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How should epistemologists respond to skepticism about knowledge of the external world? Michael Bergmann advocates noninferential antiskepticism. The thought is that, to reply to a skeptical argument, we should start with premises that do not require inference. I argue that Bergmann’s reasoning runs into the problem of easy knowledge and propose an alternative inferential antiskepticism. This view faces the problem of vicious circularity. I agree that, if we go down the inferential path, a certain type of circularity is unavoidable. I deny, however, that this type of circularity is vicious.

Summary

In this chapter challenge cases to Knowledge Counter-Closure discussed so far are distinguished from cases of transmission failure and easy knowledge. I explain how these challenge cases work and argue that Knowledge Counter-Closure can be replaced by a plausible principle phrased in terms of justification, rather than knowledge. I then discuss Murphy's claim that inferential knowledge can arise from unjustified belief and from non-belief. I close the chapter by showing that rejecting Knowledge Counter-Closure avoids substantial costs.

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Noninferential Antiskepticism and the Problem of Easy Knowledge

Chapter 4 - Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

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Noninferential Antiskepticism and the Problem of Easy Knowledge

Chapter 4 - Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

Summary