Over the past 5 years, the policy constraint posed by the sovereign bond market has strengthened. Across the G7, governments have been forced into rapid policy reversals, often due to sharp and unexpected rises in bond yields. The fact that the bond market acts as a constraint on policy—particularly on long-term investment—is well known. What has become apparent is that this market constraint has sharpened and now shapes G7 policymaking outside periods of acute crisis. This paper examines the bond market constraint, and how it has evolved in recent years. The past 5 years have seen a striking evolution, with record levels of G7 debt issued. Focusing on the United States and the United Kingdom, we outline two key empirical puzzles: first, for both, bond yields appear higher than justified by benchmark models; second, in the United Kingdom, yields have become highly (and surprisingly) volatile. We then review candidate explanations for these changes. We posit and examine new forces—demographic shocks, news coverage of fiscal watchdogs, the role of hedge funds and stablecoins. Finally, we use a simple econometric framework to provide a first test of whether these forces may explain bond yields. We find indicative evidence that they do. However, much remains unexplained, suggesting the importance of further work to understand the implications of the higher debt costs across the G7. As part of this analysis, we introduce a new dataset of fiscal watchdog media salience and publication patterns, which we make available to support future research.

We propose a novel approach to classifying inflation-targeting (IT) economies using fractionally integrated processes. Motivated by the rising prevalence and diversity of IT, we leverage variation in the persistence of inflation rates to identify four de facto strategies, or “shades” of IT. Moving from negative orders of fractional integration, indicating anti-persistent behaviour, to more persistent long-memory processes, often associated with less credible policy frameworks, we classify countries into average, strict, flexible, and uncommitted IT. This framework sheds light on differences between declarative and actual strategies across 36 advanced and emerging economies. Most countries fall into the flexible IT category, though extreme cases, including uncommitted IT, occur quite frequently. Furthermore, we link our classification to institutional features of national frameworks using ordinal probit models. The results suggest differences across categories are related to variations in the maturity and stability of IT frameworks, with weaker connections to central bank independence and transparency.

For some sixty years, the dominant narrative of the financial crisis of 1931 and Great Depression has been one of failure of central banks to cooperate and act as lenders of last resort. This historical narrative has become dominant and led to a marginalization of understanding the Great Depression as a result of an inherent instability of capitalism. Rather than arguing that one or the other of these narratives is true, in this article I examine how contemporary actors made retrospective sense of the European financial crisis of 1931 and how they used that history to shape lessons for uncertain futures. My approach is based on the concepts of sensemaking and narrative emplotment under radical uncertainty. The article shows that most contemporaneous actors were positive in their assessment of central banks and that they focused mostly on short-term capital flows and the interconnectedness of the financial system as well as structural issues going back to the Versailles Treaty in making sense of the crisis.

This article focuses on the elites governing central banks in order to provide new theoretical and empirical insights into central bank scientization. We first critically discuss the ‘politics of scientization’ as a discursive strategy that depoliticizes monetary policy under neoliberalism. We then propose an alternative, sociological approach to scientization, defining it as a reconfiguration of power dynamics in favour of the scientific field and asking whether there has been a recent increase in the share of actors from this field in central bank governance. Using global data from our prosopographical database, we analyse the educational and professional backgrounds of central bank governors worldwide from 2000 to 2020. We combine descriptive statistics, geometric data analysis, and qualitative analysis to examine global trends and variations between the Global South and North. Our findings contradict the hypothesis of a linear socio-historical process wherein academic professionals and qualified scholars replace ‘less scientific’ actors from political, bureaucratic, or financial fields. Instead, we reveal diverse dynamics shaping global monetary governance.

This article investigates the scientization process in central banks, using the Bank of England (BoE) as a case study. Its main goal is to clarify the interactions and tensions among three dimensions of scientization: contributory, policymaking and legitimizing. To do so, we outline an ideal type of contributory scientization in central banks, whereby they become active contributors to science. The article derives empirically observable characteristics for this ideal type, regarding leadership and staff profiles, use of internal resources, composition of external networks, and publication and discursive outputs. The BoE is then contrasted to this ideal type of a central bank thoroughly involved in contributory scientization. The empirical material includes archives and interviews as well as three databases providing quantitative information from the 1970s to 2019. We find that the development of contributory scientization is strategically motivated, often generating tensions with policymaking and legitimizing dimensions. Our findings suggest that scientization in central banks is best understood as a three-dimensional, non-linear process, rather than a steamroller.

This article documents the historical evolution of economic expertise at the Banque de France (BdF), from the late-nineteenth to early-twenty-first centuries. Criticizing presentism and conceptual reductionism in the notion of scientization, I characterize the evolution of economic expertise at the BdF as being a result of ‘field effects’ emerging from the BdF’s attempts to build state capacity. The BdF’s development of economics expertise should be interpreted as a way of negotiating the boundaries between various fields (private banking, technocracy, academia, and international central banking). In particular, I highlight two distinct boundary arrangements: technicalization and academization. From the late-nineteenth century to the 1960s, the rise of technical functions results from a dual positioning at the boundary between, respectively, the state and the market, and national and international institutions. The BdF’s nationalization, in the mid-twentieth century, fostered its integration into the administrative and technocratic field, putting it in competition with other ‘technicalized’ institutions. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the BdF negotiated new arrangements with the academic field. Finally, as a member of the European System of Central Banks since 1999, the BdF has sought scientific legitimacy to have a say in European monetary policymaking.

An idée fixe of Great Moderation economic policy was that central banks are only effective macroeconomic managers when they are segregated from electoral politics. That idea made a swift transition from radical heterodoxy to commonsensical orthodoxy during the 1980s and proved remarkably resistant to reality during the 2008 financial crisis. After almost twenty years of ‘unconventional’ monetary policy, scholars, policymakers, and politicians are justifiably searching for more credible ways to conceptualise and use the nation-state’s monetary authority. Two recent books provide vital energy for that intellectual exercise. Éric Monnet’s Balance of Power is a bold re-conceptualisation of monetary authority as a welfare-state support in liberal democracies. In addition to dissipating the illusion that central banks are simply interest-rate-setting inflation-fighters, Monnet presents a systematic argument for integrating them into a web of deliberative institutions (including public development banks and economically empowered parliaments) to bolster the legitimacy and effectiveness of monetary policy. Relatedly, Manuella Moschella’s Unexpected Revolutionaries attacks the idea that central bankers are responsive only to technocratic doctrine and private-market behaviour, showing how monetary authorities sculpt policies to bolster their reputation with political actors. Paying close reference to private-market liquidity guarantees and quantitative easing, Moschella maps the fortunes of unconventional policy in alignment with political support for financial-market backstops and exceptional economic stimulus. Both books provoke readers to jettison the anodyne generalities of central banks’ own glossy pamphlets and think afresh about the possibilities of economic policy’s new normality.

Since early 2021, food prices in Britain have increased by 30%. Using monthly microdata, researchers have found that frictions in the UK’s new trade relationship with the European Union (EU) play an important part in this inflation. The trade relationship is evolving, with further changes expected in 2024. This article establishes a framework for identifying trade-related inflation in close to real time. Using programming techniques, we collect daily prices of over 100,000 supermarket items, covering 80% of the UK grocery market. We identify 1,200 products from 12 countries with a protected designation of origin (PDO). This allows us to link price changes to individual EU economies. Addressing the predominance of EU PDOs, we employ a large language model to discern product origins from additional web-scraped data, thus broadening our analysis to cover over 67,000 products. Since August 2023, we find that prices for EU-originating food products have increased at a rate of 50% higher than domestically sourced products. This study presents a unique methodological approach to dissecting food sector inflation, which is well-positioned to be used in a policy setting, allowing us to assess the possible impact of impending nontariff barriers at the GB-EU border in 2024.

Leon Wansleben’s new book, The Rise of Central Banks: State Power in Financial Capitalism, tells an intricately complex story of the world’s most influential central banks successfully harnessing the forces of financial globalization to build their institutional power as the principal managers of their national economies. The book argues that, regardless of central banks’ rationales and rationalizations, the resulting expansion of global money markets has failed to generate the intended macroeconomic and societal benefits. Instead, as became evident in the post-2008 era, the world’s most powerful central banks are now structurally dependent on the increasingly self-referential markets for financial assets. While the book’s narrative is focused on inflation targeting and other monetary policy innovations since the 1970s, it raises much broader questions and invites further reflection on the nonlinear dynamics of power in today’s financial markets and the uncertain future of central banks.

Leon Wansleben’s new book, The Rise of Central Banks, explains how central banks have emerged as powerful monetary governors over the past half-century. Yet the book’s recognition that central banks cannot extricate themselves from quantitative easing and market bailouts begs the question: what does it mean for central banks to be dominant but captive? In this commentary, I identify the book’s ambiguities with the concept of infrastructural power the book draws from Michael Mann. Unless the dynamics of state-market interdependence are well specified, giving due attention to the sources of both public and private power, it is unclear what kind of agency central bankers are exercising if they lack sufficient autonomy to act in the public interest.

In The Rise of Central Banks, Leon Wansleben provides a perceptive account of the evolution of central banking practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland from the 1970s through the subprime mortgage crisis and the global pandemic. Focusing on the concrete practices of monetary policymakers, Wansleben usefully explores the relationship between the development of novel techniques of monetary policy implementation and the financialization of the economy, with the paradox that the central bank appears more powerful, but exercises this power in a system that is ever more prone to crisis. While agreeing with the broad strokes of Wansleben’s analysis, I raise questions about the nature of the ‘infrastructural power’ exercised by the state through financial markets, suggesting that the growing salience of the central bank in the policymaking apparatus should not be conflated with its independent influence over the direction of economic policy.

I use this introduction to the book forum to situate my work within scholarly discussions of relevance to the readers of Finance and Society, thereby indicating how my work advances the broader field. I also provide a brief synopsis of the book’s core findings and offer some ideas on how to think with and beyond the book.