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This chapter revisits the book’s central argument and conclusions from each chapter. It concludes that there has been substantial misunderstanding about core aspects of deterrence, which can be addressed by working from a comprehensive approach to theorizing deterrence and using this approach to guide and evaluate research. The chapter also concludes that most extant deterrence-based policies cannot and will not appreciably deter crime, and may even worsen it. The solution lies in policies grounded in stronger science built on better theory and research. Our sincere hope is that comprehensive deterrence theory (CDT) provides a helpful step in that direction.
This chapter discusses policy implications that flow from comprehensive deterrence theory (CDT). The account points to many implications. Perhaps foremost is the conclusion that there simply is insufficient research to ground deterrence-based policies. There are, though, other equally important implications. The chapter argues that, based on CDT, many deterrence-based policies are likely to be ineffective and may increase rather than decrease crime. At the same time, it is likely that deterrence-based policies can be effective, but only under certain conditions. We extend this reasoning to argue that CDT can be used to inform deterrence-based policies in jails and prisons as well as schools.
This chapter discusses the centrality of deterrence to criminological theory and to policy, and then highlights critical shortcomings in classical deterrence theory. It points to critical problems that these shortcomings create, including incomplete or inaccurate understanding of deterrence and ineffective policy. The chapter then describes the motivation for the book, which is to advance theory and policy, the structure of the book, each of the chapters, and recommendations for sequences of chapters readers can follow to pursue their particular interests.
This chapter describes the origins of deterrence theory and problems with the overly narrow conceptualization of deterrence. It discusses the problems within the context of contemporary criminology and criminal justice policy. Many policies rest on weak or inaccurate understanding of deterrence, or are premised on research that has limited generalizability. One example: A great deal of criminal justice policy focuses only on punishment severity as a way of influencing deterrence, but one can increase deterrence in other ways, such as increasing the certainty of punishment or increasing the rewards of non-crime.
“Free will skepticism” refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action – i.e. the free will – required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic free will skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing that life without free will and so-called basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these ways, and might even be beneficial. In this chapter, we attempt to provide a brief sketch of the traditional free will debate, define the various positions, and frame the debate over the practical implications of free will skepticism. We focus especially on the implications of free will skepticism for the criminal law and the retributive justification of punishment.
Most philosophers who have considered legal punishment suppose that penal institutions, either as they exist or at least as they would exist if they lived up to some normative concept of them, can be morally justified. Kant is best known as a subscriber to the first of the justifications of punishment. Kant's insistence on retributivism, that it is a fundamental moral principle or categorical imperative that moral evil deserves punishment is clear enough. Punishment is justified as a form of coercion used to protect right. Kant occasionally tries to present God's providential apportionment of happiness in accordance with worthiness as a case of doing retributive justice. Whatever opinions Kant himself may have held or expressed in favor of retributivism, Kantian ethics is seriously lacking as long as it cannot justify them or even consistently include them.
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