The Introduction develops the idea that Hegel’s philosophy is distinctive by its endorsing an artifactual paradigm for philosophy, in contrast to a natural one. The artifactual paradigm says that our knowledge of humanly constructed artifacts, rather than natural things represent the standard-setting case for objects of philosophical knowledge. The world of spirit or Geist is thus the central topic of philosophy. But the philosophical basis for the centrality of Geist is Hegel’s theory of concepts. Hegel presents a theory of concepts which allows for concepts not only to represent their objects but also to constitute them, akin to the artifactual production of an object. This interpretation contrasts with metaphysical readings of Hegel that make “the Concept” a part of the structure of reality, as well as with more deflationary interpretations that understand Hegelian concepts on the model of Kantian categories.

Chapter 5 argues that Hegel’s interest in the Concept Logic is to determine when a concept and its object are in a “true” or fully unified relation. This requires developing both the least adequate logical relation of concept to object, which he calls judgment, and the most adequate such form, which is the syllogistic form of teleology. For Hegel, what best corresponds to its concept is what is conceptually constituted. And Hegel’s model for conceptual constitution is a teleological process governed by some universal. It is argued that the Teleology chapter of the Logic does not reject the artifactual model for teleology but in fact embraces it, for the teleology of artifacts requires that an intention come “first” in the construction of its object. Artifactual teleology shows in a concrete way how the moments of conceptual form can be unified in the objective domain.

Chapter 3 concerns Hegel’s use of the term “the Concept” (der Begriff) in the Doctrine of the Concept. The chapter argues that the use of this term is closer to its ordinary philosophical meaning than is claimed by standard metaphysical readings of the Logic. In particular, the singular use of “the Concept” is a synecdoche for the structure of conceptual thought as exemplified in philosophy in general. Hegel argues that conceptual thought has a formal structure of universality, particularity, and singularity. However, in contrast to many interpretations, these are not treated as properties that all concepts must have to be concepts. Rather, these formal features are exhibited variously in different concepts, judgments, and syllogisms. Hegel’s discussion of the formal dimension of thought sets up his attempt to show that some structures of thought more perfectly exemplify the form of the Concept than others.

Chapter 6 concerns the contentious issue of the role of the concept of life in the Logic and its consistency with the artifact-centered conception of teleology defended in chapter 5. There is a common tendency in the literature to think that the Life chapter implicitly imports references to the biological domain in the Logic itself. It is here argued instead that Hegel’s Life chapter must be read in “topic-neutral” terms: in a way that requires application neither to the natural or cultural domains. Once it is read in this neutral way, we can see that “logical life” is simply the notion of a self-determining purpose. However, the concept of life as developed by Hegel is not at all opposed to the artifactual domain; this is especially because the social and cultural domain (social ontology) give us prime examples of “living artifacts,” the kind of artifacts that can be based in a process guided by thought.

Wittgenstein was associated with conceptual analysis and it is widely presumed that that there is a Wittgensteinian account of concepts, yet sustained treatments of the topic in his work are difficult to find. My contribution shows that this irony is more apparent than real. Wittgenstein discussed concepts at some length in material from the early 1930s and manuscripts and lectures from his final period. On that basis I discuss Wittgenstein’s answers to five crucial questions about concepts – concerning their definition, possession, individuation, function and how best to investigate their nature. Wittgenstein and thinkers who influenced or were influenced by him (Frege, Dummett, Peacock) have contributed substantially to our understanding of concepts in two ways: first, methodological reflections on how to approach philosophically contested concepts, the concept of a concept included; secondly, elucidation of the nature and role of concepts through their connections with linguistic meaning, explanation, understanding, abilities and rules.

Both of the two main Hellenistic philosophical schools, the Epicureans and the Stoics, can be said to have an explicit theory of concepts that is broadly speaking empiricist. For both of them assume that all concepts originate in experience and that none are innate. But while their respective accounts appear similar, they arise from contrasting worldviews: atomist materialism for the Epicureans, and corporealism and a belief in providence and the all-pervading logos of God for the Stoics. Our chapter aims to piece together these two accounts of concepts and interpret them afresh. We will explore their commonalities and differences, show how they are impacted by the respective philosophical frameworks to which each of them belongs, and highlight their philosophical value.

In early Chinese philosophy, the work done by concepts is not explained by appeal to abstract entities or mental representations but rather through the appropriate use of names. In this chapter, I attempt to follow the contours and coherence of early Chinese views centring on two key terms: míng 名 (names) and lèi 類 (categories/kinds). After introducing the key terms and general context, I develop a systematic account of names from the ‘Correcting Names’ chapter of the third-century BCE Confucian text the Xunzi. I then examine the more sceptical views found in the Zhuangzi. The last part of the chapter turns to debates about the proper categorization of things, particularly as they appear in later parts of the Mozi. Early Chinese discussions of the proper use of names tend to privilege social factors over epistemic ones, drawing attention to the ways in which concepts create social order and guide behaviour.

Conceptual engineering is, prima facie, the engineering of concepts. But what are concepts? And in what sense, if any, can they be engineered? In this chapter I introduce conceptual engineering and then distinguish three different understandings of concepts. The first, prevalent in parts of cognitive science, is the psychological account, which sees concepts as psychologically real cognitive structures in individuals’ minds. The second, with historical connections to the pragmatism of Carnap, is the semantic account, which sees concepts as semantic meanings determined by conventional principles of use. The third, rooted in Frege’s rationalism and in anti-individualism, is the representationalist account, which sees concepts as publicly accessible components of thought, determined ultimately not by use but by direct relations between individuals and the world. Disagreements over the nature, target and possible implementation of conceptual engineering are, I will claim, ultimately grounded in the more fundamental disagreement over the nature of concepts.

The concept of concept emerged in classical Greece once philosophers began to reflect on their disagreements about the nature of things. Plato made a critical advance by distinguishing the content and object of thought. It is only with Aristotle, who has more to say about content, that we find the beginnings of a theory of concepts. On his view perception enables animals to distinguish between different types of particular, but cannot consider these types on their own abstractly, as we do in thought. This latter ability, together with the operations of combination and division, allows us to consider a much wider range of types than we encounter directly in perception. Abstraction is the ability to focus on certain features rather than attending to all. But the ability to create new concepts, by adding positive and negative qualifications, underwrites the productivity of language and the possibility of scientific investigation.

This chapter explores how poststructuralist thinkers like Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault redefine the role of concepts in philosophy. It argues that the poststructuralists’ central claim is that the key moment of thinking does not occur with the use of concepts but with the dynamic processes by which concepts are constituted. The chapter begins by setting out the poststructuralists’ criticisms of what they see as a Platonism in traditional accounts of the concept, arguing that such accounts presuppose rather than explain the meaningfulness of our concepts. It then explores antecedents to the poststructuralists in French philosophy, before examining the poststructuralist shift from the discovery of concepts to their creation and reconfiguration. It concludes by analysing Derrida’s notion of différance, Deleuze’s problem-solution framework, and Foucault’s genealogical method to illustrate how poststructuralism challenges traditional accounts of the concept.

Measurement models are the focus of Chapter 5. It treats the nature of concepts, theoretical definitions, and latent variables. Chapter 5 explains model specification, implied moments, model identification, model estimation, and model interpretation, fit, and diagnostics in confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models. Factor score prediction and respecification of models are two other topics it covers.

The Epilogue discusses how the narrative and arguments of the book can help us revisit the debates in Ottoman intellectual historiography over the concept of order (nizam), underlining how labor history and class perspectives can expand the scope of questions and offer new agendas for Ottoman and global histories of the modern era. It offers a conceptual discussion of reform, and highlights the distinctive characteristics of Ottoman Reform in the long nineteenth century, by focusing on its connections with modern capitalism. It emphasizes the capitalist characteristic of the order which the reformist elites struggled to institute throughout the nineteenth century. It underlines how focusing on a specific worksite, and, in particular, studying relations of production within an Ottoman military-industrial site, could help us to reveal these capitalist patterns and class dynamics in Ottoman reform processes. It points to the necessity of the dialogue between labor/social history and intellectual history to better understand how these capitalist practices shaped or were shaped by the mentalities and ideas of Ottoman state elites during this period.

Chapter 25 introduces Alexander of Aphrodisias’ systematic reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I show how Syrianus took over Alexander’s reading of Aristotle, combining it with Plato’s references to a supreme knowledge, ‘dialectic’, and explaining the possibility of scientific knowledge of the objects of metaphysics – transcendent divine first principles – in terms of concepts innate in the soul which both image these first principles and are available to discursive reasoning as sources of knowledge of these principles. The primary text for metaphysics, according to the Platonists, was Plato’s Parmenides. I show how Proclus’ interpretation of the Parmenides, inspired by Syrianus, underlies the composition of Proclus’ metaphysical masterpiece, the Elements of Theology. Finally, Damascius is shown to have brought out to the fullest extent the limits of human reasonings about transcendent divine principles, reasonings which incessantly lead to contradictions and impasses, the aporetical ‘birth-pangs’ of the reasoning soul where it meets what transcend it.

Only two complete works on the philosophy of mathematics survive from Antiquity, Iamblichus’ De communi mathematica scientia and Proclus’ commentary on Euclid’s Elements Book I. Chapter 21 lists works by Proclus concerning mathematics and the sources he used in these works. Concentrating on Proclus’ commentary on Euclid, I describe his conception of the ontological status of the objects with which mathematics is concerned: these objects are originally concepts innate in human soul, forming part of its very nature, concepts which the mathematician then seeks to articulate, project, construct through various methods so as to constitute an elaborated science. I present also the distinctions made between the mathematical sciences and their methods, the importance of mathematics for other sciences (both superior and inferior to it), and Proclus’ relations with other mathematicians of his time.

Chapter 26 discusses in more detail the concepts innate in the soul whereby soul can reason about what transcends reasoning. I describe the relations between words, concepts and things (in this case transcendent realities), as the later Platonists saw these relations, and argue that the rational soul does not simple ‘look’ at metaphysical concepts, as it were, but that they are known as part of the dynamic, productive operations of rational thought.

In this chapter, we seek to examine how play supports children’s overall development. We specifically take the child’s perspective in planning for play development.This chapter has been designed to provide a strong theoretical sense of the concepts of play, learning and development in early education; the capacity to analyse and support play development; a look at planning for play and learning outcomes, drawing on the The Early Years Learning Framework for Australia (V2.0) or Te Whāriki.

There is growing evidence that language plays an important role in emotion because it helps people acquire emotion concept knowledge. In this chapter, we argue that language plays a mechanistic role in emotion because emotion concept knowledge, once acquired, is used by the brain to predictively and adaptively regulate a person’s subjective emotional experiences and behaviors. Building on predictive processing models of brain function, we argue that the emotion concepts learned via language during early development “seed” the brain’s emotional predictions throughout the lifespan. We review constructionist theories of emotion and their support in behavioral, physiological, neuroimaging, and lesion data. We then situate these constructionist predictions within recent neuroscience research to speculate on the neural mechanisms by which emotion concepts “seed” emotional experiences.