To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter starts by explaining that, when a company becomes factually insolvent but it is not yet subject to a formal insolvency proceeding, the shareholders – or the directors acting on their behalf – may engage, even in good faith, in various forms of behavior that can divert or destroy value at the expense of the creditors. For this reason, most jurisdictions around the world respond with a variety of strategies, including the imposition of special directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency. This chapter identifies six regulatory models for the design of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency. After examining the advantages and weaknesses of each regulatory model, this chapter emphasizes that the desirability of a particular approach depends on a variety of country-specific and firm-specific factors. It concludes by suggesting various policy recommendations for the design of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency in emerging economies.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.