Industrial disasters can have a myriad of repercussions ranging from deaths, injuries, and long-term adverse health impacts on nearby populations, to political fallout and environmental damage. This is a descriptive epidemiological analysis of industrial disasters occurring between 1995 and 2021 which may provide useful insight for health-care systems and disaster medicine specialists to better prevent and mitigate the effects of future industrial disasters.

Data were collected using a retrospective database search of the Emergency Events Database (EM-DATS) for all industrial disasters occurring between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 2021.

A total of 1054 industrial disasters were recorded from 1995 to 2021. Most of these disasters occurred in Asia (720; 68.3%), with 131 (12.4%) in Africa, 107 (10.2%) in Europe, 94 (8.9%) in the Americas, and 2 (0.2%) in Oceania. Half of these disasters were explosions (533; 50.6%), 147 (13.9%) were collapses, 143 (13.6%) were fires, 46 (4.4%) were chemical spills, 41 (3.9%) were gas leaks, and 34 (3.2%) were poisonings. There were 6 (0.6%) oil spills and 3 (0.3%) radiation events.

A total of 29,708 deaths and 57,605 injuries were recorded as a result of industrial disasters, and they remain a significant contributor to the health-care risks of both workers and regional communities. The need for specialized emergency response training, the potential devastation of an industrial accident, and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure as terror targets highlight the need to better understand the potential immediate and long-term consequences of such events and to improve health-care responses in the future.

The objective of this study was to describe and compare almost all the components of disaster preparedness between private and government hospitals in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, using the World Health Organization’s (WHO) checklist.

We assessed and compared the disaster preparedness between government and private hospitals in Province, using the 10-key component WHO checklist in a descriptive cross-sectional study. Of 72 hospitals in the region, 63 responded to the survey.

All 63 hospitals had an HDP plan and reported having a multidisciplinary HDP committee. In all responding hospitals, HDP was acceptable in most indicators of preparedness; however, some hospitals to some extent fell short of preparedness in surge capacity, equipment and logistic services, and post-disaster recovery. Government and private hospitals were generally comparable in disaster preparedness. However, government hospitals were more likely to have HDP plans that cover WHO’s “all-hazard” approach, both internal and external disasters, compared to private hospitals.

HDP was acceptable, however, preparedness in surge capacity, equipment and logistic services, and post-disaster recovery fell short. Government and private hospitals were comparable in preparedness with regards to all indicators except surge capacity, post-disaster recovery, and availability of some equipment.

Previous studies have found that public health systems within the United States are inadequately prepared for an act of biological terrorism. As the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues, few studies have evaluated bioterrorism preparedness of Emergency Medical Services (EMS), even in the accelerating environment of biothreats.

This study utilized an Internet-based survey to assess the level of preparedness and willingness to respond to a bioterrorism attack and identify factors that predict preparedness and willingness among Nebraska EMS providers. The survey was available for 1 month in 2021 during which 190 EMS providers responded to the survey.

Only 56.8% of providers were able to recognize an illness or injury as potentially resulting from exposure to a biological agent. The provider Clinical Competency levels ranged from a low of 13.6% (ability to initiate patient care within his/her professional scope of practice and arrange for prompt referral appropriate to the identified condition(s)) to a high of 74% (the ability to respond to an emergency within the emergency management system of his/her practice, institution, and community). Only 10% of the respondents were both willing and able to effectively function in a bioterror environment.

To effectively prepare for and respond to a bioterrorist attack, all levels of the health care system need to have the clinical skills, knowledge, and abilities necessary to treat patients exposed to biological agents. Policy changes and increased focus on training and drills are needed to ensure a prepared EMS system, which is crucial to a resilient state. EMS entities need to be aware of the extent of their available workforce so that the country can be prepared for the increasing threat of bioterrorism or other novel emerging infectious disease outbreaks. A resilient nation relies on a prepared set of EMS providers who are willing to respond to biological terrorism events.

Infectious disease emergencies are increasingly becoming part of the health care delivery landscape, having implications to not only individuals and the public, but also on those expected to respond to these emergencies. Health care workers (HCWs) are perhaps the most important asset in an infectious disease emergency, yet these individuals have their own barriers and facilitators to them being willing or able to respond.

The purpose of this review was to identify factors affecting HCW willingness to respond (WTR) to duty during infectious disease outbreaks and/or bioterrorist events.

An integrative literature review methodology was utilized to conduct a structured search of the literature including CINAHL, Medline, Embase, and PubMed databases using key terms and phrases. PRISMA guidelines were used to report the search outcomes and all eligible literature was screened with those included in the final review collated and appraised using a quality assessment tool.

A total of 149 papers were identified from the database search. Forty papers were relevant following screening, which highlighted facilitators of WTR to include: availability of personal protective equipment (PPE)/vaccine, level of training, professional ethics, family and personal safety, and worker support systems. A number of barriers were reported to prevent WTR for HCWs, such as: concern and perceived risk, interpersonal factors, job-level factors, and outbreak characteristics.

By comprehensively identifying the facilitators and barriers to HCWs’ WTR during infectious disease outbreaks and/or bioterrorist events, strategies can be identified and implemented to improve WTR and thus improve HCW and public safety.

Biological weapons are one of the oldest weapons of mass destruction used by man. Their use has not only determined the outcome of battles, but also influenced the fate of entire civilizations. Although the use of biological weapons agents in a terrorist attack is currently unlikely, all services responsible for the surveillance and removal of epidemiological threats must have clear guidelines and emergency response plans.

In the face of the numerous threats appearing in the world, it has become necessary to put the main emphasis on modernizing, securing, and maintaining structures in the field of medicine which are prepared for unforeseen crises and situations related to the use of biological agents.

This article presents Poland’s current preparation to take action in the event of a bioterrorist threat. The study presents both the military aspect and procedures for dealing with contamination.

In Poland, as in other European Union countries fighting terrorism, preparations should be made to defend against biological attacks, improve the flow of information on the European security system, strengthen research centers, train staff, create observation units and vaccination centers, as well as prepare hospitals for the hospitalization of patients—potential victims of bioterrorist attacks.

Anthrax is a potential biological weapon and can be used in an air-borne or mail attack, such as in the attack in the United States in 2001. Planning for such an event requires the best available science. Since large-scale experiments are not feasible, mathematical modelling is a crucial tool to inform planning. The aim of this study is to systematically review and evaluate the approaches to mathematical modelling of inhalational anthrax attack to support public health decision making and response.

A systematic review of inhalational anthrax attack models was conducted using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) criteria. The models were reviewed based on a set of defined criteria, including the inclusion of atmospheric dispersion component and capacity for real-time decision support.

Of 13 mathematical modelling studies of human inhalational anthrax attacks, there were six studies that took atmospheric dispersion of anthrax spores into account. Further, only two modelling studies had potential utility for real-time decision support, and only one model was validated using real data.

The limited modelling studies available use widely varying methods, assumptions, and data. Estimation of attack size using different models may be quite different, and is likely to be under-estimated by models which do not consider weather conditions. Validation with available data is crucial and may improve models. Further, there is a need for both complex models that can provide accurate atmospheric dispersion modelling, as well as for simpler modelling tools that provide real-time decision support for epidemic response.

The goal of this study is to test an implementation and examine users’ perceptions about the usefulness of telemedicine in mass casualty and disaster settings and to provide recommendations for using telemedicine in these settings.

Ninety-two US Army Forward Surgical Team (FST) members participated in a high-fidelity mass casualty simulation at the Army Trauma Training Center (ATTC). Telemedicine was implemented into this simulation.

Only 10.9% of participants chose to use telemedicine. The most common users were surgeons and nurses. Participants believed it somewhat improved patient care, attainment of expert resources, decision-making, and adaptation, but not the timeliness of patient care. Participants reported several barriers to using telemedicine in the mass casualty setting, including (1) confusion around team roles, (2) time constraints, and (3) difficultly using in the mass casualty setting (eg, due to noise and other conditions).

There appear to be barriers to the use and usefulness of telemedicine in mass casualty and disaster contexts. Recommendations include designating a member to lead the use of telemedicine, providing telemedical resources whose benefits outweigh the perceived cost in lost time, and ensuring telemedicine systems are designed for the conditions inherent to mass casualty and disaster settings.

Following chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear disasters, medically unexplained symptoms have been observed among unexposed persons.

This study examined belief in exposure in relation to postdisaster symptoms in a volunteer sample of 137 congressional workers after the 2001 anthrax attacks on Capitol Hill.

Postdisaster symptoms, belief in exposure, and actual exposure status were obtained through structured diagnostic interviews and self-reported presence in offices officially designated as exposed through environmental sampling. Multivariate models were tested for associations of number of postdisaster symptoms with exposure and belief in exposure, controlling for sex and use of antibiotics.

The sample was divided into 3 main subgroups: exposed, 41%; unexposed but believed they were exposed, 17%; and unexposed and did not believe that they were exposed, 42%. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of the volunteers reported experiencing symptoms after the anthrax attacks. Belief in anthrax exposure was significantly associated with the number of ear/nose/throat, musculoskeletal, and all physical symptoms. No significant associations were found between anthrax exposure and the number of postdisaster symptoms.

Given the high incidence of these symptoms, these data suggest that even in the absence of physical injury or illness, there may be surges in health care utilization. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:555-560)

Emergency medical services (EMS) providers are ill-prepared in the areas of training and equipment for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events and other public health emergencies.

A nationally representative sample of the basic and paramedic emergency medical service providers in the United States was surveyed to assess whether they had received training in WMD and/or public health emergencies, as part of their initial provider training and as continuing medical education (CME) within the past 24 months. Providers also were surveyed as to whether their primary EMS agency had the necessary specialty equipment to respond to these specific events.

More than half of EMS providers had some training in WMD response. Hands-on training was associated with EMS provider comfort in responding to chemical, biological and radiological events and public health emergencies (OR = 3.2; 95% CI = 3.1–3.3). Only a small portion (18.1%) of providers surveyed indicated that their agencies had the necessary equipment to respond to a WMD event. The comfort level and having equipment to respond these incidents was not as highly associated as the comfort level and having had training to respond to these incidents.

Lack of training and education as well as the lack of necessary equipment to respond to WMD events is associated with decreased comfort among emergency medical services providers in responding to chemical, biological, and radiological incidents. Better training and access to appropriate equipment may increase provider comfort in responding to these types of incidents.