Chapter Five was devoted to the metaphysics that underpins the Stoic theories of everlasting recurrence. The present chapter focusses on three of these theories in some detail. At least two of them, as I explain in section 6, are early Stoic. As we shall see, one is stronger than the other two, and the two weaker theories are revisions of it. A central component of this chapter is the thesis of Identity, according to which there must be a full type-identity between the events of any two cosmic cycles. Why should this thesis be true? Why could not the events be slightly, or even completely, different? Thus, sections 1 and 2 describe the three theories and how exactly they differ from one another. In sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the argument for Identity. The argument is based on the nature of the Stoic god. It is his full rationality that requires that the token-events of each new cosmos be fully type identical to those of the previous one. I close the chapter in Sections 5-6 with a discussion of the two weaker theories. What are their philosophical motivations? And in what order did they emerge in the history of Stoicism?

By way of conclusion, this chapter deals with two issues that are deeply connected to the argument of the book but that I shall leave open. The first one is Chrysippus’ own answer to question of why the Stoic god would want the conflagration if the new cosmos is identical to the old one and no improvement is possible. The second issue is when the Stoic god designs the cosmos if the series of cosmic cycle is beginningless and changeless. This second issue is related to the larger topic of cosmic creation and the link between the Stoic and the Christian god. Thus, it is of more general interest and may help to put the argument of the book in a wider historical perspective.

The chapter studies this mechanism in detail and focusses on the following questions. First, what are these ‘exhalations’ (ἀναθυμιάσεις) and why do they rise up in the sky? Secondly, why does the desiccation of the sublunary region cause celestial fire to descend to this region? More particularly, why does not celestial fire consume the sublunary region before it totally dries out, as an ordinary wildfire would consume a forest that is still relatively green and full of life? Thirdly, how does celestial fire consume the exhalations and the substances that it finds in the sublunary region? And, more generally, how do the Stoics conceive of the physical process by which a mass of fire consumes another body? In other words, how do they envision the phenomenon of combustion? Fourthly, what is the place of the concept of combustion in their elemental theory? And, finally, how long does the conflagration last?

The early Stoic cosmos is sharply different from that of Plato and Aristotle. But it is also unique compared to that of the Presocratics. In this chapter, I seek to prove that this is so by concentrating upon the Stoic theory of conflagration we just examined. The issue requires an in-depth discussion because Stoic cosmology owes enormously to the Presocratics, and the theory of conflagration is clearly the part of Stoic cosmology that has deeper roots in these early thinkers, much more so than the theories of cosmogony and everlasting recurrence

The conflagration is followed by a cosmony that restores the cosmos. In fact, a permanent end would be impossible given the rationality of the early Stoic god. In this chapter, I limit myself to asking what is the structure of the cosmogony. How, exactly, is the large mass of fire left by the conflagration transformed in the cosmogony into the differentiated masses of air, fire, water and earth that constitute the present cosmos? I shall argue that the cosmogony, which sets off as soon as the conflagration is over, divides into at least three basic stages: (a) the formation of the four elements and of the sublunary and supralunary regions as two differentiated parts of the cosmos, (b) the formation of composite homogeneous substances (gold, flesh, wood, etc.) out of the four elements; and (c) the formation of composite heterogeneous substances (animals and plants) out of homogeneous ones.

This chapter and the next build upon the previous chapters by addressing a vital question that they leave open. What is the relation between the cosmos issued from the cosmogony and the cosmos previously destroyed at the conflagration? Is it the same cosmos? Or is it different? The issue of identity drove a great deal of dispute within the school. In fact, as I explain in Chapter Six, there were three clearly different Stoic theories of everlasting recurrence that opposed one another on this question. In the present chapter, I concentrate upon two broader and more basic metaphysical problems presupposed in the dispute over identity. The two problems, concisely put, are the following. (a) Why is the present cosmos present as opposed to past or future? In general, how is the present distinct from the past and the future? (b) Supposing that the present cosmos is type-identical to the previous one and the next how can they really occupy different places in time? And how can the times themselves be distinct if the events are type-identical?

In this introduction, I start with a brief description of the structure of the Stoic cosmos that explains how it differs from other cosmic systems in Antiquity. I then describe the main goal of the book and some of the general methodological principles that I follow. Finally, I offer a synopsis of the argument that unifies it.

This chapter brings together the theory of conflagration and the theories of everlasting recurrence that embrace Identity, and draws a paradox from their combination: the ‘paradox of destruction and restoration’. If the new cosmos is wholly type-identical to the old one, would it not be more rational for the Stoic god not to destroy the latter in the first place? The idea of a conflagration followed by the restoration of a type-identical cosmos seems to threaten the rationality of the Stoic god. In this chapter, I explain how, on my view, the Stoic god is immune to this objection.

To present some of the basic notions that will be used throughout the book, this chapter offers an analysis of the Stoic cosmos that complements the brief description given in the Introduction. I start by looking at its internal structure and composition, the distinction between the sublunary and the supralunary regions, the way in which they interact with each other, and the distribution of the four elements in the sublunary region and their reciprocal change. Subsequently, I discuss the place of god in the cosmos and, in particular, the pantheistic idea that god is one of the two basic cosmic principles as well as the thesis that the cosmos is a living being whose ‘seminal reason’ (σπερματικὸς λόγος) is god. Finally, I present ‘theological determinism’, the deterministic conception of the cosmos that the early Stoics advocate and that is prevalent in their theory of everlasting recurrence.

Identifies the similarities and differences between the various worldviews generated across Ovid’s works, with particular attention given to the beginning of the Fasti. Here Janus presents an alternative vision of how the world came to be through his evolution from primordial chaos. In encouraging us to explore the correspondences and divergences between his different cosmogonies, Ovid introduces a further level of instability into the world and text alike. Ovid also continues to combine allusions to conflicting cosmogonies, with Empedocles and the myth of Statesman from Plato’s Politicus operating as important intertexts for Fasti 1. In the Politicus, Plato parodies and subverts Empedocles’ cosmic system so as to question the parameters of natural philosophy and the approaches of the Presocratics. In the Politicus natural philosophy is seen as largely dependent upon myth to provide an oblique vision of phases in the history of the cosmos that have fallen away from collective human consciousness.

To acquire new knowledge of the physical universe, it is necessary to build large research infrastructures that replace the older generation instruments that have exhausted its scientific capabilities. This premise drives the Square Kilometre Array Observatory (SKAO), an intergovernmental organization constructing two large radio telescopes with complementary science goals in Australia and South Africa. Big science requires the resources of many countries, and the SKAO was established to realize it. Although the corresponding growth in investment enables steady scientific advancement, step increments in knowledge are often serendipitous, and new-generation telescopes are designed to maximize their ‘discovery space’. Big science also needs large, multinational research teams to drive the key science objectives that define the large instruments, but often major discoveries result from the ingenuity of small groups or individuals with unique opportunities and skills. This is a personal account of my involvement in observational radio astronomy that led to the construction of the SKA-mid telescope in South Africa, highlighting the influence of privilege, providence, and lived experience on my career.

We describe cosmological solutions. First, we consider the Friedman–Lemaitre–Robertson–Walker (FLRW) ansatz and find the resulting Friedmann equations. Then we find the cosmological solution and cosmological models corresponding to types of matter. Finally, we describe in details the cosmologies of de Sitter and Anti-de Sitter space.

This chapter inquires the significance of objectivity within the democratic epistemological framework, tracing its origins to the dual naturalistic cosmology where Nature is perceived as autonomous and humans as impartial observers. Central to objectivity and “disinterestedness” is the belief that the external world remains impervious to subjective influence. This idea is exemplified in the association of objectivity with technological advancements and human-made machinery. Ezrahi contends that despite being a human creation, science has attained autonomous status as a source of truths, reintegrating Nature into Culture and emphasizing the importance of humility, given that science itself adheres to natural laws. He also underscores the complex position of humanity within the Nature/Culture dichotomy, where the human body is part of Nature, while human creations belong to Culture. Nature embodies necessity and unchangeable laws, constraining human freedom, whereas Culture represents voluntarism, freedom, human interiority, and social behavior. The chapter illustrates how scientists and politicians leverage their scientific authority to project objectivity and disinterest, legitimizing government policies while suppressing dissent and effectively depoliticizing decisions. The text emphasizes that the concept of external Nature linked to objectivity is a product of Western cosmology and not universally applicable.

In this chapter, Ezrahi analyzes the influence of philosophers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Vico, and Rousseau, as well as the Federalists, on the shift from a medieval monistic cosmology based on God to a modern dualistic cosmology, emphasizing dynamic Nature and human agency. These thinkers played a pivotal role in shaping a political order and obedience independent of divine authority, turning to Nature as the source of laws and a check on human actions. This transformation led to the emergence of new concepts, such as the state, freedom, and equality, despite their being imaginative. Hobbes pioneered the use of metaphors and empirical sciences in civic affairs. Spinoza adopted a detached scientific perspective, viewing human emotions and drives as natural phenomena. Locke presented empiricism and probability to inform political decisions through an understanding of human judgment. Vico proclaimed that political systems are based on collective political imagination, facilitating the construction of institutions and political processes rooted in commonsense. Rousseau further developed the dichotomy of Nature/Culture, highlighting its impact on politics, education, and ethics. The American Revolution marked the merging of objective Nature and human agency, giving rise to the idea of employing science to manipulate Nature.

In this chapter, Ezrahi argues that the massive discrediting of claims of objectivity has deeply weakened the social authority of professional communities and institutions – governments, scientists, and economists – which have heavily resorted to professionalism in order to seemingly depoliticize decisions and empower their legitimacy. The dual role of objectivity norms and objectification strategies in depoliticizing decisions while concealing value-political choices is scrutinized. The delicate balance between overpoliticization and over-objectification is examined, emphasizing the challenges faced by governments in navigating transparency and political functionality. The chapter traces the interconnected erosion of the transcendental concept of Nature, democratic culture, and the rule of law. The loss of objectivity in law, exemplified by challenges to the Israeli Supreme Court, underscores the broader decline in civic solidarity. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the cultural and epistemological crises facing modern democracy, raising critical questions about resources available for shaping new imaginaries of self-governance and justice, drawing on historical cosmological transformations.

Blander’s epilogue contextualizes Ezrahi’s current work within his previous research corpus as well as interweaving new concepts: depth skepticism, modest democracy, and the right to dream. Blander describes three spheres of democratic backsliding and the rise of populism: legal-institutional, social, and intellectual freedom. She suggests that Ezrahi introduces a deep explanation of these troubling trends. Blander introduces the concept of “Depth Skepticism,” which applies to philosophers, among them Ezrahi, who searched for deeper layers of the human experience in order to identify the causes of sociopolitical phenomena. The epilogue follows Ezrahi’s intellectual journey, identifying a connecting thread from his early work “The Descent of Icarus,” revealing the interaction between science, enlightenment, and democracy through “Imagined Democracies,” portraying the role of science in creating the epistemological foundations of modern democracy, to the current volume introducing the cosmological shift from Nature/Culture to a blurred “HumaNature” cosmology and how it affects democratic foundations. This shift calls for a “modest democracy” that accommodates reason, emotions, and ambivalence. It views democracy as a constructive utopia, allowing individuals and groups the “right to dream” within nonviolent pursuits. This democracy fosters compromise, balances power, and tolerates contradictions, embodying a constant state of becoming.