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This concluding chapter briefly summarizes the main findings from previous ones, noting what is right and what is wrong about the standard model of action and action-explanation. The belief-desire model excludes important classes of human action (habits, speeded actions, skills). And philosophers are mistaken in many of the claims they make about beliefs and desires (e.g. that they are all propositional attitudes), as well as in many of their widely endorsed claims (that credences are real, that desires come in degrees, that knowledge is a primitive intrinsically factive state). The chapter then draws out some methodological morals for the way in which the philosophy of mind should properly be conducted.
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