This article examines the legal foundations of an equitable global fossil fuel phase-out under international law and considers how legal principles could shape the scope of existing obligations and development of a future regime limiting the production of fossil fuels. While fossil fuel production remains largely unregulated in the international climate regime, emerging scientific, political and normative pressures demand clearer legal guidance. The article argues that a principle-based approach, grounded in established norms of international law, can clarify what equity entails in this context, and offer a coherent framework for a managed phase-out. Drawing on principles of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, common but differentiated responsibilities, cooperation, prevention, precaution and non-regression, it is demonstrated that the substantive and procedural obligations needed for an equitable transition away from fossil fuels are already part of existing international law.

The One Health approach is increasingly recognised as a holistic solution to complex global health and ecological challenges. Legislation is of utmost relevance for its effective implementation, providing a mechanism to institutionalise intersectoral and interdisciplinary collaboration, clarify responsibilities and promote sustainability. However, the legal nature of One Health remains underexplored. This paper examines how the key underlying principles of One Health align with legal principles and concepts broadly recognised by legal literature and jurisprudence, including those articulated in the Rio Declaration and the International Law Association’s New Delhi Declaration on principles of international law relating to sustainable development. Emphasis is placed on the principle of integration, a cornerstone of sustainable development that offers a pathway to operationalise One Health within legal frameworks. By conceptualising One Health as an extension and practical application of the principle of integration, this paper advances its legal characterisation, embedding it within broader principles of international law. One Health is positioned as a legal construct, providing a pathway for its implementation through law and affirming its role as an integral component of sustainable development.

This paper intends to throw light upon some aspects of the debate on the characterization of legal principles and on their differences when compared to rules. Particularly, this analysis proposes differentiating principles from rules by considering the functions they perform in law instead of their structural differences. To achieve this, we distinguish between the functions of guidance and justification that legal principles fulfill. From that distinction, we observe that the attempt to characterize legal principles based on the way in which they guide conduct does not seem to be the most appropriate either. In contrast, this paper tries to show that all the different types of precepts known as principles perform a justifying function in legal reasoning.

The controversy surrounding recent uses of white phosphorus (WP) to ‘flush-out’ suspected insurgents or in attacks against military targets in open ground has led to a renewed media interest in the legal status of WP-based munitions. An inherent public dislike for weapons that cause death or injury by fire is very natural, so one is entitled to ask whether humanity should not prevail when it comes to anti-personnel uses of such weapons. In the absence of a specific treaty dealing with the use of WP, this article, written jointly by a retired military lawyer and a scientist interested in the law, examines the use of such weapons in practice as well as the relevant legal and scientific background before attempting to reach conclusions about their legality. This involves a consideration of the reasons for the development of WP-based munitions, of their usual military uses and of some unconventional uses of such weapons. There follows an examination of the basic principles of customary international law as well as the treaty provisions dealing with incendiary weapons. Furthermore, because of the various harmful physiological interactions of WP, it was necessary to look closely at the legal provisions on poison, gas and chemical weapons. That demanded an interpretation of multiple aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention before the legal status of WP could be fully determined. The convention is constructed in such a way that what at first sight appears to be a chemical weapon may not be as a matter of law unless it is consciously applied in a prohibited manner.