To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Causation is arguably the most complex of the elements of negligence. It is covered in three sections in this chapter. Section 13.1 covers the criteria for identifying a recognisable harm and the nature of causation in tort law – what type of explanation does it look for? Section 13.2 covers the evolution of the methods adopted by Australian courts to identify factual causation. Section 13.3 discusses the difficult normative challenge of putting a limit on the extent (or ‘scope’) of a defendant’s liability.
Because this area of the law of negligence is extremely complex, the chapter includes two sets of ‘Summary points’ and two ‘Test your understanding’ features. At the end of the chapter, you will find an appendix with the provisions on causation adopted in the civil liability legislation in each state and territory.
Among the key constructs of biomedical research (random error [chance], risk, and bias in the search for causation), bias (or systemic error) is the most formidable source of inefficient and wasteful research, leading to incorrect or exaggerated results. The cause of most disease is complex, owed to many inherent (genetic) and environmental risk factors. It is in studying the interplay of these, each incurring modest risk, that many biases come into play.
The criminal law comprises a state response to wrongdoing on the part of the population, proscribing conduct that lies outside of the normal expected conduct of citizens. As such, the criminal law seeks to regulate socially transgressive or unacceptable (criminal) behaviour.In providing a framework of rules to address these behaviours, the criminal law actually comprises two discrete branches: substantive criminal law and procedural criminal law. This chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 1.2 looks at the nature of the criminal law; its purposes, limits and sources. This part examines a number of important issues, such as the purposes of the criminal law, the legitimate limits on its scope and its sources. Section 1.3 examines the notion of criminal responsibility, looking at who may be held liable for a criminal offence and the principles that underlie the state’s obligations in proving an offence.
This Element discusses the roles played by the idea of God in René Descartes' epistemology, physics, and metaphysics, and problems arising from those roles. Section 1 gives an overview of Descartes' life, works, and reception, focusing on the extent to which he is a religious or a secular thinker. Section 2 focuses on the problem of the Cartesian circle generated by his claim that all human knowledge depends on knowledge of God. Section 3 explains the role of God in Descartes' physics and addresses problems concerning how God's causal activity relates to that of creatures, including how divine providence fits with human freedom and how voluntary bodily actions are consistent with the laws of nature. Section 4 explores Descartes' claim that God freely created the eternal truths, noting its implications for his theory of modality.
This chapter uses text from throughout Aquinas’s corpus to reconstruct the main elements of his views on causation. Causation for Aquinas is a type of ontological dependence. Following Aristotle, Aquinas recognizes four species of causes. The chapter focuses in particular on efficient causation since this is the type of cause that most closely corresponds to what contemporary philosophers mean by a “cause.” Aquinas thinks that efficient causes act through active casual powers to bring about their effects. To highlight the philosophical significance of Aquinas’s views, the chapter compares Aquinas’s views on efficient causation with two prominent contemporary theories of causation, Humeanism and Nomicism.
Obstetrics claims accounted for 62% of all clinical claims by value received in the year, highlighting the underlying impact of the financial costs of maternity indemnity payments, alongside the impact of harm on patients, families and healthcare staff. CTG misinterpretation contributes substantially to claims pertaining to mismanagement of labour and cerebral palsy. Medical negligence involves establishing causation and liability. Presence of abnormal CTG, low Apgar score, low cord arterial pH, assisted ventilation, admission to neonatal intensive care, moderate or severe neonatal encephalopathy and subsequent neurological damage point to asphyxia as a possible cause. However, several intrinsic fetal disorders cause neurological disability and an abnormal CTG may have been coincidental. Causation is best determined by neuroradiologist and paediatric neurologist based on the areas of scarring within the brain on MRI. The thalamus, basal ganglia injury show scarring, reflecting acute profound hypoxia while prolonged partial hypoxia results in bilateral cortical atrophy. Expert opinion is requested to judge whether the care provided fell short of what was expected (Bolam principle).
In this chapter, our analysis will focus on the causative/inchoative alternation within Basque. Firstly, we will concentrate on the diverse root types that generate causative/inchoative alternating verbs. As we will demonstrate, most verbs that participate in the causative/inchoative alternation appear to derive from other categories, consisting of either (i) a PROPERTY-naming root, (ii) a root combined with the adverbializer morpheme -ka, or (iii) a root paired with an allative or instrumental adposition. Secondly, we will investigate the semantic classes of (derived and non-derived) verbs that exhibit the causative/inchoative alternation and examine their relation to the meaning of causation. Thirdly, we will analyze verbs exclusively exhibiting either the causative or inchoative variant, along with the specific contexts enabling some of them to alternate. Finally, we will explore the metaphorical meaning of some verbs and observe how these meanings facilitate their transitive use.
This chapter considers induction, deduction and abduction as methods of obtaining scientific knowledge. The introductory section again ends by highlighting that there is no single method, and refers to claims that scientific reasoning uses various heuristics or rules of thumb based on the specific approach and the background information we have, and that we should recognise that this can introduce various errors of reasoning: by being aware of the potential for making these errors, we are better able to guard against making them. The bulk of the chapter then looks at specific logical fallacies, using neuroscience examples to illustrate them. These include ad hoc reasoning; begging the question; confusing correlation for causation; confirmation and disconfirmation biases; false dichotomies; false metaphors; the appeal to authority, tradition and emotion; the mereological fallacy; the naturalistic fallacy; and straw man arguments.
A fit between theory and method is essential in theory – guided empirical research. Achieving such a fit in process tracing is less straightforward than it may seem at first glance. There are two different types of processes that one can theorise and, consequently, two varieties of process tracing. The two varieties are introduced by empirical examples and distinguished with respect to four characteristics. Failure to determine the form of process tracing at hand may lead to invalid causal inferences.
Physicalism is often characterized by the slogan that “There is nothing over and above the physical.” Thus, making physicalism precise requires making “the physical” precise. In this paper I advance one such way of making the physical precise and in doing so defend a new approach to defining the physical. I argue that a property is physical iff it belongs to the largest strong-component of a causal network that includes exemplary physical properties. This avoids the triviality-problem faced by physics-based accounts and withstands an important argument against accounts that are not physics-based.
Causal loops are circular chains of causally related events: each link causes others which in turn cause it. Not only are causal loops widely accepted as coherently conceivable; some are also provably self-consistent as well as seeming genuinely possible according to currently accepted laws of physics. On the common assumption that causation is transitive, each link in any causal loop would wind up causing itself; but the idea of self-causation is pretty much universally rejected as incoherent. A popular attempt to resolve this dilemma distinguishes “direct” from “indirect” self-causation: the direct variety, which operates without the aid of causal intermediaries, is claimed to be impossible even if the indirect variety isn’t. I argue against this attempted resolution on the grounds that causal loops themselves, unlike the links that compose them, should be viewed as directly self-caused; so indirect self-causation via causal loop is possible only if direct self-causation is as well. An important consequence is the availability of groundbreaking solutions to several longstanding puzzles in philosophy of mind.
The Lydian logos is indebted to tragedy for many features: its large-scale narrative structure and (in its constituent stories) small-scale episodic structure, narrative motifs and themes, even vocabulary. However, Herodotus also diverges from his tragic sources in ways that clarify the nature of his own inquiries. The source of the constraint under which Gyges makes his fateful decisions is not divine (as in Aeschylus), but the will of his king and queen, highlighting a characteristic feature of Eastern monarchy. In the final sentence of the Atys/Adrastus story, the distinctive ethnographic formula that describes Adrastus’ suicidal thoughts marks him as a uniquely Herodotean tragic hero. Croesus’ pyre scene contains both an echo of the Aeschylean Cassandra (the king’s dramatic breaking of his silence) and a defining feature of Herodotean historiē: the citation of a Lydian source for Apollo’s epiphany demonstrates the critical attitude that Herodotus brings to popular and poetic traditions.
Aeschylus’ Persae is an important antecedent for the account of Xerxes’ Hellenic campaign in the Histories, serving as both a source of phrases, images, and themes and a poetic foil for Herodotean inquiry. The tragedian’s presence is palpable in the staging of the king’s decision to attack Greece, although Herodotus shifts the causal emphasis from Xerxes’ personal flaws to coercive political and religious forces. Herodotus’ insistence on the contingency of Greek victory at Salamis marks a telling departure from Aeschylus’ vision of the battle as a great Panhellenic victory, vouchsafed by the gods and undisturbed by the conflicting interests of the poleis allied against Xerxes. In their presentation of Greco-Persian conflict both Aeschylus and Herodotus partially deconstruct the polarity between Hellenes and Persians, encouraging their respective audiences to look beyond cultural differences to common human traits that shaped the course of events before, during, and after the Persian invasion.
This book explores Herodotus’ creative interaction with the Greek poetic tradition from early hexameter verse through fifth-century Attic tragedy. The poetic tradition informs the Histories in both positive and negative ways, since Herodotus adopts or adapts some poetic features while rejecting others as a means of defining the nature of his own project. The range of such features includes subject matter; diction and phraseology; narrative motifs, themes, patterns, and structure; speech types and speech complexes; the role of the narrator – his presence, functions, source(s), authority, and limitations; the manipulation of time (narrative order, rhythm, and frequency); conceptions of truth and falsehood; the construction of the human past and its relation to the present; the relationship between humanity and deity, and the role each plays in the causation of events. In these and other regards Herodotus may use poetic precedent as a model, a foil, or some combination of the two.
This is the first comprehensive analysis in any language of Herodotus' interaction with the Greek poetic tradition, including epic, lyric, and tragic poetry. It is essential reading for scholars of ancient Greek storytelling (including myth) and those interested in the hybrid nature of narrative history, as both a true or truth-based account of past events and a necessarily creative account, which requires the author to present data in a meaningful and engrossing literary form. Close readings of specific passages demonstrate how Herodotus uses the linguistic, thematic, and narrative resources of the poets to channel and challenge their social authority, and to engage the emotions and intellect of a broad Hellenic audience steeped in the traditions of poetic performance. Herodotus adopts or adapts some poetic features while rejecting others (explicitly or implicitly) as a means of defining the nature of his own research and narrative.
Chapter 4 unpacks the reasons why international human rights is currently incapable of adequately protecting the environmental rights of future generations. It begins by explaining that future generations are not legally recognised as people who possess human rights and governments are not obliged to protect them. Even if those rights were recognised, there are no clear pathways for enforcing them. As the chapter explains, international human rights violations can be litigated by ‘victims’, who are people directly affected by an actual or imminent violation. The law does not allow for legal claims on behalf of people who do not yet exist or for harms that have not yet occurred or are not imminent, even though they may be foreseeable. Without standing to bring a legal action, the rights of future generations cannot be litigated and enforced within international human rights bodies. Additional challenges exist in relation to proving a breach of the law and establishing a causal connection when the alleged harm has yet to occur. Finally, the chapter explains the difficult task of balancing competing human rights interests and obligations across generations. After outlining these numerous challenges, the following chapter will offer a possible way forward.
Building on the problems identified in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 presents a new theory and practice of environmental rights which it argues would better protect the rights of future generations. First, it outlines a theory of intergenerational responsibility for international human rights law, drawing on Edith Brown Weiss’s theory of intergenerational equity. The chapter takes the tripartite duties commonly used in international human rights laws (the duties to respect, protect and fulfil human rights) and gives them new meaning through the application of an intergenerational lens. The result is a typology of duties for states which can be used to articulate expectations and standards with respect to the rights of future generations. The chapter also outlines changes which are needed to the rules of standing and causation to enable the litigation of future generations’ environmental rights. The proposed changes are informed by existing principles of environmental law, including due diligence and the precautionary principle, which help to navigate questions regarding risk and uncertainty and enable a more meaningful application of human rights law to threats of future harm.
A survey found that 1 in 6 (16%) of children aged between 5 and 16 years has a probable mental illness. Furthermore, research has shown that most of these disorders have their origins in childhood, even if they are typically diagnosed in adulthood. Childhood represents a critical period of physical, cognitive, psychological, behavioural and social transformation. Identifying risk and protective factors that alter the typical developmental trajectory could have long-term educational, social, societal and economic implications. This chapter will address what is meant by the term risk factor and how these can be identified, provide examples of risk factors thought to be important in child and adolescent psychiatry. It concludes with some case vignettes to highlight the importance of taking a developmental biopsychosocial approach to identifying risk, considering predisposing, precipitating, perpetuating and protective factors.
History is not just a recounting of events; it is shaped by narrative style, cognitive frameworks, and the selection of time frames, all of which influence how events are understood. The chapter delves into the ‘linguistic turn’ in history, where language plays a crucial role in expressing and interpreting the past. Key elements of historical discourse, including narration, voice, time, and causation, are examined in depth.
The chapter also addresses the challenges of teaching history in a second language (L2), emphasizing the need for specialized instructional tools and rhetorical models. With references to a comprehensive chart of integrated descriptors for history across the curriculum and a genre map for bilingual history teaching, it underscores how controlling historical discourse through language can influence societies. Thus, this work also highlights the intersection of history, language, and ideology, especially in multilingual contexts.
How can we make up our minds on whether or not international organizations are different from the sum of their parts? Taking a step back from doctrinal analysis, this chapter explores how the challenges that international lawyers have faced in that regard correspond to broader themes in philosophical discourse on ontological reductionism. This chapter suggests that questions of existence are inherently relative in the sense that they only make sense when considered in relation to other entities that are already admitted as non-redundant. Thus, the key to assessing the distinctiveness of international organizations is to first uncover the rationale that international law employs in buttressing their members as ‘real’ entities and then examine whether it can be equally applied to international organizations.