications of tokenization for the transformation of things into financial assets. Framed as the ‘democratization’ of financial investment by its advocates, tokenization is a process whereby asset ownership is fractionalized and represented by a digital token to be sold to potential investors on blockchain-based platforms. Tokenization can be seen as an extension of securitization to illiquid real-world assets or digital assets; as such, tokenization is often framed as a technique to isolate risks, reduce financing costs, and generate returns without selling the underlying assets. For example, real estate security tokens offer fractionalized ownership to smaller investors through digital means lowering entry barriers, though such investors still typically lack exposure to diversified real estate token portfolios. Through an analytical and empirical investigation, we argue the governance claims made about tokenization obscure a key contradiction: tokenization is touted as a way to democratize financial markets, but the necessary adaptation of tokenization to prevailing financial market infrastructures undermines this democratization promise. Engaging with this contradiction, we unpack the governance of financial markets and assets through the techno-financial transformation of things into digital tokens, focusing on the promise of tokenization to democratize finance.

This article introduces a blockchain-based insurance scheme that integrates parametric and collaborative elements. A pool of investors, referred to as surplus providers, locks funds in a smart contract, enabling blockchain users to underwrite parametric insurance contracts. These contracts automatically trigger compensation when predefined conditions are met. The collaborative aspect is embodied in the generation of tokens, which are distributed to surplus providers. These tokens represent each participant’s share of the surplus and grant voting rights for management decisions. The smart contract is developed in Solidity, a high-level programming language for the Ethereum blockchain, and deployed on the Sepolia testnet, with data processing and analysis conducted using Python. In addition, open-source code is provided and main research challenges are identified, so that further research can be carried out to overcome limitations of this first proof of concept.

Carbon credits have become increasingly important for supporting sustainable forest management and mitigating climate change. However, carbon projects can be challenging for local communities and smallholders to implement due to high expenses and complicated protocols. Forest projects often suffer from inefficiency, lack of transparency, and uneven benefit distribution. This study suggests a blockchain-based framework for aggregating forest carbon projects. This framework is the first in the forest sector to provide a reward mechanism for local communities or smallholders with a direct integration into an accredited registry protocol of Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification. The system combines digital identities, smart contracts, and automated incentives to improve transparency, responsibility, and trust among stakeholders. Two types of tokens are introduced: (i) Carbon Coin represents verified carbon credits within the system; and (ii) Forest Coin functions as a security token used to proportionally distribute project revenue among stakeholders. The revenue distribution was demonstrated in scenarios of afforestation, reforestation, and conservation. In addition, a web application was developed so that users can monitor project details. Unlike most blockchain carbon platforms that focus on investment and trading, this framework addresses upstream challenges, prioritising equitable benefit-sharing. The framework supports project aggregation and prioritises community ownership, advancing inclusive access to the carbon market. This study demonstrates how technological advantages can be transferred to community-driven ecological conservation.

Tokens can serve as containers for rights, thereby facilitating the transfer of such rights. On tokenisation platforms, especially in the context of decentralised finance (DeFi), it is assumed that when a token containing a right is transferred, the right itself is transferred as well. This paper uses the “token container model” as a conceptual framework to examine whether European private law frameworks on transfers of rights are compatible with such token-based transfers. Specifically, it explores the rules on the transfer of rights in movables, the rules on the transfer of rights in immovables, and the rules on assignment of claims. This analysis reveals substantial legal obstacles to the use of tokens in transferring absolute rights or claims.

Blockchain, an emerging technology exhibiting swift growth, significantly bolsters transparency within a given supply chain, enabling secure traceability, backtracking, and info tracing. Blockchain technology holds substantial promise for the dairy sector, offering enhancements unnecessary market intermediaries, thereby broadening access to credit and insurance for farmers, particularly in developing economies Such advancements could lead to more sustainable, efficient, and resilient livestock practices. However, the technology faces challenges, including the need for sophisticated infrastructure, cross-platform software, and skilled personnel with advanced expertise. Divergence in technological capabilities between developed and developing nations may hinder trade and exacerbate disparities. Regulatory barriers could also restrict blockchain's application. Thus, it is imperative to enhance blockchain knowledge among trade authorities and policymakers to facilitate its broader adoption. The objective of this review is to discuss principles of blockchain and proposed future work pathways for its use in the dairy industry.

Cases across the common law world have recognised digital assets as property, but the question of how such assets should be protected against interferences remains contested. At present, the “chattel torts” (conversion, trespass and reversionary injury) do not cover digital assets, leaving a gap in protection in respect of digital assets. There have been suggestions that the tort of conversion should be extended to cover digital assets, but this article argues that this extension would be undesirable for two reasons. First, there are fundamental differences between physical and digital assets, meaning that the concepts and thresholds used in the chattel tort context generate uncertain results (and create substantial risks of incorrect results) in the digital asset context. Second, the rules governing the chattel torts are unsatisfactory and contain many negative characteristics, and so extending the chattel torts to digital assets would replicate the same negative characteristics in the digital asset context.

Leveraging blockchain technology in the energy sector holds immense potential, particularly in facilitating decentralised energy systems. However, the legal and regulatory landscapes of several countries, including Malaysia and Australia, pose significant obstacles to its effective implementation. This article examines the specific legal and regulatory hurdles hindering the incorporation of P2P energy trading systems in these two jurisdictions: Malaysia and Australia. Through a comparative analysis, the authors aim to provide valuable insights for policymakers and regulators seeking to develop comprehensive frameworks that encourage blockchain adoption in the energy sector. The article highlights the need to address the under-inclusiveness of laws, legal uncertainty around novel blockchain-based concepts like smart contracts, and the obsolescence of legal frameworks designed for traditional centralised energy systems. By examining Malaysia’s and Australia’s unique challenges, the article seeks to contribute to a broader understanding of the complexities of adapting legal and regulatory frameworks to accommodate this transformative technology.

A Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO) is a new form of digital enterprise that operates on blockchain networks. It enables a new model of collaboration through diverse capital contributions and equitable sharing of benefits and risks. This paper explores the legal dimensions of DAO token transferability, a vital aspect for the expansion of DAO operations. First, it evaluates how property law (including the proposal by the Law Commission of England and Wales for a third category of digital asset ownership) might apply to DAO tokens so as to mitigate legal risks and ensure smooth transferability. Secondly, it investigates the potential for DAO software protocols to implement contractual transferability restrictions and examines their technological design. Finally, it looks at the legal enforceability of such restrictions and the policies needed to support their legal recognition.