This chapter considers the role courts play in protecting fundamental rights. It addresses three questions. What role do domestic courts play in the protection of rights in different constitutional settings? In examining key elements of constitutional design, the chapter show how there are significant variations in how courts protect rights across the world. Secondly, what role should courts play in the adjudication of rights? Here it is argued that courts in their ordinary work, applying legislation and the common law, do and must protect rights. With regard to the more contested question whether courts should protect rights under a constitutional bill of rights, the chapter argues that the case for such a role for courts is at its strongest in certain circumstances but that it cannot be claimed that in all circumstances courts should be conferred with this power. Finally, the chapter considers the current debates in the United Kingdom concerning a possible repeal of the Human Rights Act, and withdrawal from the European Convention of Human Rights, and expresses dismay at the prospect of the repeal of the Human Rights Act, given how elegantly that Act combines protection for rights by UK courts with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

This chapter examines the idea of ’dialogue’ as a way of conceptualising the relationship between the courts and the legislature in a system of ’weak-form review’. Tracking the trajectory of dialogue theory in Canada and in the UK, this chapter outlines the promise and perils of dialogue. By highlighting the iterative and interactive dynamic between courts and legislatures when seeking to uphold rights, the metaphor of dialogue held out the promise that it could transcend the Manichean narrative. However, the chapter argues that the idea of dialogue overpromised and underdelivered. It failed to take us beyond the Manichean narrative and ultimately provided a misleading and distorted understanding of the constitutional relationships between the branches of government in a constitutional democracy.

This chapter examines the power of the legislature to have ’the last word’ under section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights, and the UK Human Rights Act 1998. In both cases, the democratically elected legislature is empowered to legislate notwithstanding rights. Whilst both of these provisions have been hailed as the lynchpin of a New Commonwealth model of constitutionalism, or as an instance of weak-form review, this chapter observes that they have hardly ever been used. The task of the chapter, then, is to examine and explain ’the underuse of the override’. Departing from the dominant narrative that the legislature wanted to use the override but was thwarted by exogenous political costs, this chapter argues that the rare use of the override was part of the original design of both systems from the outset. Instead of being a tragic thwarting of democratic dialogue, or an unfortunate atrophy of constitutional powers, rare use of the override was a feature, not a bug in both systems. Supplementing the historical narrative with normative argument, the chapter defends the rare use of the override as a vindication of the collaborative constitutional ideal.