Thought reform campaigns aimed at the psychological transformation of captives have long been tools to enhance national security and political legitimacy in East Asia. Fusing Soviet concepts of human perfectibility and Confucian ideals of transformation through education, sophisticated systems have evolved to convert political opponents. Whether labelled as tenkō in Japan, ‘self-renovation’ in Nationalist China, or ‘new learning’ in the People’s Republic of China, these programmes shared the fundamental goal of pressuring individuals to renounce previous beliefs and adopt state-sanctioned ideologies. This article examines how Japanese war crimes prisoners, political dissidents, and former Chinese Nationalist officers experienced these campaigns. Despite differences in implementation, each regime used confession, group study, and psychological coercion. This historical perspective is particularly relevant today as China’s leadership continues to weaponise historical narratives – including the ‘correct’ understandings of WWII history – with implications for contemporary tensions between China and Taiwan.

Over the past decade, China has significantly expanded its security cooperation with other authoritarian regimes, yet existing research struggles to capture the informal and ambiguous nature of these relationships. This article develops a new conceptualisation of ‘security ties’ grounded in the logic of authoritarian rule. Security ties are sustained interactions that contribute to regime survival and unfold across five functional domains: diplomatic and military contacts, support for regime security, military capacity building, non-combat operations, and wartime support. To capture variation, this article analyses security ties along three dimensions: depth, durability, and domestic involvement. As a proof of concept, the framework is applied to China’s security ties with ten representatively selected autocracies between 2019 and 2024. The analysis reveals that China’s ties to Russia are by far the deepest, most durable, and institutionalised. Ties to other autocracies are more selective and uneven. Military capacity building emerges as a central but varied pillar, while cooperation aimed at regime security and wartime support remains limited to a narrow set of partners. The article advances debates on authoritarian alignment by conceptualising it as a differentiated web of security ties rather than a cohesive alliance, and it offers a framework for systematically analysing autocratic security cooperation.

Network ties are crucial sources of organizational learning. Different types of networks, however, embody different types of resources and may relate to exploitative and exploratory learning differently. Drawing on social network theory and organizational learning, we differentiate overseas business and overseas ethnic ties of exporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and examine their relationship with exploitative and exploratory learning, respectively. Our results based on survey data of exporting SMEs in China find that overseas business ties are positively related to exploitative learning, whereas overseas ethnic ties are positively related to exploratory learning. Furthermore, slack resources strengthen the positive relationship between overseas ethnic ties and exploratory learning. Our study provides new theoretical and managerial insights for the utilization of business and ethnic ties to achieve exploratory and exploitative learning, particularly in the context of exporting SMEs.

Why would a strong authoritarian state choose not to enforce its own policy? We extend the theory of forbearance to autocracies, highlighting its distinct incentives and characteristics. Using China’s social insurance policies as a case study, we argue that promotion-driven local officials under intense interjurisdictional competition allow firms to evade payroll taxes to boost economic performance and advance their careers. This effect is most significant among domestic private firms and foreign firms. We conduct one of the first systematic analyses of firm-level social insurance contributions in an authoritarian context, supplemented by individual-level survey data. Our findings show that bureaucratic forbearance of China’s social insurance policies has a pro-business bias, undermining the policies originally designed to address inequalities during market reforms.

Recent scholarship has emphasized methodological innovations to mitigate preference falsification in public opinion data, yet systematic scrutiny of bias in regression analyses remains limited. Drawing on analyses of political trust in China, we offer three key insights. First, determining the direction of social desirability bias in regression estimates—whether over- or underestimation—is challenging ex ante. Second, analyses of two nationally representative Chinese surveys, one incorporating a list experiment, cast doubt on the purported positive effect of social welfare expansion on political trust. Extending beyond social welfare and the Chinese case, we find similar biases when regressions rely on direct questions. Third, we show that certain identification strategies can partially mitigate regression bias when direct questions are unavoidable.

The article examines artificial intelligence (AI) narratives of the three most important powers in the emerging global AI order – the US, China, and the EU. It argues that these narratives are central to constructing the meanings ascribed to AI in international politics and therefore to understanding the global competition for AI leadership. Specifically, the article uses a method of narrative analysis to reconstruct the AI narratives of the three powers from government documents and strategy papers. These narratives speak to the worldviews and AI images of the powers, how they view each other’s aspirations and behaviours, and what their objectives and motivations are to engage in AI competition. The relationship between the narratives sheds light on the scope for international AI cooperation and conflict. The results reinforce expectations of an intensifying ‘AI race’ between the US and China for global AI leadership. The EU comes out more as a bystander to this geopolitical competition, but strives to lead the development of international AI norms and standards. The article points to different potentials for cooperation and conflict on different aspects of AI and identifies status-seeking as a possible driver of AI competition.

This article examines how China’s central political inspections indirectly enhance municipal provision of invisible public goods. Such goods (e.g., underground pipelines, drainage systems) eludes reliable public assessment through daily observation. Drawing on Mani and Mukand, we emphasize their two defining attributes: (1) conditional evaluation (public judgment requires specific triggers like extreme weather), and (2) temporal accountability lag (delayed quality assessment). Unlike technical business inspections, political inspections prioritize provincial leaders’ political loyalty, generating cascading deterrent effects on municipal officials. Confronting heightened career risks, rational local officials strategically reallocate resources to rectify undersupplied invisible goods. Empirical analysis leveraging the first wave of nationwide inspection data confirms this causal mechanism.

After the Zero COVID policy ended on December 7, 2022, ~90% of mainland Chinese were infected in a COVID-19 wave. This systematic review synthesized research estimating excess mortality during that wave in mainland China. We searched seven databases in May 2024 and updated our search in July–August 2025. Peer-reviewed research (Chinese or English), published since January 1, 2023, estimating excess deaths in the COVID-19 wave post-Zero-COVID was included. Risk of bias was assessed using a modified Newcastle-Ottawa Scale. Two authors independently conducted abstract screening, full-text review, data extraction, and risk-of-bias assessment. Seven articles were included. Two studies analysed the death records of a town and a district in Shanghai, estimating the excess mortality rates of 153.6% and 174.3%, respectively. Using indirect methods, four studies estimated national excess mortality (range: 0.71–1.87 million). Another study estimated excess mortality in Taiyuan. Studies used diverse methods to estimate excess deaths, resulting in widely varying and uncertain estimates. Choice of reference period, seasonality, and other factors affect expected mortality estimates.

Captivity is a complex phenomenon in international politics with a broad range of purposes, functions, and consequences. Existing scholarship suggests that states use captivity, for example, to facilitate hostage or prisoner exchanges, to extract material rewards, or, in the case of human shields, for deterrence purposes. This article argues that states may use captivity to deter not only traditional military threats emanating from other states, but also perceived threats to regime security posed by non-state actors, including individuals, and that emotions are central to this process. The argument is illustrated through three empirical vignettes that show how the Chinese government has detained foreign academics, publishers, and NGO workers engaged in activities seen as threatening regime security. Detention is interpreted as attempts to deter such actors. While fear is often seen as key to successful deterrence, the article indicates that paying attention to other emotions can help better understand deterrence failure. Specifically, because captivity, and deterrence, involve the denial of the captive’s agency and may trigger feelings of humiliation and shame, it can backfire as the target of deterrence efforts might seek to act to regain agency.

Shipwrecks provide invaluable insights into human society and trade. Their unique preservation conditions also mean that they can serve as exceptional biobanks, recording traces of organisms carried aboard or arriving post wreck. Yet only limited research has explored the genetic potential of onboard sediments. Here, the authors present environmental and metagenomic analyses of sediments contained in a large amphora from the 150-year-old Yangzi Estuary II shipwreck. Weaving the results with historic texts, they reconstruct part of the history of the wrecked vessel, elucidating cargo-packing techniques, its likely season and port of sailing, and its ultimate submersion within the estuarine environment.

This article considers the responses of the Indian Workers’ Association (Great Britain) (IWA) to food scarcities in India during the late 1960s. It reveals Maoist optics informed IWA critiques, departing from coexistent appraisals articulated in leftist circles in India. In doing so, the article demonstrates the relevance of worldviews, idioms, and paradigms emanating from global conjunctures beyond places of origin among diaspora. IWA luminaries were embedded in revolutionary anti-colonial networks shaped by decolonization and the global Cold War, and bestowed substance upon Maoism in these contexts. Ultimately, this informed IWA perceptions of causes and solutions to the food ‘crisis’: in their characterizations of reliance on external aid as indicative of post-1947 India’s semi-colonial status; in portrayals of Soviet ‘social imperialism’ in India during the Sino-Soviet split; or in demands for radical land reform based on a selective rendering of the Chinese model, which downplayed the consequences of the ‘Great Leap Forward’.