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  • Chapter 10 - The Kantian Legal Relation as Radical Non-Positivism

  • from Part IV - External Freedom and Kantian Legal Philosophy
  • Edited by Martin Brecher, Universität Mannheim, Germany, Philipp-Alexander Hirsch, Max Planck Institute, Freiburg
  • Book:
    Law and Morality in Kant
    Published online:
    16 December 2025
    Print publication:
    22 January 2026, pp 195-219
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  • Summary

    The chapter suggests that Kant’s relational account of legal obligation enables us to push the boundaries of non-positivism beyond any established legal practices. The first part fleshes out the demands of a radical version of non-positivism whose main characteristic is that it regards legal practices as non-necessary grounds of the demands of external freedom (legal obligations). The second part focuses on the use of Kant’s Universal Principle of Right (UPR) to underpin radical non-positivism. It proposes a relational reading of UPR according to which the independence of persons, as the central demand of external or juridical freedom, cannot be understood outside the relations of interdependence into which they enter in social life. In conclusion, the proposed reading of Kantian right complements and reinforces a radical version of non-positivism which places centre stage pre-institutional relations as foundational ingredients of the external freedom of persons (relations-first non-positivism). The key claim of the chapter is that Kantian right supports a relations-first account of legal obligation.