The Introduction introduces the central research questions of the study and summarizes the main arguments. It also lays out the research design and discusses the key concepts and how it measures them. Finally, it provides summaries of all of the chapters in the book.

Chapter 5 shows how the development of strong parties and professional militaries contributed to the emergence of enduring democracies in Chile and Uruguay. Both countries developed strong parties during the late nineteenth century thanks in part to the geographic concentration of the population and the existence of relatively balanced cleavages. During the nineteenth century, these parties at times sought power via armed revolts, but once the military professionalized, the opposition began to focus exclusively on the electoral route to power. This occurred in the late nineteenth century in Chile, but not until the early twentieth century in Uruguay. In both countries, opposition parties pushed for democratic reforms to enfranchise their supporters and level the electoral playing field. It was not until the ruling party split, however, that the opposition managed to enact major reforms, which occurred in Chile in 1890 and Uruguay in 1917. In both countries, strong opposition parties played a central role not only in the enactment of the reforms but also in their enforcement.

Chapter 1 lays out the central theoretical arguments of the book. It argues that three factors played a key role in the emergence of democracy in region: the professionalization of the military, the rise of strong opposition parties, and splits within the ruling party. It analyzes what led to the professionalization of the military and the rise of strong opposition parties and it shows how they led to varying regime outcomes in different South American countries. This chapter also discusses why existing theories of democratization cannot fully explain the emergence of democracy in the region

Chapter 8 examines the failed struggle for democracy in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In contrast to the other South American countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay made relatively little progress in professionalizing their armies in the early twentieth century and were not able to establish a monopoly on violence. As a result, the opposition, especially in Paraguay and Ecuador, continued to seek power via armed revolt, which undermined constitutional rule and encouraged state repression. The weakness of parties in Bolivia and Ecuador also enabled presidents to manipulate elections, resist democratic reforms, and run roughshod over the opposition.

Chapter 6 examines how parties and the military shaped democracy in Argentina and Colombia. Both countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes in the nineteenth century that manipulated elections to remain in power. A strong opposition party, the Radical Civic Union, arose in Argentina in the 1890s and this party initially sought power through armed revolts as well as elections, but the professionalization of the military at the end of the nineteenth century made armed struggle futile. The Radicals pushed for democratic reforms but could not achieve them until a split within the ruling party led dissidents to come to power. After passage of the reforms in 1912, the Radicals won the presidency, but Argentina then lacked a strong opposition party, which undermined democracy in the long run. In Colombia, two strong parties arose during the nineteenth century and whichever party was in the opposition sought power at times via armed revolt. Colombia professionalized its armed forces in the early twentieth century, however, which forced the opposition to abandon the armed struggle. The opposition began to focus on the electoral path to power, but was only able to enact democratic reforms thanks to a split within the ruling party. In the wake of these reforms, Colombian elections became relatively free and fair, but the country's military was not strong enough to contain increasing regional violence, which undermined the country's democracy.

Chapter 7 explores the reasons why Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela experienced relatively stable authoritarianism during the early twentieth century. All three countries professionalized their militaries during this period, which helped bring an end to the frequent revolts that had undermined their prospects for democracy in the nineteenth century. None of the three countries developed strong parties, however. The absence of strong parties impeded democratization in several ways. First, party weakness allowed presidents to concentrate authority and extend their hold on power in some cases. Second, and even more importantly, the weakness of opposition parties meant that the opposition had little chance of winning elections or enacting democratic reforms, particularly in the face of widespread government electoral manipulation. As a result, the opposition frequently abstained from elections, which only deepened authoritarian rule in these countries. In some instances, the opposition also encouraged the military to intervene to overthrow the president, which undermined otherwise mostly stable authoritarian regimes.

Chapter 3 argues that the professionalization of the armed forces played a key role in the emergence of democracy in the region by bringing an end to the opposition revolts that had plagued the region in the nineteenth century. It employs an original database on historical revolts in South America to analyze the evolution of political violence in the region. It shows that revolts were frequent in the nineteenth century and undermined the prospects for democracy by overthrowing elected governments and provoking state repression. Most of these revolts came from opposition groups and other forces outside the state apparatus. At the turn of the century, however, most South American countries professionalized their armed forces with the assistance of foreign missions, which led to a dramatic decline in revolts in the region and helped pave the way for democracy. Nevertheless, a few South American countries failed to take sufficient steps to modernize their militaries and, as a result, they remained highly unstable. A series of regression analyses show that increases in military strength and professionalization are correlated with a decline in outsider revolts, but not insider revolts, during this period.

The Conclusion summarizes the main arguments in the book and discusses to what extent the factors that shaped regime outcomes in the early twentieth century mattered post-1929. It also examines the broader theoretical implications of the book, analyzes the extent to which the arguments work in Mexico and Central America, and lays out an agenda for future research on historical democratization.

In October 1947, just more than two years after the Japanese Empire officially surrendered to the Allies and the most destructive conflict in human history finally ended, the veteran American statesman Henry L. Stimson published an article in Foreign Affairs.1 As the flagship journal of the elite Council on Foreign Relations, it was a natural forum for someone such as Stimson, a former secretary of state and (twice) secretary of war with over four decades of experience at the highest levels of American government, to share some of their ideas.2 In his piece, entitled “The Challenge to Americans,” Stimson outlined what he felt were the opportunities and struggles the United States faced in the aftermath of World War II.3 He opened with a declaration: Americans faced “a challenging opportunity, perhaps the greatest ever offered to a single nation. It is nothing less than a chance to use our full strength for the peace and freedom of the world.”

This chapter examines how US officials responded to their ultimately unsuccessful attempts to shape Anglo-American grand strategy during 1942 by changing their approach to these debates in 1943. It argues that War Department civilian and military officials led this effort by overhauling US strategic planning processes and forcefully criticizing British strategy and policy as antithetical to American political objectives. Army planners tactically used their position within the US foreign policy process to craft a hostile narrative about British military aims to shape how their superiors approached US–UK strategy formation and to prioritize their own conceptions of America’s geopolitical ambitions. These efforts hardened US officials’ determination to advance Washington’s wartime goals above London’s and helped forge a strong level of political coordination between the War Department and the JCS for ensuring this occurred. The result was that American defense officials were able to convince President Roosevelt to back their strategic views and to shun Britain’s Mediterranean approach for defeating Germany.

It is difficult to overstate the horrors unleashed by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. While it has been challenging over the decades to determine the precise number of casualties, it is probably safe to say the number is in the hundreds of thousands.1 Those who were not instantly obliterated in the attacks had to face exposure to the blasts, extreme heat, nuclear fallout, radiation poisoning, and the complete and utter destruction of their cities. Some survivors experienced life-threatening health problems stemming from these weapons months, years, or even decades after the bombings, including organ failure, transgenerational genetic damage, and multiple types of cancer. Journalists such as John Hersey and Charles H. Loeb helped reveal these devastations to millions of people who could hardly fathom them.2 Stimson himself was badly shaken by the reports he received in the bombings’ aftermath. He told members of the Ausable Club in upstate New York days after the nuclear strikes that the war had “compelled” America “to invent and unleash forces of terrific destructiveness.

This compendium of essential works clarifies that the Australian Army’s force structure is organic and constantly changing. It provides a starting point for quickly acquiring new capabilities at short notice when required to meet emerging threats and challenges. The Army’s response to realising government direction and investment in new capabilities is being examined via a series of options under the Army Objective Force. It involves a careful and deliberate program of analysis that will provide a framework to develop the Army of the future. Readers can be assured that the Australian Army’s future is informed through understanding of its past – understanding that is provided to the Army’s planners today through contributions such as this.

As a response to antisemitic stereotypes of Jews as weak and brainy, Zionism wanted Jews to develop their muscles instead. It was a useful call that coincided with the need to literally build the Jewish home in Palestine from the ground up. The agricultural development of land and the construction of villages and towns on it provided ample opportunities for Jews to become the kind of muscular Jews Zionism fantasized about. Later, when the Arab resistance to Jewish settlement grew, Jewish farmers developed into soldiers as well and completed the transformation of Jews.

Southeast Asia seems locked endlessly in a boom-and-bust cycle of democratizing, then regressing, then democratizing again. This review of the history of democracy and autocracy in Southeast Asia underscores three themes. First, Southeast Asia reminds us that support for democracy is always contingent. The chapter shows how readily factors such as political polarization and the failure of democracy to deliver on its promises can produce receptive audiences, if not full-on partners, for aspiring autocrats. Second, the chapter explore the ways in which institutions can keep autocratic sympathizers in the wings or in the game, and how institutional reforms, particularly those that seek greater political openness and broader empowerment, can, under some circumstances, stoke political divisions and provide fodder for these reactionary forces. Importantly, the chapter suggests, formal liberalization may elevate antidemocratic impulses, in ways that should by now be anticipated (by scholars, democracy promoters, policymakers). Finally, it is noted how seldom pro-democracy forces, even when present and active, command center-stage – though when they do, their influence can be powerful.

In the Introduction, we define a coup d’état as the unconstitutional replacement of the incumbent executive by military officers or civilians supported by the armed forces, an act that is often accompanied by the suspension of civil guarantees and liberties as well as the nullification of legislative power. We then provide an overview of the economic underpinnings of twentieth-century Latin America and describe the main characteristics of the Cold War in the subcontinent (from the role of the US to the impact of Cuba’s integration into the socialist bloc, from the changing role of the military as an institution to the Doctrine of National Security). We examine the role of the Catholic Church, one of the key actors during this period, in political stability. We close by offering two possible ways to read this book, taking advantage of the comparative framework that its structure offers. Our collective goal in this volume is to explain the end of an era – the Cold War – that conditioned the subcontinent’s transition to democratic regimes, regardless of whether subsequent governments have slanted neoliberal or neo-populist.

On March 11, 1973, after seven years of de facto government, Argentina celebrated its return to democracy in an electoral act that seemed to announce a new era. Although the alternation between the military and civilians was not unprecedented, two things led many to assume that coups were being left behind forever. First, after years of proscription, clean elections had led the Peronist movement to the government. Second, the new leader, after eighteen years of exile, was the founder of that movement, Juan Perón. “They’re leaving and never coming back!” – referring to the military – was the chant with which demonstrators celebrated the transfer of power and change of regime. Less than three years later, however, on March 24, 1976, a new military coup broke the constitutional order, with no resistance from either the armed forces or civil sectors. This chapter analyzes the main causes, internal and external, that enabled the military’s return to power. Based on the role played by the most relevant political and social actors, the chapter explains the conditions that made it possible for what was considered buried in 1973 to appear as the only way out in 1976, at least to numerous civil sectors.