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From the ninth to the fourteenth centuries, Japan purposely eschewed concluding diplomatic relations with the countries on its periphery. The international environment that made this fundamental policy possible first formed in the ninth century in the East China Sea with the appearance of maritime merchants. Japan was able to obtain foreign goods through trade ships without having to follow troublesome diplomatic procedures. In addition, no strong hegemonic power could threaten Japan militarily after the ninth century. Assuming this environment, Japan did not engage with any other country beyond temporary communications. Japan’s environment changed with the appearance of the Mongols as a hegemonic nation in thirteenth century. But even under military pressure, Japan refused to conclude diplomatic relations with the Mongols. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Mongols approved trade with Japan without the conclusion of formal diplomatic relations. In the latter half of the fourteenth century, the Ming’s making trade inseparable from the paying of tribute forced Japan to honour the Ming demand. This caused a radical change to Japan’s foreign diplomatic relations.
Allen Ginsberg visited China in 1984, first as part of an American delegation of writers and then as a private traveler. He visited many cities over a period of several months and spent time lecturing on American poetry. He found China oppressive and, in many ways, disappointing, and also he suffered many health problems owing to the pollution there; but nonetheless his time in China was a creatively fertile period for him, resulting in a number of important poems. This chapter details his travels around China, focusing on a sense of paranoia that plagued him because he was in a totalitarian state where he was constantly observed. It also looks at the poems that emerged from his trip, examining the various influences his inquiries into Chinese poetry had on his own work.
I examine the complexities of maritime connections between China and South Asia created by the entry of multiple states and non-state actors in the Indian Ocean between the thirteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. Divided into three chronological sections, the chapter first focuses on private traders, shippers, coastal polities, and European colonial enterprises in shaping and regulating commercial activity, diplomatic encounters, and their involvement in cross-regional interaction, exchange and conflict. The networks of traders that criss-crossed the ocean is highlighted. The next section analyses the impact of the seven voyages of Zheng He in the early fifteenth century on restructuring maritime interactions between China and South Asia. The final section centres on two entrepreneurs, one Chinese and one Indian, who utilised British colonial networks to advance their ventures and contributed to the expansion of maritime exchange. The chapter provides new insights into the nature of interactions between China and South Asia when there were no norms or regulations beyond specific coastal polities and regions.
‘Pan-Asianism’ came to prominence after the Second World War. Beyond the conventional understanding of the link between pan-Asianism and Japanese imperialism since then, this chapter explains the role of pan-Asianism as an anti-imperial ideology and strategy in the early twentieth century. As an anti-imperial ideology, pan-Asianism advanced a normative argument for the emancipation of Asia from Western imperialism and provided an alternative to Eurocentric discourse on civilisation, a vision premised upon a shared Asian spirituality, heritage, culture and glorious past. As an anti-imperial strategy, pan-Asianism offered Indian nationalist leaders in exile a language to gain support of the Japanese and the Chinese for their nationalist movement against British rule. Although pan-Asianism later came to be used as a justification in Japanese imperialism, it is important to highlight the anti-imperial role that pan-Asianism played in the early twentieth century. This chapter does so by analysing the works of leading Pan-Asianist ideologues and activists of the period and by highlighting the ideological and strategic aspects of their conception of pan-Asianism as anti-imperialism.
This chapter explores how considerations of private international law affected marriage and gender relations during the Mongol occupation of China, in the Yuan dynasty (1260–1368). I first address matters of jurisdiction and choice of law that arose in Yuan China and border areas when lawsuits involved non-Chinese. It demonstrates the willingness of Mongol Yuan officials to consider non-Chinese law in adjudication and how this process could be complicated by facts on the ground. The section reveals under Mongol rule a form of ‘transnational everyday life’, as other scholars have termed it, and the disadvantages that often accrued to women in these circumstances. Then I demonstrate how the Chinese encounter with Mongol rule and the resulting ‘foreign’ elements introduced into legal practice brought about changes in traditional, codified, Chinese marriage law. Finally, I address the Mongol use of strategic marriages in their interpolity relations both during the united world empire and in the Yuan dynasty. These interpolity marriage relations were crucial to Mongol successes during their conquests and in their efforts to maintain sovereignty over conquered peoples.
This chapter begins by describing the pre-history of southern China and the origins of colonial Hong Kong. It then proceeds to a discussion of English in the late nineteenth century and the formation of an English-speaking Chinese elite in colonial Hong Kong. Since the resumption of Chinese sovereignty in 1997, the government has promoted a policy of “trilingualism” (Cantonese, English, and Putonghua) and “biliteracy” (written Chinese and English). Recently, the national government has moved to assert tighter control over the territory, and there has been increasing importance placed on the learning and use of the national language, Putonghua. At present, English continues to be widely used in key domains of Hong Kong society, including government, law and many areas of employment. This is likely to continue in the future, despite Hong Kong’s increasing integration economically, politically, socially, and linguistically into mainland China.
Chapter 13 concludes by recapping the book’s key themes, considering potential obstacles to mandatory cooperation, and identifying other matters of international concern, such as pandemics, that are good candidates for mandatory cooperation under the equitable conception of sovereign equality.
This chapter surveys the history of China from the time of first contact with British traders in the early seventeenth century until the present. It traces the story of English through the era of pidgin English, to English language education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and recent policies in the People’s Republic of China. Since the opening of China in the late 1970s, English has been officially promoted as a key to modernisation. Today, official attitudes to the language seem to be less enthusiastic than the recent past, but, despite this, the popularity of learning English appears to be undiminished among China’s growing middle classes.
When discussing Asian religion, art, and philosophy, Emerson generally bestows praise and tends toward cosmopolitan, universalist sentiments. Old Asian ideas, especially from Persian, Indian, and Chinese traditions, reinforced his Transcendentalist sense of morality and, especially, his belief in “the infinitude of the private man.” In the contexts of geography and history, however, he gravitates toward nationalist, imperialist, and racist views. Here he betrays his vulnerability to some of the ruling ideas of geographical determinism and teleological historicism informing the ideology of manifest destiny. Yet, true to form for a writer who so famously abjured consistency, this basic distinction does not always hold. This chapter thus begins with an examination of Emerson’s discrepant Asias before analyzing how, despite this general dichotomy, he was sometimes able to subvert prevailing tendencies and introduce uncommon subtleties to his representation of Asia, its cultures, and its peoples.
Issues of race and racism have been highly controversial in contemporary China. This chapter examines the significance of various events and the polemics they provoked around the politics of race and nationalism. Indeed, the controversy has to be appreciated in light of the rise of nationalistic feelings among Chinese netizens, who have insisted that the fashion world should no longer cater to Western aesthetics and should align with the aesthetics of Chinese people.
This article examines the intellectual formation of Johannes Schütte, Superior General of the Society of the Divine Word (SVD) and a central figure in the drafting of Ad Gentes Divinitus, the Second Vatican Council’s 1965 decree on mission. Drawing on Schütte’s missionary writings and SVD archival materials, this article argues that his decade in China – which ended in imprisonment and expulsion by Communist authorities in the early 1950s – decisively shaped his vision of Catholic reform. Branded an agent of Western imperialism, Schütte came to recognize what he called “grains of truth” in Communist critiques of the missionary enterprise, pushing him to reassess the structural weaknesses of foreign-controlled mission work. The article further situates Schütte’s career within the broader history of decolonization: China’s revolutionary expulsion of missionaries functioned much like formal independence movements elsewhere, accelerating institutional and theological change within the Church. By insisting that the Church take root in local cultures rather than reproduce Western forms, Ad Gentes turned the lessons of missionary failure into a new ecclesiological program. In tracing Schütte’s trajectory, the article contributes to three areas of scholarship: the long history of decolonization, the relationship between Cold War anti-Communism and Catholic reform, and the role of China in the global history of twentieth-century Christianity.
This essay explores what it means to reckon with imperial violence decades after the Japanese Empire’s demise in 1945. Through legal, historical, and ethnographic analyses of civil lawsuits filed in courts across Japan since the 1990s by Chinese and South Korean victims seeking apologies and monetary compensation from the Japanese government and corporations involved in enslavement, I explore how the lawsuits exposed a politics of abandonment that left victims of imperial violence unredressable for decades. This evasion of imperial accountability, I argue, was etched into the legal, economic, and diplomatic structures of what I call the unmaking of empire—the entwined processes of de-imperialization and de-colonization. The move from empire to nation-state thus produced transitional injustice which calls for post-imperial reckoning: a double task of accounting for both the original imperial violence and the politics of abandonment after empire in perpetrator and victim nations. I show how new legal and moral landscapes for imperial reckoning are expanding the scope and agency of accountability, challenging accepted models of redress and raising the stakes for current generations to reckon with unaccounted-for pasts.
We stand at a curious moment in the history of law and technology. Nations around the world are scrambling to regulate or deregulate artificial intelligence, each convinced they are in a “race”—for dominance, for values, for the future itself. Brussels votes on comprehensive AI Acts. Beijing issues the world’s first copyright ruling on AI-generated content. Washington debates whether chatbots should have First Amendment rights. The underlying premise of this volume is that this framing as a zero-sum competition fundamentally misunderstands both the nature of AI and the task before us. The truth is more sobering and more hopeful: We are not racing against each other but experimenting together, trying to govern technologies that respect neither borders nor traditional legal categories. The real question is not who will “win” the AI race, but how we can learn from each other’s experiments fast enough to keep pace with systems that evolve by the microsecond. This Special Issue of the German Law Journal brings together fifteen contributions that demonstrate why comparative law has never been more essential—or more challenging. The authors span continents and legal traditions, from Beijing to Brussels, from Silicon Valley to Sydney.
Beyond its role in nation and state building, I argue that standard language promotion enables autocrats to increase citizens’ satisfaction with the government by expanding the reach of propaganda. Drawing on large-scale surveys supplemented by original interviews, I test this argument in China, which has successfully promoted a common language, putonghua, in recent decades. By leveraging cross-cohort, cross-locality variations in exposure to putonghua at school following a major language reform in 2001, I find that greater exposure to putonghua increases government satisfaction. Individual-level evidence highlights a potential mechanism: increased consumption of television political news, a key channel for state propaganda delivered exclusively in putonghua. This study has implications for state–society communications and authoritarian control.
Solar photovoltaic (PV) has been increasingly adopted in past years. This study provides empirical analysis using a county-level dataset that supported PV poverty alleviation projects (PPAPs) in rural China over 2008–2019 and finds that the rural per capita income of counties participating in PPAPs on average increased by 5 per cent compared to that of their counterparts. The effect is larger in more economically developed areas, those with abundant sunlight hours and in counties where centralized PV predominates. A cost–benefit analysis suggests that PPAPs can yield a net benefit of 57,690 yuan over their life cycle per rural household, with the ratio of household annual income growth to government fiscal expenditure ranging from 1.2 to 1.6. PPAPs are found to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 22 million tons annually, accounting for 0.4 per cent of China's carbon emissions reduction in 2020. Our results hold important implications for other countries working to alleviate poverty and reduce carbon emissions.
China's Green Belt and Road Initiative (GBRI) was launched in 2017 to address key criticisms of the original BRI and to better align China's overseas development strategy with the global climate agenda. This research examines whether the GBRI represents a genuine shift in China or just a symbolic gesture, and explores its underlying domestic and international drivers. Specifically, it interrogates three prevailing interpretations of the GBRI: a greenwashing tactic, a geopolitical strategy, and a global climate cooperation effort. Our analysis reveals a more dynamic and nuanced process behind the GBRI's emergence and evolution in China. On the one hand, the initiative is rooted in Chinese green industrialization and globalization, interacting with external opportunities and constraints. On the other hand, the rise of GBRI has elicited diverse responses: while US-aligned countries have imposed barriers, emerging markets, while selectively, have embraced Chinese green energy investments.
Genocide is a contested concept with normative, legal, political, and empirical dimensions, each pulling in different directions. The chapter emphasizes that, in addition, a fundamental contradiction exists in the concept: The legal definition, anchored in an international treaty, dominates the social sciences, even though the legal definition is problematic for the specification of a particular type of violence. The concept is thus perpetually trapped between legal and empirical imperatives, rendering it unwieldy for the social science objective of isolating a particular type of phenomenon. The chapter rejects the solution of jettisoning the concept, instead proposing a set of solutions for how to retain the concept and separate it from its legal origins. The chapter concludes by arguing that such solutions are unlikely to carry the day, but that social scientists should still seek to develop a rigorous conceptualization of the term that allows for the identification of specific types of political violence. Finally, a postscript offers an interim assessment – from the perspective of this chapter – of the war in the Middle East that began on October 7, 2023.
Grounded in comparative politics, this chapter presents new theory in comparative political economy: First, it argues that, in the context of technological transition, a legal system that facilitates reassignment of property rights, making certain rights less secure, plays an important and under-theorized role in promoting economic development. It focuses on China’s technological transition from a rural, agricultural economy to an urban, industrial one to highlight the relationship between technology change, reassignment of land rights, and transformative economic growth. The chapter reinterprets England’s post–Glorious-Revolution reassignment of land rights, using enclosure, estate, turnpike, and other parliamentary acts, in light of China’s rise. It also identifies the problem of state misallocation of land resources in the Chinese case. Second, it argues that the authoritarian state also invests in the formal legal system in order to manage conflict over changes in land rights and to legitimate the state. It revisits England’s eighteenth-century use of law, including the Riot Act and Black Act, to contain protest over dispossession and compares it to China’s embrace of authoritarian legality to repress conflict. The chapter defines liberal and illiberal law in both form and content and locates the analysis in the context of the law-and-development movement.
In this paper, we examine the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the transmission of fiscal policy shocks in China, combining a structural VAR with macroeconomic data and a panel model with firm-level data. We first identify two types of structural fiscal shocks using a Bayesian SVAR with sign restrictions and informative priors on structural elasticities: (1) stimulus shocks, defined as deviations from a policy rule for the budget deficit, and (2) government size shocks, which reflect changes in taxes not necessarily affecting the deficit. These shocks are then incorporated into a local projections framework using firm-level data. Our analysis reveals that SOEs respond fundamentally differently from non-SOEs to fiscal shocks. The results suggest that SOEs are not in strict competition with non-SOEs for government resources: both types of firms benefit from fiscal stimulus, yet SOEs are the ones predominantly subject to crowding out when the size of the government sector expands. At the same time, SOEs in strategic industries consistently receive government support under both government size shocks and tax-cut-led stimulus shocks. Moreover, in nonstrategic sectors, SOE investment exhibits a leading effect over non-SOE investment under tax-cut-led stimulus—an effect that vanishes under spending-led stimulus.
In Illiberal Law and Development, Susan H. Whiting advances institutional economic theory with original survey and fieldwork data, addressing two puzzles in Chinese political economy: how economic development has occurred despite insecure property rights and weak rule of law; and how the Chinese state has maintained political control amid unrest. Whiting answers these questions by focusing on the role of illiberal law in reassigning property rights and redirecting grievances. The book reveals that, in the context of technological change, a legal system that facilitates reassignment of land rights to higher-value uses plays an important and under-theorized role in promoting economic development. This system simultaneously represses conflict and asserts legitimacy. Comparing China to post-Glorious Revolution England and contemporary India, Whiting presents an exciting new argument that brings the Chinese case more directly into debates in comparative politics about the role of the state in specifying property rights and maintaining authoritarian rule.