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Contrary to oft-repeated views, litigation over the KCIR did not result in a ban on compulsory arbitration: in the 1920s, it was understood that the KCIR cases showed compulsion was permissible in most of the era’s major industries. However, US Supreme Court rulings on the KCIR were important: the extremity of the KCIR’s design, and the self-discipline of its labor opponents, created cases that posed important legal questions in uniquely clear, simple form. Drawing from archival material as well as opinions, this chapter shows that KCIR-related litigation was seized upon as a chance to clarify the scope and character of state economic regulation authorized by the public interest, and whether the Fourteenth Amendment categorically protected peaceful, orderly strikes. Justice Taft’s 1923 ‘Wolff Packing Company’ opinion, typologizing regulation in the public interest, was a clarifying landmark underpinning the Court’s sharp anti-regulatory turn. Justice Brandeis’ 1926 Dorchy decision, flatly denying an absolute right to strike under the Fourteenth Amendment, was a stinging and enduring reversal for labor.
The rigid outlook of its supporters assured the KCIR’s emphatic defeat, which was broadly discrediting to labor courts. The positions taken against the KCIR also reveal the contours of the labor policy ultimately developed in the United States. The KCIR’s fascist premises were apparent by 1926, when the US made a decisive turn away from industrial compulsion. The evolutionary view of law was categorically rejected in the Wolff decision; Wolff’s decade of doctrinal ascendency ended an era of innovative state policy leadership in the United States. The procedural outlook of the KCIR’s liberal critics became the basis of New Deal labor policy, ushering in America’s unique model of labor law without labor rights. In rejecting these tenets of the KCIR, leading thinkers also turned away from international policy developments that shared those premises. Thus, America’s divergence from the labor policy of the rest of the world owed to the development of ideas, no less than institutions and structures, and it was liberals most engaged with global flows of ideas who did the most to turn the United States onto its distinctive path.
The United States, virtually alone in the capitalist world, never used labor courts during the Interwar period; existing accounts incompletely explain why US labor policy design diverged here. In the early 1920s, the weak labor policy and incoherent labor law of the United States was a widely recognized, urgent problem. The US government was newly strong and economically interventionist. There was ideological consensus on the basic features of an acceptable labor policy, but owing in part to political support for several plausible models, and unsettled partisan and intellectual alignments, the US did not make progress on labor policy in these first post-War years. Controversy over the KCIR, founded as a provocation in this debate, helps make sense of these patterns. The intellectual, legal, and political effects of the KCIR’s failure extinguished American interest in labor courts generally. Position-taking, especially reaction against the KCIR, reveals the emerging alignments that were to be crucial to the design and political realization of the unique labor policy of the New Deal.
The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, founded in 1920, was the lone US trial of a labor court – a policy design used almost everywhere else in the industrialized world during the interwar period. What led Kansas to establish the KCIR when no other state did? And what were the consequences of its existence for the development of economic policy in the rest of the country? Ben Merriman explores how the KCIR's bans on strikes and lockouts, heavy criminal sanctions, and unilateral control over the material terms of economic life, resulted in America's closest practical encounter with fascism. Battered by the Supreme Court in 1923, the KCIR's failure destroyed American interest in labor courts. But the legal battles and policy divisions about the KCIR, which enjoyed powerful supporters, were an early sign of the new political and intellectual alignments that led to America's unique New Deal labor policy.
This chapter recounts the history of labour law in Australia since colonisation. It identifies four key periods – the early convict period, the period of protective regulation; the compulsory arbitration and awards period, and the period of deregulation and the ‘gig’ economy. By taking in the earlier period of convict or penal labour, this framing departs from the conception of labour law as only emerging in the late nineteenth century with the contractual employment relationship. By taking it forward to the new economy of employment, the chapter follows labour law theorists seeking to expand and broaden the field to include all workers and their need for labour protections. Themes of freedom and unfreedom, trade union organisation, gender differentiation, race, immigration and Indigenous labour are threaded through as factors underlying the employment relationship and its changes over this long history. Characteristics of Australia’s system such as compulsory arbitration are shown as divergences in comparison with Britain and US
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