In this chapter, we argue that human flourishing and the virtues are constitutive norms of human agency, thereby grounding virtue ethics in action theory. Building on Chapter 1’s critique of the Market Failure Approach, we argue that human action cannot be understood solely through instrumental rationality, as Humeans maintain. Instead, we contend that human flourishing – the harmonious pursuit of intrinsically valuable goods – is the constitutive aim of agency. Since the cardinal virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and practical wisdom are essential to achieving flourishing, they function as constitutive standards of action. We show how practical wisdom enables agents to apply virtue concepts in concrete situations, unifying the demands of diverse virtues and resolving conflicts between incommensurable goods. Responding to critics of virtue ethics, including Kantians and situationists, we defend a substantive conception of practical reason that is sensitive to context. This chapter lays the foundation for the market virtues framework developed in Chapter 3 and throughout the book by articulating how agents flourish in market contexts – through virtuous, mutually beneficial exchange.

This chapter introduces and explains the concept of market virtues – role-differentiated traits that enable agents to act well in market contexts – by building on the neo-Aristotelian framework introduced in Chapter 2. In response to the practical limitations of the Market Failure Approach (MFA), we elaborate the ideal of eudaimonic efficiency, which defines good transactions as those that enhance human flourishing without unjustly harming others. While cardinal virtues like justice and practical wisdom remain essential, they must be adapted to the unique norms of market institutions. We argue that market virtues such as honesty, trustworthiness, respect, and competitiveness not only mitigate market failures but also facilitate mutual benefit in ways that go beyond the MFA’s imperatives. Drawing on the work of Bruni and Sugden (2008; 2013), we defend markets as sites of moral formation, countering critics who view them as corrosive to virtue. We also address concerns about instrumentalism and the adversarial nature of markets. Ultimately, we argue that market virtues are both necessary for sustaining eudaimonic efficiency and constitutive of human flourishing within a market society, enabling individuals to constitute themselves as agents through virtuous participation in economic life.

This manifesto argues that by combining student voice, agency and practical wisdom, or phronēsis, a more equitable and just educational system can be created that supports students’ empowerment as leaders of transformative change who can make well-informed, values-based judgements. Practical wisdom is the ability to make well-informed decisions based on knowledge, experience and ethical values. The manifesto recommends specific actions in support of this, such as reevaluating curriculum goals; availing students of different types of knowledge, capacities and reasoning; and establishing environments that promote collaboration and reflection. It aims to inspire educators to nurture children to be better decision makers and collaborative problem solvers. It concludes that despite the challenges facing the world today, the voices of children and young people offer hope, and that we must listen to them.

This chapter critically evaluates the Market Failure Approach (MFA) to business ethics, focusing on two fundamental challenges it faces in real-world economic contexts: the theory of the second best and the ubiquity of negative externalities. While the MFA offers a simple, rule-based framework based on the concept of Pareto efficiency, we argue that its efficiency imperatives are often inapplicable or indeterminate in real-word market settings. Drawing on a neo-Aristotelian perspective, we contend that ethical formation and practical wisdom are essential for navigating these complexities. The chapter introduces eudaimonic efficiency as a more realistic and morally adequate ideal of market activity, one that emphasizes human flourishing and justice, rather than Pareto efficiency. The ideal of eudaimonic efficiency reframes the moral purpose of markets as enabling voluntary exchanges that enhance well-being without unjust harm. We show how the application of market norms inevitably requires virtues like honesty, justice, and practical wisdom, challenging the MFA’s aspiration to rule-based moral guidance. By embedding market ethics in a framework of virtue and formation, we lay the groundwork for a richer theory of market morality, developed throughout the book.

‘Truth’ refers to reality – what is, was, will be, and should be – and its aspects, in the context of representations thereof. A true something is the real thing, and a true proposition, belief, hypothesis, exemplar, and so forth is a successful representation of truth in the first sense. The virtue of truthfulness is the judicious love of truth in both senses. From love of reality and correct representations of it, the truthful person tends to tell others the truth as she sees it, but is not fanatical about telling it, because virtues like justice, compassion, and gentleness, which themselves are a kind of truth, can enjoin the withholding or even distortion of truths. Truths can be horrible, and it can take courage and humility to admit them.

Temperance is a condition of a person’s physical appetites (for food, drink, and sexual contact) in which those appetites themselves conform to a rational standard. Temperance is possible for human beings because of the sophistication with which we can conceptualize the objects of our appetites and because an appetite’s object is internal to the appetite’s identity. A salmon steak construed as poisoned appeals to our appetite (and thus affects the pleasure of satisfying it) differently than one construed as healthful. Temperance differs from self-control, which doesn’t involve a conformity of the appetites themselves, but imposes rational control on unmodified appetites. The rational standard for temperance is the human good, which is the object of the virtues of caring. Thus, the temperate person’s physical appetites are such that, without being controlled, they fit the person to participate in an order of peace.

Practical wisdom is caring understanding of the good in the situations of a human life. Our emotions are rational to the extent that we care about the real good and are truthful about the facts. The two main kinds of virtues – the virtues of caring and the enkratic virtues – embody different aspects of practical wisdom. On the one side, in compassion, generosity, justice, and sense of duty, we care about and understand our good in its varieties and aspects. On the other side, we know about and know our practical way around ourselves, our shortcomings and the ways they may be mitigated and repaired by use of courage, patience, perseverance, and self-control. The virtues of caring form a coherent ensemble and overall picture of the good, a practical wisdom by which we see our situations in the perspective of a whole life.

This chapter argues that because judging inevitably requires the exercise of judgment, one of our most critical concerns should be ensuring that the people we select as judges have good judgment. It explores what good judgment might mean and draws on work in both law and philosophy exploring the nature of judicial character. It further explores two components of judicial character, specifically practical wisdom and intellectual humility, and in the case of the latter, surveys a growing body of work in philosophy and psychology that investigates humility’s nature and benefits. It briefly outlines ways in which a renewed emphasis on judicial character might be implemented.

This chapter discusses the contextualization of human traits in situations. Most of the research on contextualizing traits has, up to now, been centered on personality traits. Therefore, much of the examination is on how personality traits relate to situations, but it extrapolates those findings to virtues and discusses theory and research related to the contextualization of virtue traits. In the exploration of trait contextualization, the chapter clarifies that current understandings of traits do not take them to be simplistic behavioral tendencies that manifest despite contextual influences. Instead, the contemporary understanding of traits is that they are virtually always influenced by situational factors. It explores direct situational influence on action, the ways individuals influence situations, and three types of person–situation interactions. It then presents practical wisdom as a generally neglected feature of person-situation interactions. The chapter argues that practical wisdom's role in person–situation interactions goes beyond what shows up in personality research by clarifying that some individuals see more opportunities for virtue trait expression in situations than others. Moreover, this practical wisdom underwrites high-quality decision-making. It concludes by discussing how a virtue perspective adds important elements (agency, aspiration, and practical wisdom) to the contextualization of traits.

Empirical virtue researchers have not generally relied on robust virtue theory. Without a unifying theory of virtue, scientific studies have developed without guidance, and the result is a patchwork of relatively disconnected studies of specific virtues based on ad hoc assumptions about those virtues. Therefore, this chapter presents an ecumenical, realistic virtue theory as a conceptual foundation for empirical research in virtue science. It suggests that moral virtues are (1) acquired traits that are (2) manifested in behavior, (3) steered by knowledge, and (4) fully motivated. The virtue theory presented is inspired by philosophic work (primarily Aristotle and Confucius), but it does not engage in the contentious debates active in philosophical approaches to virtue, leaving aside the debates about the nature and importance of ideal human virtue and focusing on the ordinary virtues that are often ascribed to people who are morally good. We also discuss the important role of culture in virtue definition. Finally, we outline the four components of virtue: (1) behavior, (2) cognition, (3) emotion/motivation, and (4) practical wisdom.

This chapter discusses the field of moral development and explores what this research field can tell us about virtue development, which is a relatively neglected topic in virtue theory. The chapter is primarily about moral development in children, both because there is substantial scientific interest in this population and because virtue development must begin in childhood. Moral development research illuminates three apparently naturally developing preconditions for virtue development: (1) the ability to choose, (2) an interest in collective welfare, and (3) an interest in ethical normativity. Moral development research is also compatible with the STRIVE-4 Model in that it is primarily quantitative. Moral development generally does not focus on traits, with the exception of some research on moral identity, moral emotions, and moral exemplars. The chapter concludes by exploring how virtue science can contribute to moral development research, including an increased emphasis on (1) person-centered research, (2) the contextualizing of development in situations and roles, (3) flourishing, and (4) practical wisdom.

This chapter outlines several threads of personality psychology to explore what it can tell us about virtue science. Personality psychology includes structural approaches (e.g., Big 5 and HEXACO), process approaches (e.g., the Cognitive-Affective Processing System or CAPS), integrations of structural and process approaches (e.g., Whole Trait Theory and the Three-Tiered Framework of Personality), and an emerging focus on systematic changes in personality through the lifespan. This research has clarified that traits exist and are measurable, that traits relate predictably to meaningful outcomes, that informant reports correlate to self-reports on personality, and that personality emerges cross-culturally. CAPS was developed to account for situational variation in personality expression. The systematic developmental changes in personality suggest that individuals mature as they adopt important roles in life, such as work and mating relationships. The integrative approaches to personality highlight its multidimensional nature and make it reasonable to consider merging the study of personality and virtue. The chapter concludes by arguing that virtues and personality dimensions are sufficiently different because virtue science emphasizes morality, choice, and practical wisdom, whereas personality theory and research do not. It suggests that traits may be best understood as a genus with at least two species: personality and virtue.

Chapter summarizes how the limited available research on our proposed four components of virtue (behavior, knowledge, motivation/emotion, and practical wisdom) has been generally consistent with STRIVE-4 Model predictions. Observed behavior and motivation/emotion have been studied to some extent, but little research has evaluated virtue knowledge or practical wisdom. Like other areas of virtue scholarship, these four components are often studied in isolation, preventing a holistic understanding of virtues. Although the available evidence is consistent with these four components, the chapter suggests that an important step forward in virtue science is integrating the four components for a more complete understanding of virtue. To connect virtue science with neurophysiology, the chapter concludes by highlighting the limited work on the interface of virtue and neurophysiology.

This chapter discusses the contextualization of human traits in social roles. It begins by exploring how personality traits relate to social roles, then it extrapolates those findings related to virtues and discusses theory and research on social roles and virtue traits. The discussion of the social role contextualization is based on identity theory, which explains that social roles are repetitive patterns of action that are included in social structures and result in role identity formation in the individual. The chapter reiterates that up-to-date trait conceptualizations do not view them as simplistic behavioral tendencies that manifest in any social role. Instead, traits are currently understood as influenced by social role expectations. Practical wisdom plays a large part in the expression of virtues through social roles. Practical wisdom adds an element to virtue expression and social roles that is absent in personality research because some individuals see more opportunities for virtue trait expression within a role than others. It then clarifies this theoretical discussion with examples of common role and virtue enactments from the parenting, teaching, and healing roles. It concludes by discussing how a virtue perspective adds important elements (agency, aspiration, and practical wisdom) to the contextualization of traits.

The first commonly held thesis that prevents solving the Conjunctive Problem is the Divergence Thesis, according to which Aristotle thinks that it is possible to possess theoretical wisdom and reliably manifest it in contemplation without possessing practical wisdom and reliably manifesting it in ethically virtuous activities. This thesis, though widely endorsed on the basis of a single passage, is false. The apparent support provided by that passage fades away on closer inspection. Once freed from the restrictive grip of the usual interpretation, we are prepared to understand Aristotles distinctive account of the motivations of intellectually virtuous agents. His account invites us to revisit assumptions about what the ideal epistemic agent looks like that have figured prominently in recent experimental philosophy.

This chapter outlines contemporary research related to excellent and inadequate leadership. This research reveals some practical problems arising in leadership research and identifies important psychological issues that contribute to bad or toxic leadership. The concept of wisdom, including practical wisdom, is elaborated as an effective and ethical foundation of leadership theory and practice. Central to practical wisdom are wise reasoning and the ability to do things wisely, including doing leadership wisely. There is a discussion of issues related to developing wisdom generally, and then specifically in leaders and potential leaders. The chapter fills a gap in understanding how to develop wisdom in people so that they act wisely. The chapter will give you some ideas on how to develop your wisdom potential. Finally, we will discuss the implications of our views on leadership and wisdom before concluding with reflections on why we keep appointing/ voting for bad leaders.