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This chapter explores the different ways of approaching judicial review, and makes some initial criticisms of the historical ‘ultra vires debate’ of the 1990s and 2000s. It argues for a return to the concept of jurisdiction (and jurisdictional error) as a central category of the law, and for a focus on non-statutory executive powers as a primary case for and from which to build a theory of the supervisory jurisdiction. While legislative intention is important, wherever it is relevant, it is not relevant where the official powers in question obviously derive from rules of competence outside of legislation. Further, common law rules of conduct are always central to judicial review in the context of statutory grants of power. This insight is conducive to a simpler and more powerful conception of judicial review based around a common law doctrine of ultra vires.
Ultra vires doctrine has declined in importance in Australia in tandem with the rise of constitutional principles in judicial review of administrative action. The Australian Constitution creates an entrenched right of judicial review in the original jurisdiction of the High Court. This right has led to the development of a conception of judicial review that is anchored on separation of powers principles but has not incorporated the ultra vires doctrine. This constitutional approach gained ascendancy in Australia not long after the ultra vires/common law debate arose in the United Kingdom and led Australian courts down a path that is both different and similar. The similarity lies in the issues Australian courts have faced, such as the doctrinal basis of judicial review, or whether an overarching concept might provide a coherent theoretical framework. The difference of the Australian experience lies in the terminology adopted in Australian law, such as their adoption and refinement of jurisdictional error even though that concept was disclaimed by UK courts. When the constitutional overlay of Australian is stripped away, the difference in approach to the UK clearly lessens.
This chapter discusses error of fact and error of law as grounds of judicial review.It addresses both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error of fact, as well as the admission of fresh evidence.It then considers error of law and the uncertain approach taken to Anisminic in Hong Kong.It concludes with a consideration of the distinction between error of fact and error of law.
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