This chapter argues that Hobbes’s appreciation of Galileo’s principles of motion occurred in stages by focusing on a principle that Hobbes introduces in Leviathan 2.1 to explain the imagination: “when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, (that nothing can change itself) is not so easily assented to.” Although there is evidence that Hobbes became aware of the importance of this principle in early criticisms of Thomas White and in early notes for De corpore, he did not incorporate it into his account of the imagination in Elements of Law (1640). However, in later works, such as the English and Latin versions of Leviathan and De corpore, conceiving of unhindered motion as continuing eternally provided Hobbes with the ability to explain more aspects of human cognition related to the imagination. Furthermore, thinking of the passion "curiosity" as an infinite endeavor enabled Hobbes to explain why human scientific endeavors can persist even in the face of failure or apparent uselessness.

I start this chapter by briefly describing three possibilities for the future of capitalism and economic inequality. The first is that the rich continue to get richer; the second is a polar opposite approach that seeks to create economic equality at all costs; and the third involves the possibility of multiple forms of capitalism. Each possibility is explored in the next three chapters. In the remainder of this chapter, I explain why it is important to chart possibilities: doing so helps us understand potential paths forward and can meaningfully guide us toward the forms most congruent with our wishes. This world-making approach to psychology draws on theorizing around the psychology of imagination, which I develop here. I also return to value pluralism to help frame our understanding of the three futures that comprise Part III.

Sociocultural psychology of the lifecourse, which examines the development of the persons in their changing environments, offers here the frame for our exploration of development in older age. Although it has largely addressed the development of children, youth and adults, it has only recently started to approach the specificities of developing with age. This chapter retraces the ontological and epistemological foundation of this approach. It then further explores three sets of concepts of foremost importance when approaching development in the lifecourse into older age: those related to dynamics of distancing and imagining, core when examining semiotic processes in human development; those of interests and engagements, which emphasise sense-making and affects; and what regards the domains of conduct in which people engage. The chapter then sketches the specificities of development in older age within people’s material, social and symbolic environment.

Many interpreters of Kant accept the idea that our knowledge depends on an a priori synthesis of the pure manifolds of space and time exercised by the “transcendental imagination.” This chapter argues that although we can find that Kant suggests such a view, it is incoherent and unnecessary. Even though all cognition requires synthesis of spatial and/or temporal manifolds, and such synthesis requires the imagination as Kant defines it, namely, the ability to represent objects not currently present to us, “pure space” and “pure time” (and for that matter “pure apperception”) are not objects of any kind, but only forms of objects. Synthesis must take place in accordance with the pure forms of intuition, with the categories, and with the schematized versions of the categories necessary to apply their logical meaning to spatio-temporal manifolds, but such synthesis, even in the case of mathematical construction in pure intuition, is carried out by the imagination in accordance with a priori forms or rules; but synthesis itself is never a priori, thus there is no call for such a thing as “transcendental imagination.” Or, there is a transcendental role for the imagination, but not for a transcendental imagination.

Part III treats systematic challenges to natural perfectionism, and opens with the so-called fact/value dichotomy. This challenge can be parsed in four main ways. First, the metaphysical challenge, which has historical roots in Hobbes and Hume. This holds that the ‘natural’ cannot accommodate the normative: a claim I argue is question-begging, depriving norms, furthermore, of any proper grounds. Second, the inferential challenge, which maintains that one cannot move validly from ‘is’-type propositions to ‘ought’-type ones. This Humean challenge fails, I argue, since natural perfectionism rests its claims on natural facts that are already inextricably inflected with value. Third, G. E. Moore’s semantic challenge. Moore claims that any naturalistic definition of ‘good’ both commits the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and falls foul of the ‘open question argument’. I argue that the former is a pseudo-fallacy and that the latter conflates not seeming ‘closed’ with being ‘open’. Fourth, the conceptual challenge attacks ‘thick’ concepts, these being purportedly inextricable amalgams of ‘fact’ and ‘value’. I argue that thick concepts are defensible, for pragmatic, grounding and moral reasons.

I open by charting by the well-worn philosophical distinction between intellection and perception, and unpack the debate over whether (or to what degree) the latter is separable from the former. I conclude that the ‘cognitivist’ position is correct: that human perception is properly infused with conceptual content, this marking us out as the species we are (viz. rational animals). With all this in place, I ask whether there is a cognitive hierarchy among the senses. Aristotle and recent researchers like Viberg answer ‘yes’, vision being at the top, smell at the bottom of the hierarchy. But I argue that this depends on an undue privileging of cognitive extent and precision. I then investigate the imagination and the alleged threat it poses to cognitivism. I argue that the imagination – when functional, and not reducible to fantasy – is in fact a profound aid to cognition (since it enhances it and lends it more ‘colour’). I end by looking at aesthetic perfection, where the role of the imagination is of peculiar importance – though I express scepticism about the traditional hyper-valuation of aesthetic over everyday perceptual experience.

Synesius of Cyrene (b. ca. 373–d. ca. 410) was trained in the classical literature that depicted war as an event with armies opposing one another in battle, but he experienced a different kind of conflict in his own life – namely, the periodic and unpredictable raiding that troubled late ancient Libya. Synesius’ letters and his treatise On Kingship show that these conflicts brought sentiment to the surface as a kind of evidence about people that could be implicitly trusted; Synesius’ sentiment was palpably xenophobic, aligned against both “barbarians” and “Scythians,” and so strong as to circumvent rational examinations of the evidence around him. This essay examines the scaffolded construction of stereotype, built in Synesius’ advice to a hypothetical ruler, and demonstrates how knowledge, even knowledge that seems intimate and trustworthy, can be bent through engagements with violence.

In this introduction to Pragmatism Revisited, Robert Lane summarizes the book’s fifteen chapters. Those chapters apply classical and newer pragmatist ideas to a wide range of issues, including the imagination, conceptual change, ignorance, religious fundamentalism, truth in political discourse, authoritarian populism, academic freedom, criminal punishment and mass incarceration, environmental philosophy, bioethics, artificial intelligence, the Black intellectual tradition, feminism, gender, and social construction; the final chapter examines the future of pragmatism itself.

Ambrosio reads Charles Peirce’s pragmatic maxim as inviting us to conduct experiments with our imaginations. On her account, the images that Peirce used to prompt his audience into such imaginative inquiry are tools that elicit imaginative activity. But since they are external and public, they also constrain that activity, resulting in shared habits that are subject to social criticism and thus to change. Ambrosio also considers John Dewey’s characterization of deliberation as “dramatic rehearsal” in the imagination of different possible courses of action. While she notes that Dewey’s approach to the imagination adds a moral dimension missing from Peirce’s, she sees the two pragmatists as united in the view that experimental imaginative activities are empirical and social with important material components. She also engages with contemporary work on the imagination, suggesting that contributors to recent debates on that topic would benefit from studying Peirce and Dewey.

The final chapter ends the book with a discussion about when do images still matter despite their abundance and why images have an ambivalent relationship with reality. Can we distinguish between images that reflect reality, manipulate reality, or help us imagine an alternative reality? Can we talk of a ‘good’ image, a powerful one that lives on, and invites dialogue? Can we talk of a ‘just’ image? We want images that do us justice, whether it is for our personal memories or grieving, or for our collective identity and society.

Dante’s defense of the life of reason can guide our consideration of the most current concerns.We are more in need that ever of a theoretical basis for openness, for ongoing inquiry, and for a genuinely common good. Dante’s understanding helps us think more clearly about the dogmatisms of our age, which, as ever, envision comprehensive transformations of human life uninformed by the moderating self-knowledge available in the poem.

As our power grows, it becomes more necessary judge its use, to assess the relative weight of the goods we seek when that power is deployed.To do so, we rely on reason as a guide. But reason’s capacity to adjudicate among goods is widely doubted. It requires a defense. This chapter argues that a premodern thinker may best be equipped to meet this need.

Abstract: In this chapter, Fesmire reassesses John Dewey’s Human Nature and Conduct (1922) through four enduring themes: the role of social habits in moral growth, the centrality of imagination in moral deliberation, the importance of unintended consequences in ethical decision-making, and moral progress as problem-solving. Fesmire describes Dewey’s view of moral dilemmas as entanglements of conflicting forces without absolute resolutions. Dewey’s theory of “dramatic rehearsal” describes moral deliberation as an imaginative process of anticipating outcomes. Dewey emphasizes the interconnectedness of means and ends, urging ethical inquiry that is experimental and adaptable. Fesmire situates this within Dewey’s later pluralism, which rejects singular ethical principles in favor of reconciling competing moral considerations. Dewey ultimately frames moral progress as an ongoing process of intelligent inquiry rather than adherence to fixed doctrines. As Fesmire shows, Dewey’s approach encourages democratic, participatory ethics, emphasizing open dialogue and flexibility in resolving moral conflicts.

This chapter focuses on the role that allusion plays in establishing a shared language of intimacy. It describes how Wollstonecraft and Godwin, in their letters to one another, trade literary allusions as a way of flirting. That practice cast doubt on the transparency of speech, however, since the difficulty of openly expressing feeling, versus the relative ease of slipping into a literary cliché, led to the sense of distrust that also features throughout their letters. The tension between transparency and trust is further explored in the pair’s novels. Wollstonecraft’s The Wrongs of Woman; or, Maria presents a heroine who falls in love with a man based on the books he reads, in a manner which suggests either quixotic delusion or a defiant trust in the imagination. Godwin’s novels depict scenes of shared reading which rethink his earlier philosophical discussions of personal affection versus independence, and openness versus secrecy or reserve.

Revival processes appear central to folk musics across different cultural and national traditions. Consequently, this chapter argues that, rather than perceiving revival as the exception, processes of revival and change should thus be perceived as a central feature of tradition. As is outlined here, revival needs to be approached from a much broader perspective. Falling back on case studies from England, Latvia, and Germany, this chapter further analyzes how acts of revival are entangled with themes of authenticity and nostalgia. Utilizing different claims of authenticity as elaborated by Denis Dutton, these waves of revivalism might be described as a defensive mechanism against eras of accelerated global change. Following scholars such as Svetlana Boym and Ross Cole, folk revivalism can thus be understood as an act of imaginative investment in the past and future, a nexus where nostalgia and utopia – as a counterpoint or solution to this sentiment of loss – meet.

In this chapter Angeline Morrison offers an exquisitely written account of what mythopoeic singing means to her and why it is central to reimagining the history of British folk music. Drawing on the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, she highlights the transformative power of song. Disembodied, imaginal, or non-physical things, she argues, can be sung into being. This process can serve the cause of decolonization by engaging in a form of contemporary mythmaking that re-enchants and re-populates historical landscapes with figures known to have been present, but who may not be identifiable in the body of song that survives.

Imaginings play a crucial role in accounting for fictionality, but what are they? Focusing on those invited by fictions, this chapter argues for the deflationary view that imaginings are just entertainings, I=E. This view was standard in early analytic philosophy, but few current writers appear to hold it. The chapter critically addresses an argument by Walton against I=E that may contribute to explaining this turn; some who espouse views that are otherwise close to I=E endorse this argument against it. In response to Walton’s argument, the chapter invokes a point suggested by Walton himself: Many imaginings – i.e., entertainings, on the view defended here – are mental episodes that agents launch for a purpose. The chapter also appeals to this fact to dispose of a miscellany of other contemporary considerations against I=E. In addition to answering objections, the chapter offers a positive consideration in favor of I=E: to wit, that it may help to establish the imagination as a fundamental, irreducible mental attitude – a view that many philosophers do endorse.