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1 results

  • 8 - Stalingrad and the Eastern Front, 1942

  • from Part III - Campaigns
  • Edited by David Stahel, University of New South Wales, Canberra
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Companion to the Nazi-Soviet War
    Published online:
    13 November 2025
    Print publication:
    20 November 2025, pp 137-155

  • Summary

    This chapter describes German and Soviet strategies for the year 1942 and covers operations from May 1942 to March 1943. These includes the Soviet offensive towards Kharkiv, German preliminary operations such as the conquering of Sevastopol and the Kerch peninsula, but also operations on other sections of the Eastern Front like Soviet offensives against Rzhev and the German operation ‘Whirlwind’. However, the focus is on the German summer offensive and the Battle of Stalingrad. By linking these events to the operations along the eastern front as well as decisions and events outside the eastern theatre, the chapter argues that Germany’s failure in 1942 was a consequence of Allied superiority in men and material, but also of a German leadership that underestimated Soviet warfare capabilities. The German command wanted to achieve too many objectives with too few resources in too short a period of time. This failure was part of a larger turn of the tide in the war, that finally led to the Axis defeat.