This chapter examines the origins and consequences of national security institutions in the United States during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. It explains the political logic shaping continuity and change in institutional design. The limited threat of bureaucratic punishment during Eisenhower and Kennedy prompted both to maintain integrated institutions through most of their presidencies. In contrast, fears that bureaucratic leaks would derail passage of his transformative social and economic legislation led Lyndon Johnson to adopt fragmented institutions. These fragmented institutions came at a cost: They degraded the quality of information that the bureaucracy provided. As a result, Johnson based the most consequential foreign policy choice of his presidency – the escalation in Vietnam – on incomplete and biased information. The analysis suggests that the costliest American foreign policy miscalculation of the Cold War was in part a tragic consequence of how Johnson resolved the trade-off between good information and political security.

In 1958–59, Khrushchev acted aggressively, most notably with his ill-conceived attempt to force the Allies out of Berlin. This move was partly a response to Mao's actions in the Taiwan Strait and a similar calculation of war risks. Both leaders believed their gambles would not trigger a military response from the United States, but Khrushchev soon realized he had miscalculated. Instead of adhering to his deadline, Khrushchev engaged the West in a dialogue. In September 1959, he visited the United States, gaining the recognition he so desired. Meanwhile, the Great Leap Forward, which Mao launched to prove that China was better than the USSR at building socialism, resulted in a massive famine in China. The failure of the Great Leap boosted Khrushchev's confidence, but Sino-Soviet relations continued to worsen.

Could the Cold War have ended at the turn of the 1960s? This chapter argues against viewing the downing of Gary Powers' U-2 plane as an unfortunate incident that precluded a superpower agreement. Khrushchev skillfully used the incident to embarrass Eisenhower and ruin the May 1960 Paris summit. However, it is doubtful that Khrushchev could have ever made the concessions – not least over Berlin – that would have led to the end of the Cold War. He remained determined to defend his revolutionary credentials, particularly against his Chinese critics. Fundamentally, the Soviet Union faced an identity crisis: was it a content superpower seeking to maintain its position or the center of world revolution aiming to overthrow the existing order? The roads not taken in 1960 remain unknown, but the sequence of events that played out over the spring and summer of 1960 led to a heating up of the Cold War.

The 1950s is known as a time of great prosperity as the gap between the richest and the poorest narrowed to its lowest point in history and as social mobility was at its highest. It was also a time in which an extraordinary array of commercial products entered our economy as the result of federal research and development programs. After America’s development of the atomic bomb, the Manhattan Project supported the transformation of the technology into more productive commercial uses. This role was repeated in the 1950s when the space race contributed to the federal development of the internet, together with a vast array of technologies such as cell phones and GPS services that we use today. However, there was a dark side to the 1950s. Racism was rampant and anxiety about nuclear disaster increased. In response to that anxiety, there were two movements in the United States. On the left there were movements for student democracy, civil rights, women’s rights, and the like. On the right, a new style of economics was emerging with great allegiance to markets and a commitment to reduce the size of government. Once again, we see the tension between markets and government which remains with us.

One of de Gaulle’s great successes in the Second World War was to allow France to punch above its weight in the Alliance. However, the French army struggled to match in military proficiency de Gaulle’s lofty aspirations for French power and influence. The Vosges campaign proved yet another punishing trial for the French army. Its professional cadres seriously attrited in Tunisia, in Italy, and in the march from the Mediterranean coast, distant from its North African base, utterly dependent on the Americans for supplies, the command echelon riven by rivalries of a political, doctrinal, and personal nature, the poorly equipped First French Army was forced to endure a bitter campaign in the harshest of winter conditions, while simultaneously “amalgamating” clusters of poorly trained and disciplined FFI and volunteers. While the reconquest of Alsace and that of the “Atlantic pockets” were symbolically important to de Gaulle and the French, they were low priorities for the SHAEF commander, whose mission for Sixth Army Group was to “hold the flank” while advances were to be made further north. Eisenhower’s personal rivalry with Jacob Devers, combined with a lack of confidence in the volatile de Lattre and a rebuilding French army, possibly caused him to “miss opportunities” for an early crossing of the Rhine in late November 1944, and the disruption of the German Ardennes offensive, which caught him by surprise on 16 December. While Eisenhower blamed Devers and de Lattre’s timorousness and lack of mastery of armored warfare for the persistence of the Colmar Pocket, and pressured Sixth Army Group to eliminate it, he constantly diverted resources which might have allowed them to do so to Patton. Tensions between de Gaulle’s political agenda and Eisenhower’s operational focus, apparent since Algiers in 1942, exploded with the Strasbourg crisis of January 1945, which was successfully resolved only after Churchill’s intervention. However, the Allied failure to clarify the French role in the post-war occupation of Germany created conditions for further clashes between Eisenhower and the French during the culminating invasion of Germany.

Ronald Reagan decided he would win the Cold War against the Soviet Union. This required a strong economy. He supported the Federal Reserve breaking inflation with high interest rates. He also reduced taxes and regulation. After a short recession, the economy boomed. Reagan harnessed all elements of national power in pursuit of democracy and freedom abroad. Military strength was key, and he launched a massive rearmament program. He pushed human rights issues, pointed out Soviet abuses and hypocrisy, separated the Eastern Bloc from Western money and technology, blocked Soviet advances in the Third World, and used insurgencies against Soviet clients as Moscow did against the West. But Reagan also feared a nuclear exchange and was eager to negotiate reductions in nuclear weapons. He benefitted from Soviet economic weakness, political bankruptcy, and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, who realized the Soviet Union needed reduced tensions with the West in order to reform its broken system. George H. W. Bush succeeded Reagan, continued his grand strategy, and reaped the benefit of victory in the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of democracy to Eastern and Central Europe, as well as other areas, particularly Latin America.

“Overseas,” explores the experiences of the defenders of Graignes in their journey toward the battlefield. The paratroopers trained in western Nebraska and did a variety of demonstration jumps in the area, including near Denver, to stimulate the sale of war bonds. Thereafter, they made the arduous journey by train to New York and across the Atlantic Ocean. They trained in Portrush, Northern Ireland and near Nottingham in England. The chapter makes the point that the socio-cultural experiences of the paratroopers in the United Kingdom would be similar to their experiences in Graignes. The chapter concludes with General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s decision to overrule Sir Arthur Trafford Leigh-Mallory’s opposition to using paratroopers on D-Day.

Operation Torch, the 8 November 1942 Anglo-American landings in French North Africa (AFN), strengthened and ballooned the Mediterranean into a major “Second Front” and put the Anglo-Americans on the strategic offensive until the war’s end. Torch also crystallized the contradictions of Vichy’s wartime posture, and dispelled all ambiguity of “the order to defend against whomever.” The collapse of the Vichy formula of a French Army surviving within a sovereign, neutral France, an open invitation to Axis forces to enter Tunisia and Constantine, and the scuttling of the French High Seas Fleet at Toulon confirmed France’s descent to the status of a second-, if not third-tier power. Going forward, Torch removed any incentive for the Germans to cease to meddle in French internal politics, and ironically accelerated Vichy collaboration. Torch became the first instance in which resistance was integrated into operational planning. The Darlan deal alienated the resistance in France and drove them into the arms of de Gaulle, making it virtually impossible for the Allies to jettison the nettlesome French Leader. AFN supplied both a geopolitical “trampoline” to advance the Allies’ strategic agenda and a fragile venue for France’s resurrection. The French reaction to the Anglo-American invasion was undermined in part by confused command arrangements in AFN, made more complex by Darlan’s fortuitous presence in Algiers. This chapter traces the tortuous hesitations of the French command in Algiers and Rabat, which allowed Axis forces to gain a foothold in Tunisia. The so-called “Darlan deal” struck between Darlan and Eisenhower to cease French resistance in AFN was to have far-reaching consequences. In the wake of Torch, all the accouterments of Vichy independence disappeared – the zone libre, the empire, the armistice army, and the fleet.

This chapter considers people (primarily conservatives) who have criticized the Nordic Model and suggested a counter, dystopian version. This approach stretches from Eisenhower in the 1950s to Trump. Sweden and its alleged problems with crime and immigration are a particular theme of this argument.

Looking at the Korean and Vietnam Wars, we evaluate the influence of casualties disaggregated by space/hometowns and time on mass opinion in both the Korean and Vietnam wars and on individual opinion in the Vietnam War. We find a powerful connection between US casualties and public support for a war consistent with our expectations about the importance of casualty trends, the geographic locations of casualty hometowns, and the interaction of these dynamics. Disaggregated casualties are better able to capture variation in mass public and individual wartime opinion than are logged cumulative national casualties – the standard wartime measure employed. We also find that the wartime information-opinion process operates more strongly in the ex ante identifiable early stages of a conflict, and less effectively later in a conflict when casualty expectations (and thus the value of new information) begin to harden. These results strongly support the general notion that casualty patterns act as an observable proxy for our RP/ETC process by capturing information that individuals draw on to generate ETC and formulate wartime positions, improving our ability to understand and predict wartime opinion.

The 1932–1968 period represents a crucial era of change between the Republican Party and the American South. With the New Deal realignment, the GOP slowly but surely came to the realization that some form of electoral competition in the South could no longer be avoided for the party to have a chance at winning presidential elections and congressional majorities consistently. After FDR’s death, and with liberals and conservatives in the Democratic Party divided on civil rights, Republicans – for the first time – had both the opportunity and the need to advance in the South. But how to take advantage of this opening in the South while simultaneously not alienating traditional Republican voters elsewhere proved to be a difficult puzzle to solve. While the 1964 election showed that catering to Dixiecrats could open the South up to the Republican Party, Goldwater’s dismal performance everywhere else temporarily scared Republican leaders. A breakthrough in the inherent conflict between (a) the party’s failure to succeed in the South and (b) the price it paid outside of the South for trying was forged by Richard Nixon, in his efforts to win the 1968 presidential nomination. In assessing both the internal dynamics within the GOP as well as the national effects of previous Republican southern strategies, Nixon identified a winning strategy. By rejecting segregation, Nixon reassured voters outside of the South that he was not giving in to the worst elements in the Dixiecrat movement. Yet Nixon’s support for the less extreme policies that Southern conservatives were demanding – a slowdown in the implementation of civil rights reforms – was tied to the broader sense of insecurity whites felt across the country with regard to job safety and crime.