The composite nature of perceptions is examined further in terms of mereological structure. Manifolds of outer intuition are stretched out in a space that both differentiates between an object and its exact duplicate and underlies fine discriminations ad indefinitum of a single object’s manifold. However, there is also a unity of space that runs through all spaces contained in it. Since space is a form of perception, there is therefore also a unity that runs through all nested perceptual manifolds. For this to be possible, space has to be a special kind of whole, namely, what Kant calls a totum analyticum, i.e., a whole whose parts depend on it, rather than vice versa, i.e., not a totum syntheticum. It is argued that a particular mereological structure of space is a precondition for the organization of manifolds of perception. Another precondition is what Kant calls “affinity,” i.e., that perceived particulars – including tropes – can be represented in ways that are associable with each other. In neither case is the unity due to a combinatorial synthesis. In empirical cognition, such a synthesis can only trace out an order of a perceptual manifold that is already there.

In this chapter, I set out Merleau-Ponty’s critique of intellectualism, which understands perception proper in terms of the top–down imposition of scientific and proto-scientific concepts on our sensory deliverances by way of judgements. Intellectualism begins with Descartes and is refined in parts of the B edition of Kants First Critique. The scientistic reading of Kant is propounded most notably by Léon Brunschvicg, one of Merleau-Ponty’s early teachers. I outline Merleau-Ponty’s critique, to the effect that intellectualism neglects pre-conceptual perception, motivated attention and action and our early and exploratory acts of learning. It also neglects the singularity of empirical things and of the somatically and cognitively constituting subject. I go on to show how Merleau-Ponty takes up ideas from Kant that are not tied to intellectualist suppositions, including the synoptic synthesis of apprehension, the schemas for pure and empirical concepts, orientation in space, the feeling of perceiving and the productive imagination.

The “Afterword” briefly reiterates the main points about the story of Graignes. It emphasizes that ordinary people, non-elites, did extraordinary things, effecting the course of military and foreign policy during the Normandy campaign.

The Introduction provides a synopsis of the book. It presents major themes and a chapter outline, and it reviews the limited historiography on Graignes. What has been written about Graignes has been largely limited to amateur historians who focus on weapons and combat. The introduction highlights that this study is based on multi-national research and that it points to the roles of non-elites in making foreign and military policy. In particular, the women of Graignes played major roles in aiding US paratroopers.