The physical-force elements in the Northern Ireland conflict were Irish republican illegal organizations versus illegal loyalist organisations; ranged against both but more often aimed against nationalists were the armed police force, its auxiliaries and the British army. Constitutional elements were the SDLP, representing nationalists, various unionist parties ranging from moderate to extreme, Irish politicians and British secretaries of state. Political reform and reconciliation progressed slowly, and 3,663 people of all ethnicities and origins died before the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 put an end to hostilities.

Independent Ireland was characterised by political tension, repression, unemployment, emigration and social activism. Some new, short-lived political parties were formed. Ireland voted to join the EEC in 1973 and became more formally integrated with Europe over the succeeding decades. Women entered the workforce in greater numbers and attained high public visibility, clamouring for social welfare, employment and reproductive rights. Birth control was fully legal by 1990, homosexuality decriminalised in 1993 and divorce legalised in 1995. The late 1990s saw investment in public services, rising employment and falling emigration and immigration. The Catholic church, rocked by sexual scandals and challenged by growing secularism, saw its power wane.

Successful retirement requires proper planning through the decades, starting in your 20s and continuing through your 70s. The key to saving enough for retirement is to invest as much as possible, as early as possible. The bottom line is this: you must create an investment strategy where you literally do not run out of money before you die. Future financial freedom is dependent on the exercise of current financial discipline. By creating realistic budgets, adequately funding savings and retirement accounts, following wise investment strategies, and reacting appropriately to economic and market conditions, you have the best chance to fund and enjoy a future that meets your needs and goals. Chapter describes important financial planning through the decades of life, 20s, 30s,40s, 50s, 60s, 70s,80s, 90s, and 100s.

In Ireland, where the struggle for independence has transformed generations of former gunmen into established statesmen, political violence offers a less contentious term than terrorism for analysing how non-state actors used force to bring about political change. Conveying how violence was conceived ‘as a form of politics, a bargaining tool in the negotiation process between state and opposition’, it offers a useful (if more diffuse) category to analyse the political impact of violence. Given that ‘terrorists don’t just do terrorism’, there is a strong case for analysing terroristic forms of violence alongside other strands of political and armed struggle which it supplemented or displaced. This chapter will argue that the significance of political violence in Ireland stemmed primarily from its impact on non-violent nationalism and the state, and that the forms of violence adopted by republicans shaped that dynamic relationship in important ways.

The narrative around contemporary terrorism and political violence has emphasise its transnational character. There has been a tendency to see this dimension of terrorism as something novel, rendering contemporary terrorist threats as more dangerous than those experienced in the past. The idea of globally networked violent actors is frightening, and understandably excites public anxiety. Yet the overwhelming majority of terrorism has tended to be not only domestic, but local, conducted by individuals in the country where they normally reside, usually striking at targets close to their home. Transnational connections do exist, of course, but rather than being the defining feature of some ‘new’ terrorism, they have been a feature of violent political movements since long before 11 September 2001. Indeed, they arguably date back to the emergence of terrorism itself as some phenomenon discernable from other forms of violent contestation. This chapter has two aims. It will assess the importance of transnational links to radical and violent non-state actors for Irish Republicanism. Further, through an analysis of the Irish case study, it aims to contribute to our understanding of such transnational links more generally.

It seems unarguable that religious belief and practice have contributed on occasions in the past to the generation and sustenance of terrorism. Moreover, the contemporary persistence of religious commitment suggests that such long-rooted processes may have life in them yet. In relation to terrorism as to much else, those who espouse a religious faith probably deserve more serious-minded, respectful attention than scholars sometimes afford them. Certainly, in settings where religious values and beliefs have undeniably contributed in complex ways to the dynamics of terroristic violence (such as Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine), the assumption of an evaporative quality to religion and its effects would seem profoundly ill judged. And if terrorism is potentially most revealing in regard to the world-historical forces with which it intersects, then examination of the multilayered relationships between terrorism, history and religion represents a major challenge. Accordingly, this chapter suggests that the precise nature of the important and complex relationships between terrorism and religion might helpfully be examined through addressing the following four historically minded questions. First, should religious belief and practice be seen more as causes of terroristic violence, or as restraining influences upon it? Second, has religious terrorism represented an existential threat, or more of a horrific nuisance? Third, is religious terrorism a novel phenomenon, or a recognisably familiar one? Fourth, is religion a detachable part, or an organically inextricable feature, of the beliefs which can lead to terrorist activity?

The Second Republic sparked considerable enthusiasm concerning the possibilities that a large-scale permanent redistribution of landed property could resolve the social problems in southern Spain. Yet, as this chapter argues, land reform failed because there was insufficient uncultivated land that could be brought under the plough, and labour-intensive agriculture was not feasible under dry-farming conditions. Indeed, cereal cultivation was becoming increasingly capital intensive, especially on the heavy, fertile Campiña soils. The slow and limited progress of settlements under the 1932 Reform Law contrasts with the land invasions in the spring of 1936, which resulted in over a hundred thousand peasants receiving almost immediately over half a million hectares. However they failed to solve the overriding problem of insufficient land and, because weak state capacity implied that land settlements could not be implemented impartially, they simply changed which authority decided who was to benefit, and who was to be excluded.

Between July 1972 and February 1974, the British Conservative government focused on creating a power-sharing settlement with the constitutional parties. In the meantime, the security and intelligence services would try to reduce IRA activity to a level at which it could not obstruct the power-sharing government. But once the power-sharing executive collapsed in May 1974, the British government's political policy radically shifted. Between May 1974 and December 1975, the British Labour government under Harold Wilson and Merlyn Rees envisaged an agreement on Northern Irish independence between Irish republicans, Ulster loyalists and others as being possible. This idea was not irrational. Various leading IRA and UDA members had demonstrated a willingness to contemplate an independent six-county Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, the Labour government refused to give the public or private declaration of intent to withdraw that the IRA wanted. The British feared that any declaration would provoke a loyalist uprising and civil war. The ceasefire collapsed as the IRA was not willing to forgo a British declaration of intent to withdraw. Nevertheless, the British Labour government under Harold Wilson had been willing to explore withdrawal from Northern Ireland, if republicans and loyalists could agree to independence.

Between August 1969 and March 1972, the British government focused on reforming but maintaining unionist-majority rule at Stormont to appease both unionists and nationalists. Fear of provoking a civil war and getting entangled in Northern Irish politics - which counted for little at Westminster - explains the British government’s reluctance to attempt significant reforms prior to 1972. In addition, Edward Heath’s government was reluctant to negotiate and grant significant concessions to violent opponents of the state. Yet allowing Stormont to delay and dilute reforms and to influence British security policy dragged the British Army into conflict with the nationalist population. As nationalist anger increased, the non-violent Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) pulled out of Stormont in the summer of 1971. IRA activities increased. Escalating violence eventually forced the British government to suspend Stormont and assume direct rule. By March 1972, the British government had realised that the IRA could not be militarily defeated, and tried instead to reduce violence to 'an acceptable level' to enable political solutions to emerge. But IRA violence continued and influenced both the SDLP and British government to talk to the IRA in June 1972.

The intelligence war had had minimal impact on the IRA’s campaign by June 1972. Various factors explain the limited infiltration by intelligence services of the city and rural areas where the IRA was operating at that time. In urban areas, IRA support increased following the active role played by republicans in defending nationalist areas, indiscriminate British Army actions against the nationalist community and the lack of political and socio-economic reform by Stormont and Westminster. Other factors unique to rural areas restricted intelligence, included republicans’ long-term sense of injustice at being forced into a unionist-dominated Northern Ireland state in the 1920s. British forces also conducted various indiscriminate security operations in nationalist areas, such as in County Tyrone. These operations provoked further tension. The failure to coordinate British military and RUC Special Branch intelligence on a consistent basis made containing the IRA harder. In addition, IRA barricades in Derry City and Belfast, and the ability of some rural IRA units to use the border to evade detection, meant that surveillance of the IRA via vehicle- or personality-checking systems was difficult. The intelligence war’s failure to significantly erode the IRA’s capacity for conflict partly explains why the British government talked to the IRA in June 1972.

This chapter investigates the intelligence war’s effectiveness against each regional IRA group between July 1972 and December 1975. Whilst the Belfast IRA suffered some operational difficulties because of British intelligence efforts, the Derry City IRA, rural republican units in Fermanagh, Tyrone and south Armagh, and the cells operating in England had not been damaged to any considerable extent by 1975. It is true that the number of deaths caused by the IRA had declined since 1972. But the republican movement had spread further across Northern Ireland and the borderlands of the Irish Republic. The IRA maintained a persistent campaign for reasons explored in this chapter. Northern Ireland remained politically unstable in 1975, and when the IRA called a prolonged ceasefire, this was not out of desperation. This chapter discusses important events in the intelligence conflict between 1972 and 1975, included the discovery by the IRA of the Four Square Laundry intelligence operation in Belfast in 1972.

A majority of IRA leaders agreed to a ceasefire in late December 1974 because the British government suggested privately that they were contemplating political withdrawal. This chapter also suggests that the ceasefire collapsed because the British government would not announce their withdrawal before a political settlement had been agreed. The British government feared that a declaration of intent to withdraw would provoke a loyalist uprising. Republicans did not trust that the British government would withdraw without a public or private declaration. Many grass-roots republicans felt tricked by the British government into a ceasefire that they began to believe had been designed to degrade the IRA’s armed capacity. However, evidence suggests that, in 1975, the British government wanted gradual political withdrawal from Northern Ireland. Many leading republicans were willing to politically compromise during that year and potentially accept an independent Northern Ireland. But pressure from grass-roots republicans meant that the leadership had to demand a British declaration of intent to withdraw.

The IRA called a ceasefire from June to July 1972 primarily because it was keen to negotiate from a position of strength. Equally, various IRA leaders recognised the need for a negotiated political settlement. The IRA demonstrated their desire to engage in dialogue with the British government in early March 1972, when leading IRA members held secret talks with Leader of the Opposition Harold Wilson. This chapter also suggests that the British government were partly responsible for the collapse of the 1972 ceasefire. The British government never outlined the boundaries of a potential political settlement to the IRA. Neither did they try to politicise the republican movement by legalising Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland. The IRA contributed to the ceasefire’s failure too. Despite sizeable support levels in working-class nationalist areas, they had no political mandate from which to encourage the British government to provide concessions towards the republican position.

After 1975, British policymakers no longer believed that the IRA would settle for a political compromise. Instead, the British government sought to reduce IRA activity to a level at which it would not interfere with potential political agreements between constitutional nationalists and unionists. Continuing IRA activity convinced the Thatcher government to continue this strategy towards Irish republicans. The aim of enticing Irish republicans to fully politicise via backchannel negotiations would only be readopted under Peter Brooke in 1990. In order to force republicans to promptly agree to a political compromise, John Major’s government followed a similar strategy to that of Harold Wilson’s government between 1974 and 1975. There would be a combination of backchannel conversations alongside a continuing intelligence campaign to erode the IRA’s armed capacity. This chapter also outlines how the IRA and Sinn Féin leadership privately only sought a return to talks after 1975. They sought to persist with the IRA’s campaign and to maximise Sinn Féin’s share of the vote in order to get the British government to return to talks and provide concessions towards Irish republican objectives.

Chapter 10 suggests that the Irish government and the SDLP talked to Sinn Féin from the late 1980s for two primary reasons: Sinn Féin’s sizeable minority of nationalist support in Northern Ireland, and the IRA’s persistence. Continuing IRA activity, Sinn Féin’s electoral mandate in Northern Ireland, and the pan-nationalist talks also encouraged a shift in British government strategy towards trying to bring republicans into a political settlement in the 1990s. The IRA’s aim of encouraging the British government to return to talks had succeeded by the 1990s. Nonetheless, this chapter suggests that the electoral stagnation of Sinn Féin alongside the stalemate that the conflict had reached by the 1990s convinced the republican leadership to make political concessions in talks. But the prospect of further increasing Sinn Féin’s electoral mandate and achieving concessions for Irish nationalists via the pan-nationalist alliance also influenced Irish republicans to end the armed campaign. This chapter also explores how various grass-roots republicans agreed with the peace process strategy, and why Denis Donaldson and other Sinn Féin informers were not pivotal to the peace process strategy being formed and accepted within republicanism. I emphasise the importance of political factors, rather than the intelligence war, in leading to peace.

The introduction outlines how despite Stakeknife and Donaldson infiltrating the IRA, this book argues that the intelligence war did not force the IRA into the peace process. The secretive and elusive nature of rural IRA units, republican units in England and the IRA leadership, alongside the additional security provided by the cell structure in Belfast and Derry City, meant that the IRA was not pushed into terminal decline by British intelligence. I explain how the peace process resulted from a political and military stalemate that existed for all sides. I also outline how the IRA's prolonged ceasefires in 1972, 1975, 1994 and 1997 did not result from the intelligence war.