In August 1989, on the occasion of the bicentennial of the French Revolution, Le Monde published an interview with Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. In that interview Thatcher, in France at the time as an honored guest of French President François Mitterrand, asserted that claims that the notion of subjective rights originated with the French Revolution, and specifically with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of August 1789, are nonsense. The socialist French Prime Minister Michel Rocard criticized Thatcher vocally, and her arrival at the bicentennial celebrations was met with jeers, yet many historians today would agree with her, whatever their preferred origin point(s) for a concept of subjective rights. What is more controversial is Thatcher’s alternative account of the origins of the notion of subjective rights: to her, they had been invented by the Greeks, and were already foundational to Athenian democracy.

This chapter addresses what states can do, and what powers international organizations can have

The book concludes with situating the EAEU legal order within the indicia developed in Chapter 1 demonstrating whether and how these are fulfilled for the autonomous legal order to emerge. There are certainly some manifestations thereof, such as the Court’s move to recognize and incorporate the discourse of major doctrines relevant for legal order autonomy. Nevertheless, it has troubles demonstrating some of the indicia, and the power struggle between the Member States and EAEU institutions has resulted in limitations, particularly running the risk of misapplication of Union law and fragmentation of the legal system, as well as endangering the ability of the legal order for self-maintenance. While this leads to ‘fragile autonomy’, there are embedded premises, which can help in overcoming this, if such a desire prevails. The book spells out some concrete ways to do so.

What accounts for the fact that some physical events occur while others do not? This is a question of physical modality. Three models in contemporary analytic metaphysics have dominated the investigation of physical modality: the Neo-Humean Model, the Universals Model, and the Powers Model. Each model aims to explain, in ontologically conspicuous ways, the unfolding of possibilities in space and time. This chapter explains the Neo-Humean and Universals Models, then shows that while they explicitly deny a place for powers in their fundamental ontologies, they nonetheless implicate powers. That is, they subtly assume the reality of powers. As a result, the Powers Model is the way to go in explaining physical modality. However, there are different ways of conceiving powers. After describing variations of the Powers Model, the chapter returns to the main question posed in the introductory chapter: What is the nature of powers from the inside? Stricter attention to the internality of powers is necessary to better understand the Powers Model and its metaphysical commitments.

This chapter introduces the two main questions that this book attempts to answer. First: Why powers? Second: What are powers like? It also discusses the overlap between metaphysics and science, some differences between powers and qualities, the relationship between properties and substances, how we can know powers, and different types of powers isms. The chapter then distinguishes between networking and nodal accounts of powers before previewing the central idea of the book: the 3d account of powers (a nodal account), which combines two core theses. The first is the Physical Intentionality Thesis, which concerns the fact of physical intentionality: that the power is directed toward manifestations. The second is the Informational Thesis, which concerns the content of physical intentionality: what the power is for or directed toward. Lastly, a roadmap for the rest of the book is provided.

This chapter explores possible differences between powerful qualities and pure powers, argues for the Pure Powers Model, and discusses the problem of being for pure powers. It is argued that powerful qualities are modally indistinguishable from pure powers but have a denser nature. Since pure powers are ontologically simpler than powerful qualities yet equally explanatorily relevant to modality, we should reject powerful qualities. After rejecting the Powerful Qualities Model, the reality of pure powers is defended. If pure powers are to provide a stable basis for physical modality, the problem of their being or grounding during periods of nonmanifestation needs resolution. It is argued that pure powers are self-grounded. A regress argument advanced by Stathis Psillos, which challenges the self-grounding of pure powers, is deflected. Lastly, Point Theory is developed to explain the self-grounding of pure powers.

This chapter analyses the path leading the Union to shift from a liberal approach to a democratic constitutional strategy to address the consolidation of platforms powers. This chapter aims to explain the reasons for this paradigmatic shift looking at content and data as the two paradigmatic areas to examine the rise of a new phase of European digital constitutionalism. This chapter focuses on three phases: digital liberalism, judicial activism and digital constitutionalism. The first part of this chapter frames the first steps taken by the Union in the phase of digital liberalism at the end of the last century. The second part analyses the role of judicial activism in moving the attention from fundamental freedoms to fundamental rights online in the aftermath of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The third part examines the shift in the approach of the Union towards a constitutional democratic strategy and the consolidation of European digital constitutionalism.

International organizations perform activities in areas in which states can no longer operate effectively in isolation, and in which there is a common interest in cooperation within a permanent international framework. This chapter will examine international organizations primarily from a legal perspective. The chapter aims to present a general overview of the law of international organizations. It discusses the legal status, privileges, and immunities of international organizations. The chapter further deals with membership issues, powers, and institutional structures. The chapter also looks at decisions of international organizations: the way in which they are taken and the different types of decisions. The chapter will briefly examine the finances of international organizations. There has been an exponential increase in activities of international organizations over the years. Not all of these activities have been successful, however, and there have been failures and wrongdoings. In recent years, a much-debated issue is the extent to which international organizations and/or their members may be held responsible for such failures and wrongdoings.

International organizations perform activities in areas in which states can no longer operate effectively in isolation, and in which there is a common interest in cooperation within a permanent international framework. This chapter will examine international organizations primarily from a legal perspective. The chapter aims to present a general overview of the law of international organizations. It discusses the legal status, privileges, and immunities of international organizations. The chapter further deals with membership issues, powers, and institutional structures. The chapter also looks at decisions of international organizations: the way in which they are taken and the different types of decisions. The chapter will briefly examine the finances of international organizations. There has been an exponential increase in activities of international organizations over the years. Not all of these activities have been successful, however, and there have been failures and wrongdoings. In recent years, a much-debated issue is the extent to which international organizations and/or their members may be held responsible for such failures and wrongdoings.

In this chapter, I consider whether we can solve the problem of negative action by insisting that intentional omissions, refrainments, and the like aren’t really actions at all, but ‘mere manifestations of agency’. I argue that the distinction between actions and mere manifestations of agency is more difficult to draw than it may appear, and that drawing such a distinction requires us to abandon plausible claims about the relations between powers and their manifestations, and between intentional behaviour and practical reasons. We must find some other solution to the problem.

This chapter addresses what states can do, and what powers international organizations can have